Johnson v. State Clerk\u27s Record v. 7 Dckt. 38769 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-20-2011
Johnson v. State Clerk's Record v. 7 Dckt. 38769
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. State Clerk's Record v. 7 Dckt. 38769" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3992.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3992
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Supreme Court No. 
Petitioner/Appellant , 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
38769-2011 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Dennis A. Benjamin 
ATIORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
mey for Petitioner/Appellant 
* *. * * * * * • 
STATE A TIORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
Attorney for Respondent 
VOLUME 7 of 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Supreme Court No. 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
38769-2011 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine. 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Dennis A. Benjamin 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
Attorney for Respondent 
VOLUME 7 of 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Petitioner's Filing Memorandum 12-2-10 1649 
Memorandum Decision Granting Respondent's Motion 12-3-10 1665 
for Reconsideration 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-6-10 1673 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-6-10 1675 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-6-10 1677 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Petitioner's Memorandum Dismissing Claim 12-6-10 1679 
Order RE: Cameras in the Courtroom 12-7-10 1681 
Court Minutes 12-7-10 1683 
Court Minutes 12-8-10 1688 
Court Minutes 12-9-10 1692 
Court Minutes 12-10-10 1697 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-10-10 1700 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Motion for Order to Prepare Transcript of Post- 12-14-10 1702 
Conviction Relief Hearing at County Cost 
Order to Prepare Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief 12-15-10 1705 
Hearing at County Cost 
Motion for Order to Transport Petitioner to Pocatello 12-15-10 1706 
Women's Correctional Center 
Order to Transport Petitioner to Pocatello Women's 12-15-10 1709 
Correctional Center 
TABLE OF CONTENTS--1 
Petitioner's Filing Memorandum 12-21-10 1710 
Order Regarding Post-Trial Briefing and Citations to the 1-13-11 1716 
Record 
Stipulation and Order Relating to Briefing Schedule 1-27-11 1722 
Respondent's Post-Evidentiary Hearing Proposed 2-14-11 1724 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 2-14-11 1766 
of Law & Order 
Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Proposed Findings 2-28-11 1795 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Response to Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and 2-28-11 1806 
Conclusions of Law & Order 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 4-5-11 1835 
Judgment 4-8-11 1929 
Notice of Appeal 4-29-11 1931 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public 4-29-11 1935 
Defender 
Order for Appointment of State Appellate Public 5-3-11 1937 
Defender 
Motion for Order to Pay for Clerk's Record and 5-4-11 1939 
Transcript on Appeal at County Cost 
Order for Blaine County to Pay for Clerk's Record and 5-5-11 1942 
Transcript on Appeal 
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Supporting 5-26-11 1943 
Affidavit 
Notice of Reporter's Transcript Lodged 6-6-11 1950 
Exhibit List 1952 
TABLE OF CONTENTS--2 
Clerk's Certificate 
Certificate of Service 
TABLE OF CONTENTS--3 
1955 
1956 
INDEX 
Certificate of Service 1956 
Clerk's Certificate 1955 
Court Minutes 12-7-10 1683 
Court Minutes 12-8-10 1688 
Court Minutes 12-9-10 1692 
Court Minutes 12-10-10 1697 
Exhibit List 1952 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 4-5-11 1835 
Judgment 4-8-11 1929 
Memorandum Decision Granting Respondent's Motion 12-3-10 1665 
for Reconsideration 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public 4-29-11 1935 
Defender 
Motion for Order to Pay for Clerk's Record and 5-4-11 1939 
Transcript on Appeal at County Cost 
Motion for Order to Prepare Transcript of Post- 12-14-10 1702 
Conviction Relief Hearing at County Cost 
Motion for Order to Transport Petitioner to Pocatello 12-15-10 1706 
Women's Correctional Center 
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Supporting 5-26-11 1943 
Affidavit 
Notice of Appeal 4-29-11 1931 
Notice of Reporter's Transcript Lodged 6-6-11 1950 
INDEX--1 
Order for Appointment of State Appellate Public 5-3-11 1937 
Defender 
Order for Blaine County to Pay for Clerk's Record and 5-5-11 1942 
Transcript on Appeal 
Order RE: Cameras in the Courtroom 12-7-10 1681 
Order Regarding Post-Trial Briefing and Citations to the 1-13-11 1716 
Record 
Order to Prepare Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief 12-15-10 1705 
Hearing at County Cost 
Order to Transport Petitioner to Pocatello Women's 12-15-10 1709 
Correctional Center 
Petitioner's Filing Memorandum 12-2-10 1649 
Petitioner's Filing Memorandum 12-21-10 1710 
Petitioner's Memorandum Dismissing Claim 12-6-10 1679 
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 2-14-11 1766 
of Law & Order 
Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Proposed Findings 2-28-11 1795 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-6-10 1673 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-6-10 1675 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-6-10 1677 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Request and Order to Obtain Approval to Video Record, 12-10-10 1700 
Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
Respondent's Post-Evidentiary Hearing Proposed 2-14-11 1724 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
INDEX--2 
Response to Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law & Order 
Stipulation and Order Relating to Briefing Schedule 
INDEX--3 
2-28-11 1806 
1-27-11 1722 
!l 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
FI LED A.M. I f 1/ P.M. -iJ,.f.!-' 
DEC 02 2010 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
FAX 2087882300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
), 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________ ~R=e=sp~o=n=de=n~t ___________ ) 
Case No: CV -006-324 
PETITIONER'S FILING 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached documents in the above-
styled matter: Subpoena and Affidavit of Service for Officer Ross Kirtley; Subpoena and 
Affidavit of Service for Julia Dupuis; Subpoena and Affidavit of Service Conseula 
Cedeno; Subpoena and Affidavit of Service Jane Lopez. 
EY AT LAW 
C STOPHER P. SIMMS DATED 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was delivered to 
the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica 
Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; 
The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 
208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail 
---
Hand Deliver 
---
__ /_Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 2 \vY 
11129/2010 
SARAH M JOHNSON 
-VS-
STATE OF IDAHO 
BLAINE COUNTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SHERIFF'S RETURN ON SUBPOENA - SHERIFF'S# 1015063 
RECEIVED BY SHERIFF ON 11/17/2010 
I CERTIFY THAT I SERVED A COpy OF THE SUBPOENA TO 
OFFICER ROSS KIRTLEY 
ON 11124/2010 @ 11 :20 HRS, 
ROSS KIRTLEY 
700 W JEFFERSON STREET #228 
BOISE, ID 83720 
CV20060324 
I RETURN THE SERVED SUBPOENA AND ASSESS MY FEES OF: $55.00 PAID 
BY ADVANCE FEES. 
GAF-Y RANEY, SHERIFF 
AD~Cf Y'.~ B#" ;,. , 
LL Y ADAMS 4485 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS-ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1861 
HAILEY, 10 83333 
1/4254/ 44\tvs l 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
-VS-
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
ADA COUNTY SHERlFF'S OFFICE 
CIVIL SECTION 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
BLAINE COUNTY -FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT CASE NO: CV20060324 
SHERIFF'S CASE NO 1015063 
SERVE TO: Officer Ross Kirtley 
ADDRESS: 700 W JEFFERSON STREET #228 BOISE, ID 83720 
I, _----'r:;'--~__'_\ l-'4-_~--'-' -= .:;.-_~S"--___ , CERTIFY THAT I PERSONALLY 
(DEPUTY'SPRINTED NAME) 
SERVED A COpy OF THE 
• SUBPOENA 
TO: -::-::--~ __ 0-=b-==~ ___ '_\ ~_. ,_VC_\-.:-\ __ -t--____ --__ 
(NAME OF INDIVIDUAL RECEI ING DOCUMENTS) ). 
AT: (Q 0 lJu :-:s- -e C ~. ~22~ ~ (~ 
(ADDRESS) 
ON: II [ .-z.. '*"1 L 0 AT: _-----Lrt_7~ _ _ 
(DATE) (TIME) ~ 
_-1:--'-1<--,-\ _4l...-Q--=-.,~~-=--__"~=____ __ ADA#: _m_S_ 
(SIGNATURE) 
ORIGINAUl/3l, 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ R~es~p=o=nd~e=n=t,~ __________ ) 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: OFFICER ROSS KIRTLEY 
700 W. Jefferson Street, #228 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this I -) day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA (tt<SQ 
SUBPOENA 
11/30/2010 
SARAH M JOHNSON 
-VS-
STATE OF IDAHO 
BLAINE COUNTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SHERIFF'S RETURN ON SUBPOENA - SHERIFF'S# 1015457 
RECEIVED BY SHERIFF ON 11/24/2010 
I CERTIFY THAT I SERVED A COpy OF THE SUBPOENA TO 
JULIA DUPUIS 
ON 11130/2010 @ 12:39 HRS, 
JULIA DUPUIS 
4522 W BEACON LIGHT 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
CV20060324 
I RETURN THE SERVED SUBPOENA AND ASSESS MY FEES OF: $55.00 PAID 
BY ADVANCE FEES. 
ADA CO TY, IDAH 
GARY RA~Y' SHERIFF 
BY .-'A.<" L",) J:;tlV 
DEPUTY LEANN WALTON 4196 
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS-ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1861 STE 303 
HAILEY, ID 83333 
1/4254/4196 \lttJt;; 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
-VS-
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
CIVIL SECTION 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
BLAINE COUNTY -FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT CASE NO: CV20060324 
SHERIFF'S CASE NO 1015457 
SERVE TO: Julia Dupuis 
ADDRESS: 4522 W BEACON LIGHT ROAD EAGLE, ID 83616 
I, _......!L:::..=.."e.....,a.""""'--'Y"\'-L!.(""..~_\N-"-'tL!4.,.""""-'\_k~'--'--""--_" CERTIFY THAT I PERSONALLY 
(DEPUTY'S PRINTED NAME) 
SERVED A COpy OF THE 
• SUBPOENA 
TO: ;:ru,\) C& ~u. \..5 
(NAME OF INDIVIDUAL CEIVING DOCUMENTS) 
AT: LJs a?. \N. B-e~ L~\v+ t~lQ. 
(ADDRESS) 
ON: II 130 1'0 AT: 1dc3Cf 
~DA1E) (TIME) 
 (.;J~ ADA#: 4\% 
(SIGNATURE) 
ORIGINAL fA \\t"5~ 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
• _ f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, SUBPOENA 
________ ~R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~ __________ ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Julia Dupuis 
1-166 RivCI vicl"C Dtive 
Dclle~e, leah\"} 83313 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this \ ~ day of November, 2010. 
ACSO CIIJIL '10N01J24PM 2:18 
SUBPOENA 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY:_-1~~~~~~~\­
Deputy Clerk 
SUBPOENA 
AMERICAN EAGLE INC., BAIL BONDS 
Rick Filkins, President 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Blaine County, Fifth Judicial District 
Case No. CV -2006-0324 
SERVED TO: Consuela Cedeno a.k.a Maria Cedeno 
ADDRESS: 820 Silverstar Drive, Hailey Idaho 83333 
DATE: December 1,2010 at 9:08 p.m. 
I, Rick Filkins, certify that I personally served the above named individual at the above location 
on the above date and time, with the following document(s): 
4. Subpoena for Consuela Cedeno 
Rick Filkins 
Dated this 2nd day of December, 2010 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
-~,-.~~~ 
'"t" \' 
... \~ .. 
, ~~-.-. -" ~~-'--"'-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ R~es~p~o~n~de=n=t,L_ __________ ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Consuelo Cedeno 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
Physical Address Unknown 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you maybe held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this \s day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA 
"... . .,.- .-._-
CLERK OF THE ISTRI~;:9URT 
cct~TY~rr 
By:. ________ --I-~__+_. 
Deputy Clerk 
SUBPOENA 
. AMERICAN EAGLE INC., BAIL BONDS 
Rick Filkins, President 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Blaine County, Fifth Judicial District 
Case No. CV -2006-0324 
SERVED TO: Jane Lopez 
ADDRESS: 820 Silverstar Drive, Hailey Idaho 83333 
DATE: December 1,2010 at 9:08 p.m. 
I, Rick Filkins, certify that I personally served the above named individual at the above location 
on the above date and time, with the following document(s): 
• Subpoena for Jane Lopez 
Rick Filkins 
Dated this 2nd day of December, 2010 
ISSUED 
DATE_ I I - I)" ~- (.b----._ .. :'~~.~) 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 2087882300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ R~es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~ __________ ) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Jane Lopez 
Case No: CV-2006-0324 
SUBPOENA 
Physical Address Unknown 
'"'" . :..:... 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to 
testify in the above case; 
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls 
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary 
hearing. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or 
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in 
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this 
subpoena. 
Dated this (S day of November, 2010. 
SUBPOENA l~~ 
SUBPOENA 2 \ {JuJ-\ 
FI LED ~ .. ~. \1/\' , 
DEC - 3 2010 
Jolynn Drage, District 
Goult Blaine Cal ty, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON, ) 
) Case No. CV 2006-0324 
Petitioner, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. ) GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
) MOTION FOR 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) RECONSIDERATION 
) 
ResEondent. ) 
THIS MATTER is before the court on the respondent, State of Idaho's 
Motion for Reconsideration. The court heard oral argument on the motion on 
November 8, 2010. The petitioner was not present, but she was represented by 
her counsel, Christopher P. Simms. The respondent was represented by Jessica 
M. Lorello. The court took the matter under advisement subsequent to the 
hearing. The record was supplemented with the Affidavit of Jason Pintler, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
Direct Appeal Co-Counsel. Based upon that affidavit, and the standard of proof 
required of the petitioner, the court hereby GRANTS the respondent's motion for 
reconsideration as to the petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. 
The claim will be dismissed. 
ANALYSIS 
The respondent, State of Idaho (hereinafter referred to as the "State") 
seeks reconsideration of this court's prior ruling precluding summary disposition 
on the petitioner, Sarah M. Johnson's (hereinafter Johnson) claim that her 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that there was insufficient 
evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction. 
After this court's prior ruling, the court was provided with new evidence, 
in the form of an affidavit from Jason Pintler, one of Johnson's appellate lawyers. 
The court has considered the entirety of Mr. Pintler's affidavit, and determines 
that no genuine issue of material fact remains that, if resolved in Johnson's favor, 
would entitle her to any requested relief. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural 
equivalent of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56. "A claim for post-conviction 
relief will be subject to summary dismissal ... if the applicant has not presented 
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 
599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quoting Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 
P.2d 738,739 (1998»). Thus, summary dismissal is permissible when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved 
in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such 
a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 
269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). 
However, "while the underlying facts must be regarded as true, the 
petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 
250,220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009)(quoting Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 
P.2d 27, 29 (1985»; see also Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. 
App. 2008). As this court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in this case, 
summary dismissal is appropriate where the evidentiary facts are not disputed, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for 
this court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those 
inferences. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 
P.3d at 714. Thus, this court is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of 
Johnson but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn 
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
The most probable inferences regarding appellate counsel'sl performance 
are set forth in paragraphs 5 through 18 of Mr. Pintler's affidavit, and the court 
will not repeat them here. Those paragraphs substantiate that, notwithstanding 
the lack of a "live witness" to assess credibility, there is no genuine issue of fact 
necessitating an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson must 
show that her attorney's performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced 
by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. 
State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a 
deficiency, Johnson has the burden of showing that her attorney's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). These standards are equally applicable to claims 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). To establish 
prejudice, the applicant must show a "reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the [appeal] would have been 
different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Johnson must also 
overcome the" strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the 
I The court recognizes that Johnson had more than one appellate attorney, as referenced in Pintler's 
affidavit; however, the court will refer to counsel in the singular in this opinion, based upon the facts 
presented by Pintler himself. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance," Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 
406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
As to appellate counsel specifically, such an attorney has no constitutional 
obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by a defendant. Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho at 765, 760 P.2d at 
1181 (citing Jones, 463 U.s. at 751-754). Beyond that, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on appeal cannot be predicated upon counsel's failure to 
raise meritless issues. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,809 n.2, 839 P.2d 1215, 
1223 n.2 (1992). 
Pintler's affidavit establishes that Johnson's appellate counsel was not 
ineffective in any way. As to the first, deficient performance prong of Strickland, 
the court finds that Pintler reviewed the appellate record with another attorney, 
and that both counsel knew and reasonably applied existing law to the issues at 
hand. Therefore, their conduct was not objectively deficient. The record also 
establishes that Judge Wood found that the aiding and abetting instruction was 
supported by the evidence, even if such evidence was circumstantial. His 
determination to give the instruction was a discretionary determination. See 
State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 539-40, 37 P.3d 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2001). Given 
that standard of review, appellate counsel's rejection of this issue on appeal was 
not deficient. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA nON - 5 
The record also establishes that the second, prejudice prong of Strickland 
cannot be met because even if the issue regarding the aiding and abetting 
instruction had been raised on appeal, there has been no showing that the result 
would have been different. This court concludes that the appellate court would 
not have found an abuse of discretion in giving the instruction, based upon the 
record as it now exits. Accordingly, there is no prejudice to Johnson in the 
approach taken by her appellate lawyers. 
Johnson's proffered authority for the lack of evidence to support the 
aiding and abetting instruction is likewise misplaced. The law she relies upon --
that circumstantial evidence is insufficient if an inference of innocence is possible 
-- has been rejected by both the Idaho and the United States Supreme Courts. See 
Holland v. U.S., 348 U.s. 121, 138-40 (1954); State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 
8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000). The legal standard relied upon by Johnson is not 
consistent with these legal standards. 
Finally, to the extent that Johnson is asserting that this claim was not 
based upon strategy, but was instead based upon inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the law, or some other objective basis for evaluating counsel's 
performance, Pinter's affidavit puts those issues to rest. The affidavit establishes 
that both Pinter and co-counsel researched the relevant legal standards and 
thoroughly reviewed the record and ultimately concluded that the sufficiency of 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 6 
the evidence claim Johnson contends they should have pursued was without 
merit. The record and the law support counsel's assessment as well as Judge 
Wood's conclusion that the instruction was appropriate based upon the evidence 
presented. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the court hereby dismisses Johnson's 
claim asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Judgment for the State 
will enter accordingly. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~£-
Dated this _~_ day of Decem 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the -d- day of December, 2010, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or 
hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Mr. Christopher Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Fct~ JD%'7~S?·.)~CO 
Ms. Jessica M. Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010. 1 {ax: ;)O~- ~8-{-~01"1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL ISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _ ...... ,. , ~~~..,,;;_ r:::._ ~...;. ~ _ _ .-.>:6_5_J3 _ ) Q r' he 
5:A.t~ ~Q~nS~ , ) 
Plaintiff(s}, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
.-! ~~~~~stb~JdA:;.;..:..lM> __ " ~ 
Defendant(s). ) 
I hereby request approval to: 
~Video reoord 
Case No.: 
Date: 
[ ] broadcast 
REOUESTTO OBTAI APPROVAL 
TO VIDEO RECORD, ROAOCAST OR 
PHOTOGRAPH A CO RTrPieeee~a ~~~...., 
, DEC - 6 2010 
I Jo/ynn Drage, Clerk District I Court Blair:.e C9,u'!ty, /d~_ 
~PhotOgraPh the foil wing court proceeding: 
- 2."1 
Time: ~.m. ~ Loeallo~ 3lZl ~E~~V:6 
Presiding Judge: _ ___ __ ~ 
j 
I have read the Rule 45 of the Idaho Court AdministratiIJ8 Rules r~ardlng cameras in the 
courtroom, and will comply in all respects with the provisions of that Ie, and will also make 
canaln that aU other persons from my organization participating in vid 0 or audio recording or 
broadcas11ng or photographing of the court proceedings have read R e 45 of the Idaho Court 
Administrative Rules and will comply in all respeots with the provisions lot that rule. 
Bradley Gujre l 
p~~ ! 
Signature 
Iimes~News 
News Organization Represented 
Dater I 
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ORDER 
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: :: I: = 
i [ ] DENIED. I 
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i 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
-
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 ~nrtnBDrage, Clerk District 
u lame County Idaho 
FA,X 208 788 2300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Case No: CV -006-324 
Petitioner 
. -----.I 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PETITIONER'S MEMORALNDUM 
DISMISSING CLAIM 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
__________ ~R=e=sp~o=n=d=e=nt~ ___________ ) 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her MEMORANDUM 
DISMIISSING CLAIM, and in support thereof states as follows: 
1. In paragraph 15.d. of her Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to have admitted into evidence a 
ballistics recreation demonstrating the effect of shooting the murder weapon through a 
sheet of the type on the bed in the master bedroom of the crime scene. 
2. In fact said Demonstration of Stellate Tearing was admitted into evidence, albeit 
with a limiting instruction, as Exhibit 1012. (Trial Transcript page 48l3) 
WHEREFORE, for the reason stated above Petitioner withdraws and dismisses 
said claim from her Second Amended Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief. 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM DISMISSING CLAIM 
R P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DATED 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £. day of __ tJ_E---"''''---____ 2010, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF was delivered to 
the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; 
Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office 
of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second 
Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. 
Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-
0126. 
US Mail 
---
/~Deliver 
___ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155 
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F I L E D ~:~:--t)-­
DEC 07 2010 
Jolynn Drage. District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2006-0324 
ORDERRE: 
vs. 
CAMERAS IN THE 
COURTROOM 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 45(h), the Court, having considered 
the requests of several media outlets under the Rule permitting cameras in the trial 
courtroom, hereby MODIFIES permission to broadcast and/or photograph the above 
hearing with the following additional restrictions: 
1. An informal pretrial media conference will be held on December 7, 2010 at 9:00 
a.m. M.S.T. at the Twin Falls County Courthouse in the Conference Room, or 
other suitable location, for the purpose of reviewing all relevant matters with 
representatives of the news media who desire to provide coverage of the trial 
proceedings. It is anticipated that such relevant matters may include: 
a. Any objection to coverage that may have been raised; 
b. The scope of coverage to be permitted; 
c. The nature and extent of the technical equipment and personnel to be 
displayed, including location of equipment and personnel and; 
d. The restrictions on coverage to be observed. 
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DEC-OB-2010 MON 04:56 ~~ DISTRICT TCA FAX NO. 2n D 736 4002 
2. Coverage of this trial shan be subject to the continuing supervision of the 
presiding trial judge. No coverage shall take place within the courtroom, whether 
during recesses or at any other time, when the presiding trial judge is not present 
and presiding. 
3. No interviews will be allowed inside the courtroom. 
4. Notwithstanding the approval of an application for permission to provide 
coverage of the trial, the presiding trial judge shall have discretion throughout 
such proceeding to revoke such approval or to limit the coverage authorized in 
any way. In the exercise of this discretion, the presiding trial judge intends to be 
especially sensitive and responsive to the needs and concerns of all parties, 
victims. witnesses, and other participants in such proceedings. 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Administrative Rule 45(f) and (h)(9), one TV organization will 
be selected to provide pooled TV coverage and one still photographer will be 
allowed inside the courtroom. It is anticipated that those news entities seeking to 
obtain video or stili photographic coverage of the court proceedings will 
determine, on their own, which entity will provide pooled TV coverage. 
DATED this 61sy of December, 
P, 02/02 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
VIRGINIA BAILEY 
Court Reporter 
SHARlE COOPER 
Deputy Clerk 
December 7, 2010 
Date 
10:00 a.m. 
Time 
SARAH JOHNSON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV 06-324 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
----------------------------------) 
Evidentiary Court Trial 
9:55 Court reviews file. Christopher Simms with petitioner Sarah Johnson, Jessica 
Lorello and Ken Jorgensen for the State ofIdaho. Mr. Simms addresses Court in regards 
to the State requesting removal of evidence from Blaine County to Twin Falls County for 
this trial. A stipulation was reached between Counsel for the State Jim Thomas and 
Appointed Counsel for Sarah Johnson, Keith Roark. Ms. Lorello, moves to exclude 
witnesses, Mr. Simms does not object and joins in that motion, Court so orders. Ms 
Lorello, moves the Court for reconsider, or alternatively ask for a motion in limine ruling 
as to witnesses Michelle Ellison; Allan Dupuis; Glenda Osuna; Luis Ramirez; Becky 
Lopez and Carlos Ayala. 
9:59 Mr. Simms gives argument. 
10:01 Ms. Lorello gives brief follow-up argument. 
10:01 Court denies the motion for reconsideration at this time. 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
10:02 M. Lorello would like clarification to the stipulation to dismiss a count in the 
petition. 
10:03 Mr. Simms gives comments; claim 15d of the second amended petition as to the 
ballistic tests that dealt with the sheets. 
10:08 Mr. Simms gives opening statements. 
10:21 Ms. Lorello gives opening statement. 
10:22 Petitioner's 1 st witness, Patrick Dunn called to the stand, sworn and examined by 
Mr. Simms. 
10:34 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, sustained. 
10:40 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation as to witness's knowledge of gang tattoos, 
sustained, Mr. Simms will redirect witness. 
10:41 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation, overruled. 
10:42 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay as to what the Father would say, allowed for the 
truth of the matter. 
10:43 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, overruled, allowed for the truth of the matter. 
10:45 Mr. Simms offers Petitioner's Exhibit 1 (Grand Jury Transcript), obvious 
hearsay objection is noted; offered and admitted. The parties have agreed the Court 
would consider as evidence the trial transcript, the record and the exhibits in the criminal 
case. 
10:47 Ms. Lorello stipulates to admitting Petitioner's Exhibits 4,5, 6, 7 and 8. Court 
admits Petitioner's Exhibit 4,5,6, 7 and 8. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 4 (Johnson Residence Layout) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 5 (photo of door way going into the bedroom with weapon and 
blood spatter) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 6 (photo of trash can at Johnson residence) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 7 (photo of rifle scope removed from rifle on guest bed in 
Johnson home) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 8 (photo of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges) 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
10:55 Petitioner's Exhibit 13 (transcript of Police interview Consuelo Cedeno and 
Jane Lopez), identified. 
10:57 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, Mr. Simms gives argument, Court overrules 
objection. 
10:59 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, overruled. 
11:00 Petitioner's Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, to be reviewed by witness. 
State objects to Petitioner's Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, hearsay and foundation, Court 
relies on previous ruling to hearsay, Counsel must lay foundation. 
11:02 Petitioner's Exhibit 13, offered, objection, admitted. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 9 (phone records ofConsuelo Cedeno) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 10 (phone records of Jane Lopez) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 11 (Bruno Santos application for travel document) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 40 (Qwest Telephone Records) 
11:05 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay, Mr. Simms gives argument. 
11:06 Ms. Lorello gives further comments. Court overrules objection. 
11:07 Mr. Simms continues examination. 
11:10 Mr. Simms offers Petitioner's Exhibits 9, to, and 11, Court notes continuing 
objection of Ms. Lorello, overruled, admitted. 
11:19 Petitioner's Exhibit 34,35 and 36 reviewed by witness. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 34 (transcript police interview of Bruno Santos) 
11:24 Petitioner's Exhibit 34, offered, same objection, same ruling, admitted. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 35 (Sheriff Report from Interview of Bruno Santos) 
. Petitioner's Exhibit 36 (transcript of phone call between Nikki Settle and Bruno 
Santos) 
11:26 Petitioner's Exhibits 35 and 36 offered, objection by Ms. Lorello, Court reviews 
rule, overrules objection, admitted. 
11:31 Petitioner's Exhibit 37 (report of investigation, summary of interview with 
Carlos Ayala) 
COURT MINUTES - 3 I Lr/?S 
11:34 Petitioner's Exhibit 37, offered, same objection, same ruling, admitted. 
11:38 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation, Mr. Simms laid foundation. 
11:40 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation, sustained. 
11 :43 Objection by Ms. Lorello, hearsay and foundation as to who was speaking, Court 
overrules hearsay objection. Mr. Simms laid foundation for who was speaking. 
11:46 Objection by Ms. Lorello, reference in petition and hearsay, Court allows 
statements. 
11:48 Ms. Lorello places concerns to the evidence on the record. 
11:52 Petitioner's Exhibit 12, offered, and will be played during Sheriff Femling's 
testimony, Court reserves ruling the Sheriff's testimony, objection by Ms. Lorello. 
11:53 Petitioner's Exhibit 18 (Lab Report from Cellmark lab), offered, hearsay arid 
relevance, goes to cumulative claim Counsel's unpreparedness for trial, Court overrules 
hearsay objection. Takes the relevance objection under advisement until after lunch 
11:58 Court in recess for the lunch hour. 
1:31 Court reconvenes. Mr. Simms gives argument on claim discussed prior to lunch 
recess. 
1:33 Ms. Lorello gives argument. 
1:34 Court overrules objection and allows Petitioner's Exhibit 18 to be admitted. 
1:35 Petitioner's Exhibit 40, offered, objection, overruled, admitted. 
1:36 Cross-examination by Ms. Lorello. 
1 :39 Objection by Mr. Simms to the form ofthe question, overruled. 
1:51 Redirect by Mr. Simms. 
1 :54 Witness stepped dovl'll and was excused. 
Petitioner's 2nd witness, Mark Rader, called to the stand sworn and examined by Mr. 
Simms. 
2:48 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello. 
2:55 Redirect by Mr. Simms. 
2:58 Witness stepped doVl'll and was excused. Court takes a brief recess. 
COURT MINUTES - 4 
3:16 Court reconvenes. 
Petitioner's 3rd witness Raul Ornelas called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Simms. 
3:33 No cross examination. Witness stepped down and was excused. 
Petitioner's 4th witness, Stuart Robinson called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Simms. 
3:49 Objection by Ms. Simms argumentative, sustained. 
3:50 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello. 
3:51 Witness stepped down and was excused. 
Petitioner's 5th witness Bob Pangburn called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Simms. 
4:35 Cross Examination by Ms. Lorello. 
4:45 No redirect examination. Witness stepped down and was excused. 
4:50 Court recesses for the evening, will reconvene at 10:00 am in the morning 
COURT MINUTES - 5 
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Evidentiary Court Trial Day 2 
Time 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. CV 06-324 
Parties met in chambers at 10:00 am in regards to a witness. 
10:13 Court in session. Friday Court will start at 9:00 am. 
Mr. Simms offers Petitioner's Exhibit 15 (Disciplinary Order from Supreme Court), offered 
as public record and as impeachment for testimony from yesterday of Bob Pangburn, objection 
as hearsay, relevance and foundation. Court gives ruling as to hearsay, overruled; as to relevancy 
it becomes relevant, overruled; as to the certification, conditionally denies the request to admit; 
not admitted. Mr. Simms asks for clarification, if Court is provided, before the end of the trial, 
with a certified copy of the exhibit it will be accepted into evidence. 
10:17 Mr. Simms addresses Court in regards as to the subpoena that has been served on Julia 
Dupuis. Witness is not present at this time. Based on her not appearing Mr. Simms offers into 
evidence a written statement by Julia Dupuis. 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
10:22 Ms. Lorello objects. 
10:23 Mr. Simms gives further argument. 
10:24 Ms. Lorello gives argument. 
Court gives ruling, sustains objection for today, will allow Counsel after the close of evidence on 
Friday a chance to do a trial deposition on this witness, since the Court will not take this case 
under advisement until sometime next year. 
10:26 Mr. Simms has had contact with Blaine County Public Defender in regards to Bruno 
Santos. Mr. Simms would like to have a hearing in regards to Bruno Santos' testimony later 
today preferably by phone. 
10:27 Petitioner's 6th witness Jerry "Walt" Femling called to the stand, sworn and examined by 
Mr. Simms. 
10:51 Mr. Simms would like to play the video/audio recording of Ross Kirtley's initial response 
to the scene. 
10:52 Ms. Lorello objects hearsay, Court overrules hearsay objection, allows the recording to be 
played. Court reporter waived for the playing of the DVD. 
10:53 Petitioner's Exhibit 12 (DVD of video/audio recording by Ross Kirtley's response to 
the scene) is offered, admitted and played for the Court. 
11:58 Court notes 7:23:23 on the comer ofthe video portion ofthe DVD, takes noon recess. 
1:32 Court reconvenes. Chris Simms with Sarah Johnson are present for petitioner, Jessica 
Lorello and Ken Jorgensen present for the State. No preliminary matters prior to continuing 
playing DVD. 
2:25 End of DVD, witness Jerry "Walt" Femling retakes the stand under previous oath and Mr. 
Simms continues examination. 
2:29 Objection by Ms. Lorello, foundation as to time, sustained. 
2:40 Objection by Ms. Lorello as to time, Court allows answer. 
2:41 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello. 
2:49 Objection by Mr. Simms, non responsive and hearsay, correct in objection infom1s Ms. 
Lorello to ask another question. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
2:51 Redirect by Mr. Simms. 
2:57 Witness stepped down and was excused. Court takes a brief recess. 
3:22 Court reconvenes all parties present. Petitioner's i h witness Jane Lopez called to the stand, 
sworn and examined by Mr. Simms. 
3:28 Objection by Ms. Lorello, as to this witnesses knowledge of this document; discussion by 
Counsel, Court allows Counsel to proceed with questions. 
3:30 Objection by Ms. Lorello, leading, overruled for the nature of the question. 
3:31 Objection by Ms. Lorello, leading, overruled. Cross examination by Ms. Lorello. Witness 
stepped down and was excused. 
3:32 Petitioner's 8th witness Steve Harkins called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Simms. 
3:45 Petitioner's Exhibit 34 (transcript of interview of Bruno Santos), reviewed by Mr. Simms. 
3:47 Objection by Ms. Lorello, as refreshing witness's recollection, Court allows Mr. Simms to 
continue. 
3:54 Objection by Ms. Lorello, beyond the scope ofthe petition, argument, overruled. 
3:55 Ms. Lorello makes a record, the purpose of the beyond the scope objection is because the 
State is not consenting to litigation that is not clearly in the petition. 
4:08 Objection by Ms. Lorello, assumes facts not in evidence. 
4:15 Objection by Ms. Lorello, not reading the record accurately. 
4:18 Objection by Ms. Lorello, misrepresents the testimony, response by Mr. Simms, Court 
allows witness to answer question. 
4:23 Objection by Ms. Lorello, relevance, sustained. 
4:24 Objection by Ms. Lorello, relevance, Mr. Simms response, goes to the intent and 
seriousness of law enforcement; Court allows question. 
4:34 Recordings ofInterviews of Mel Spiegel and Christopher Hill offered into evidence by Mr. 
Simms. Court inquires as to purpose. Mr. Simms lays out basis for offering them. 
4:35 Mr. Jorgensen objects. Court allows him to argue as to the legal matter. 
4:38 Mr. Simms gives argument. 
COURT MfNUTES - 3 
4:39 Court gives ruling, overruled objection, admitted solely for the purpose of establishing the 
alleged inconsistency and scope of the investigation, the assertions made s to there truth are not 
going to be relied on by the Court and will compare the statements as given. 
4:40 Cross examination by Ms. Lorello. 
4:43 Witness stepped down and was excused. 
Court addresses parties in regards to the telephone conference in regards to Bruno Santos' 
testimony with Dan Dolan. Dan Dolan will be present at 9:00 or 9:30 am in the morning for the 
testimony of Bruno Santos. 
4:45 Court in recess for the day. 
COURT MrNUTES - 4 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV 06-324 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
----------------------------------) 
Evidentiary Court Trial Day 3 
10:19 Court in session. Christopher Simms present with petitioner, Sarah Johnson. 
Jessica Lorello and Ken Jorgensen present for the State of Idaho. Court reviews meeting 
in chambers with Counsel as well as Dan Dolan Counsel for witness Bruno Santos. 
10:20 Mr. Simms would like to take up Petitioner's Exhibits 29 and 30 police interviews 
of Mel Spiegle and Christopher Hill, that were offered yesterday and would like to play 
them today. Petitioner offers into evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 2 (CD oftranscript of 
proceedings of trial), No objection from Ms. Lorello, Court admits. Mr. Simms 
additionally offers Petitioner's Exhibit 41 (the record on appeal) State has no objection. 
Court admits all exhibits 29,30,2 and 41. Court's intent is to not bring all of the exhibits 
here but have them available in Blaine County for the Court to review. The record on 
appeal is here and we have access to it here. Counsel does not object to the Court 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
traveling to Blaine County to review this case, nor communicating with persons from the 
prosecutor's or the Court in Blaine County to locate these exhibits and record. 
10:23 Petitioner's Exhibit 29 (DVD Interview of Mel Speegle 2/10/2009) previously 
admitted, played for the Court. Counsels stipulate to waive Court reporter of exhibit. 
10:26 Court is having a hard time hearing the audio. A speaker is placed by a micro 
phone to enhance the sound. DVD restarted. 
10:39 End of Petitioner's Exhibit 29, 
10:40 Petitioner's Exhibit 30 CDVD Interview of Chris Hill 2/12/2009) previously 
admitted, played for the Court. Counsels stipulate to waive Court reporter of exhibit. 
10:52 End of Petitioner's Exhibit 30. 
10:53 Petitioner's 9th Witness Consuelo Cedeno called to the stand, sworn and examined 
by Mr. Simms. Interpreter Mary Jo Palma present to interpret and under previous signed 
oath with the Court. 
10:58 Objection by Ms. Lorello, beyond the scope, Court overrules objection, allows 
questioning. 
11:02 Objection by Ms. Lorello, asked and answered, Court allows question to be 
answered yet again, overruled. 
11:07 Objection by Ms. Lorello, beyond the scope as to what is alleged in the petition, 
Court allows question, overruled. 
11:10 Petitioner's Exhibit 13 is handed to witness directed to page 3026. 
11:10 Object to the characterization of what he is reading as testimony by Ms. Lorello. 
Mr. Simms apologizes for the mischaracterization. 
11:15 No cross examination. Witness stepped down and was excused. 
Petitioner's 10th witness Bruno Santos called to the stand, present with Attorney Dan 
Dolan, and Interpreter Mary Jo Palma, sworn. Attorney for Bruno Santos may remain 
next to Bruno Santos on the witness stand during his testimony. Court instructs witness to 
listen to the whole question interpreted before answering. Court also reminds the witness 
he has a Fifth Amendment right. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
11:20 Direct examination by Mr. Simms. Fifth Amendment right invoked. 
11:22 Objection by Mr. Dolan, argument by Counsel. Court sustains. Mr. Simms strikes 
the testimony of Bruno Santos in the criminal trial. Ms. Lorello gives argument as to 
relevance. 
11:27 Court sustains the objection. 
Mr. Simms continues with direct examination. Fifth Amendment right invoked. Mr. 
Dolan argued. Objection is sustained. 
11:29 Mr. Simms continued with direct examination. 
11:33 Fifth Amendment right invoked. Objection is sustained. 
11:34 Ms. Lorello gave argument that Fifth Amendment rights were discussed and 
argued in chambers. Mr. Simms gives argument on Mr. Santos' gang affiliation. 
11:35 Mr. Dolan argued on the gang affiliation question. Objection is sustained. 
11:36 Ms. Lorello objected as to 404(b) evidence. Court overrules a 404(b) objection. 
11:37 Fifth Amendment right invoker, Court sustains. Fifth Amendment objection, Court 
overrules. 
11:38 Objection by Mr. Dolan, different question from the previous question. Court asks 
Mr. Simms to rephrase. 
11:39 Mr. Simms continues with examination. Fifth amendment right invoked. 
Objection is sustained. 
11:40 Mr. Simms continues with examination. Fifth amendment right invoked. 
Objection is overruled. 
11:42 Objection by Mr. Dolan, Court sustains. Mr. Simms has no further questions for 
this witness given the Fifth Amendment rights. 
11:43 No cross examination from the state. 
11 :43 Witness stepped down and is excused. 
11:44 Petitioner's 11 th witness, Maria Eguren, was called the stand. Ms. Eguren was 
duly sworn and examined by Mr. Simms. 
11:56 Court is in recess and will reconvene at 1:30 pm. 
COURT MfNUTES - 3 
1 :33 Court reconvenes. Maria Eguren returns to the stand under previous oath. 
1 :45 Petitioner's Exhibit 32 (Document -ISP chain of custody), offered, objection, 
need foundation laid. Offered only for the chain of custody (left side of document), 
admitted for that purpose. 
1:59 Cross examination by Mr. Jorgensen. 
2:00 State's Exhibit 1002 (Screen print from AFIS system), offered, no objection, 
admitted. 
2:03 Redirect by Mr. Simms. 
2:05 Witness stepped down and was excused. 
Petitioner's lih witness, Robert J. Kerchusky called to the stand, sworn and examined by 
Mr. Simms. 
2:08 Petitioner's Exhibit 38 (Resume of Robert Kerchusky), State stipulates to 
admittance of Petitioner's Exhibit 38, offered and admitted. 
2:47 Petitioner's Exhibit 39 (latent fingerprint cards), offered, objection hearsay, 
argument, admitted, reserves as to facts asserted in document. 
3:03 Court takes a brief recess. 
3:20 Court reconvenes, Mr. Robert Kerchusky returns to the stand under previous oath 
and Mr. Simms continues examination. 
3:35 Mr. Simms approaches witness with Petitioners Exhibits 19,20,21,22,23,24,25, 
26,27,28. Court approves. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 19, objection by Mr. Jorgensen, sustained. (Blaine County Police 
Report), offered, admitted subject to prior ruling. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 20 (ISP Forensic Report) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 21 (ISP Forensic Report) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 22 (Blaine County Sheriff Report) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 23 (ISP Forensic Report) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 24 (Blaine County Sheriff Report Hill ID) 
Petitioner's Exhibit 25 (ISP Forensic Report) 
COURT MINUTES - 4 
Petitioner's Exhibit 26 (ISP Forensic Report) 
Petitioner's Exhibits 20 through 26 offered, same objection same ruling admitted in 
a limited way. 
3:56 Cross Examination by Mr. Jorgensen. 
3:59 Document created by Mr. Kerchusky shown to witness and a portion read by 
witness. 
4:08 Objection by Mr. Simms, Counsel interrupts before response is completed. 
4:09 Court reporter reads back question. 
4: 17 Redirect by Mr. Simms. 
4:19 Witness stepped down and is subject to recall. 
4:21 Court takes a brief recess. 
4:32 Court reconvenes. Petitioner rests at this time. 
4:33 State's 1st witness Tina Walthall called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Jorgensen. 
5:07 Cross examination by Mr. Simms. 
5:29 Redirect examination by Mr. Jorgensen. 
5:34 Witness stepped down and was excused. Mr. Simms would like to recross. Court 
does not allow recross. Court in recess for the night, 9:00 am start in the morning. 
COURT MINUTES - 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
VIRGINIA BAILEY 
Court Reporter 
SHARIE COOPER 
Deputy Clerk 
December 10, 2010 
Date 
9:00 a.m. 
Time 
SARAH JOHNSON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV 06-324 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Evidentiary Court Trial Day 4 
9:02 Court reconvenes for the fInal day of trial. Christopher Simms present with 
petitioner Sarah Johnson. Ken Jorgensen and Jessica Lorello present for the State of 
Idaho. 
State's 2nd witness Mel Speegle called to the stand, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Jorgensen. 
9:09 Cross examination by Mr. Simms. 
9:13 Mr. Jorgensen inquires ifthere was a question before the witness or ifMr. Simms 
was just reading the transcript. If Mr. Simms was just reading transcript Mr. Jorgensen 
moves to strike the reading. Mr. Simms asks a question ofthe witness. 
9:23 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, extremely vague question not sure what contradictions 
we are going to hear. Court instructs Mr. Simms to rephrase question. 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
9:24 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, does not accurately characterize what we say in the 
interview with Detective Harkins. Court overruled. 
9:25 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, what things are we taking about, overruled. 
9:27 Redirect Examination by Mr. Jorgensen. 
9:28 Witness stepped down and was excused. 
9:29 State's 3rd witness Christopher Kevin Hill called to the stand sworn and examined 
by Mr. Jorgensen. 
9:34 Objection by Mr. Simms, leading, sustained. 
9:35 State's Exhibit 123 (rifle scope) from the original criminal trial handed to 
witness. 
9:36 Objection by Mr. Simms, speculation, Court instructs witness to answer if he can 
without speculating. 
9:37 Objection by Mr. Simms, speculation as to what he would have done as opposed to 
doing, sustained 
Objection by Mr. Simms, overruled. 
9:38 Cross examination by Mr. Simms. 
Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, line of this question, sustained. 
9:40 Objection by Mr. Jorgensen, as to the characterization of what he was doing on the 
BLM land, overruled. 
9:41 No redirect, witness stepped down and was excused. 
State rests at this time. No rebuttal from the Petitioner. 
9:42 Court addresses Counsel in regards to time frame to take case under advisement. 
Mr. Jorgesen instructed to retrieve State's Exhibit 123 and send back to Blaine County 
for safe keeping. 
Court reporter will have transcript completed by the first of January. Counsel will file by 
5 :00 pm on January 31, 2011 all findings of fact and briefing in Blaine County and copy 
to Twin Falls a Judge's copy; also to be submitted electronically to Justin Call law clerk. 
Simultaneous rebuttal closings and all final documents will be filed by 5 :00 pm on 
COURT MrNUTES - 2 
February 11,2011 in Blaine County with a Judge's copy to Twin Falls also to be 
submitted electronically to Justin Call law clerk. Case will possibly go under advisement 
the first part of March. 
Housekeeping matters discussed. Mr. Simms has one document that needs a certification 
before submitting to the Court for consideration. Mr. Simms will not be taking the trial 
deposition of the witness. Petitioner's Exhibit 12 admitted. 
9:48 Mr. Simms gives closing argument. 
9:57 Ms. Lorello gives closing argument. 
9:58 Court thanks Counsel, in recess for this case. 
COURT MINUTES - 3 
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ORDER 
THE COURT, having considered the above Request for Approval under Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders that permission to video record the above hearing is: 
[ ] GRANTED under the following restrictions in addition to those set fortll in Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules: 
[ ] DENIED . 
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THE COURT, having considered the above Request for Approval under Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders that pennission to broadcast the above hearing is: 
[ ] GRANTED und.er the followiug restrictions in addition to tbose set forth in Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules: 
[ ] DENIED . 
..........................•........................... ........................... ~ ..........•... , ........•.. ••.....•....... 
THE COURT, having considered the above Request :for Approval under Rule 45 of the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders that permission to photograph the above hearing is: 
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Court Admi.nistrative Rules: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t=, ____________ ) 
Case No: CV-2006-324 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
TO PREP ARE TRANSCRIPT 
OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
HEARING AT COUNTY COST 
I.C. 19 - 4904 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, through counsel, and moves this Court to order 
preparation of a transcript of the Post-Conviction Relief Hearing herein, at county cost, 
and in support thereof states: 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Pocatello Women's Correctional 
Facility, serving two life without the possibility of parole plus fifteen years sentences. 
2. Upon application for Post-Conviction Relief, counsel was appointed to represent 
Petitioner pursuant to the Blaine County Public Defender Contract, upon a finding that 
Petitioner is indigent. 
3. The Post-Conviction Relief hearing took place on December 7, 2010 - December 
10, 2010, before the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, District Court Judge, in Twin Falls 
County. 
4. Post hearing briefs are to be submitted to the Court based on testimony produced 
at the Post-Conviction Relief Hearing, on or before January 30, 2011 .. 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT 1 
COUNTY COST 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this Court enter an Order directing the 
preparation of the transcript for Post-Conviction Relief Hearing, at the Court Reporter's 
earliest convenience. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
) z . /3, /i:) 
DATED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of December 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST -CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT 
COUNTY COST was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special 
Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO 
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting 
Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, 
Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, 
Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT 2 
COUNTY COST l1b'1.J 
US Mail 
---
Hand Deliver 
---
~ia facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208;;t4155 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING AT 
COUNTY COST 
DEC-15-2010 WED 01:04 PM ~ourt Services FAX NO. 736 4155 P. 02 
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Jolynn Drage, C . District. 
Court Bla.ine Go" "':1' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF lDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH MARIE JOHNSON, ) Case No: CV-2006-324 
) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER TO PREPARE 
) TRANSCRlPT OF 
VB. ) POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
) HEARING AT COUNTY COST 
STATE O~ IDAHO. ) 
) LC. 19·4904 
Re~ } 
The Court, haviDg considered PETITIONER"S MOTION FOR ORDER. TO 
PREPARE TRANSCRiPT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF liEARlNG AT COUNTY 
COST filed herein by the PetitiODe'!, Sarah M Johnson, by and through her Attorney, 
Christopher P. SiIIims. and good cause appearing therefore, HEREBY ORDERS the 
transcript of~ P~st-Conviction ReIiefHeanng in the above styled matter wmscnDed at 
the'cost ofBl~e County. Idaho. 
DATED this 11 day of December, 2010. 
ON. G. RICHARD BEVAN. DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER 10 PREPARE TRANSCRIPT OF POST CONVlCI10N lUU.1B.F H!AlUNG AT COUNTY COST l . 
SOOO/SOODI!! 
/: 
Ii 
FILED ~ .. ~. :J.·:oS J.,lj 
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SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~ __________ ) 
Case No: CV -2006-0324 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER 
TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
I.C. 19-4907 (a) 
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED 
111-
COMES NOW Petitioner by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER P. 
SIMMS, and files this, her MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO 
POCATELLO WOMENS CORRECTIONAL CENTER and in support thereof states as 
follows: 
1. Petitioner is serving life sentences, upon conviction of Murder, First Degree, with 
Firearm Enhancement, The Fifth District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Blaine, 
Case No. CR-2003-1820 in the custody of the Pocatello Women's COITectional Center, 
located in Pocatello, Idaho, 
2. Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, was set for 
evidentiary hearing and heard commencing December 7,2010. 
3. Petitioner was transported to the Twin Falls County Jail in order to be present at 
the Theron Ward Judicial Building, located in Twin Falls, Idaho, for said hearing. 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
4. Petitioner should be transported back to the Pocatello Women's Correctional 
Center pending any ruling by the Court on matters presented during the four (4) day 
evidentiary hearing, which concluded on December 10,2010. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court enter an Order to Transport 
Petitioner to the Pocatello Women's Correctional Center. 
istopher P. Simms 
Attorney for Petitioner 
/2./ . /u 
Dated 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of December, 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL CENTER was 
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: 
Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-
0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Facsimile number 
208.788.5554, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126 by: 
US Mail 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
~ia facsimile 208.854.8074,208.788.5554 and 208.736.4155 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO POCATELLO WOMEN'S 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
3 
DEC-15-2010 WED 04:42 PM ~ourt Services 
DEC-16-2010 WED 02: lLAlNE COUNTY JUDICIAL 
FAX NO, 
FAX NO, 
736 4155 P. 02/02 
)86627 p, 02 
FILED ~:~. 5\(5: 
Jo/ynn Drage, District 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF !HE FIFTH ruDIClAL DIS....-. ..... "" Court Blaine Count ,~ 
i STATE 0' IDAliO 
IN AND ROa THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON. ) 
) Case No: CV -2006-0324 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER TO TRANSPORT· 
VS. ) PETITIONER TO 
) POCATEllO WOMEN'S 
STATE OP IDAHO, ) COlU.ECITONAL CENTER 
) 
~2n~nt, ) 
TIle' CoUl'tt having considered. Potitioner's MonoN TO ORDER 
PETlnoNEk TRANSPORTBD TO POCA'l"BLLO WOMEN's COR.R.ECITONAL 
CENTBR, filed herein and goodi oause appcarl.tlg therefore, HEREBY ORDERS 
Petitioner Transported to t110 Pocatello Women's COITeetiona/. Facility, from the Twin 
, 
Falls COtulty Jail. at the eariie,,1 opportunity. 
, \ 
ORDER. TO TRANSPORT PE1mONER TO POCA"rELLO WOMEN'S 1 
CORRECTIONAL CID-.'T'fER 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
FILED~' ._-P.M. __ _ 
[D~C 2 f 2010 ] 
~/ynt1nBDr.!. '8ge, Clerk District 
ou ame County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ R==es=p~o=nd=e=n=t ____________ ) 
Case No: CV-006-324 
PETITIONER'S FILING 
MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached document, a certified copy 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho's Disciplinary Order in the Matter of Bobby 
E. Pangburn, Attorney at Law, Idaho State Bar vs. Bobby E. Pangburn, previously 
marked and offered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 15, and again offers same into 
evidence under Rule 902 as a Domestic Public Record Under Seal and under Rule 803 a 
public record the circumstances and source of which indicate no lack of trustworthiness. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
C RISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 
/Z2J/u 
, . 
DATED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of December 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was 
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: 
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile 
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and 
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126. 
US Mail 
---
Hand Deliver 
---
~~faCSimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.736.4155 
---
PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
IN THE MATTER OF BOBBY E. 
PANGBURN, ATTORNEY AT LAW. 
) 
) 
----------------------------------------------------------- ) 
IDAHO STATE BAR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
BOBBY E. PANGBURN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DISCIPLINARY ORDER 
Supreme Court Docket No. 34173 
ISB FC No. 05-07 
Ref. No. 07-287 
A CERTIFICATE OF RECORD with attachments of proceedings before the Professional 
Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar was filed by Respondent May 11, 2007 which contains 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION. A NOTICE 
OF OBJECTION was filed by Appellant Pangburn June 1,2007. APPELLANT'S BRIEF was 
filed by Appellant October 4,2007. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was filed by RespondentOctober 
25,2007. APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was filed by Appellant Pangburn December 7, 2007. 
The CONCLUSIONS OF LAW found that Appellant Pangburn has violated Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct 8.1 in conjunction with his admission that he violated Oregon DR-I-
I03(C), failure to cooperate and failure to respond to disciplinary authorities as set forth in the 
Sixth Cause of Action in the Third Formal Amended Complaint. 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of T.W., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated 
LR.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, lA, 1.5(£), 1.16(d), and 8.4(c). 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of R.K., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated 
LR.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, lA, and 1.16(d). 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of W.E., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated 
LR.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, lA, and I.l6(d). 
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) 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of M.B., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn violated 
I.R.P.e. 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of M.S., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn has 
violated I.R.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of C.B., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn has 
violated I.R.P.e. 1.2 and 1.4. 
With respect to Appellant Pangburn's representation of T.S., the Committee concludes 
that Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant Pangburn has 
violated I.R.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.l6(d). 
Further, the Committee also considered the ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, (hereinafter, "ABA Standards") to determine the appropriate sanction to recommend 
in this case. ABA Standard 3.0 addresses the factors to be considered and the Committee has 
considered the duties violated, if any, Defendant's mental state, the actual or potential injury 
caused by Defendant's misconduct, if any, and the existence of aggravating or mitigation factors. 
(ld.01.815). 
The recommended disciplinary action includes suspension from the practice of law in the 
State of Idaho for a period of five (5) years, with three (3) years being withheld. Further, 
Appellant Pangburn shall be placed on probation for a period of three (3) years following his 
reinstatement, if any, upon the terms and conditions imposed. 
After review of the BRIEFS and the CERTIFICATE OF RECORD, this Court upholds 
the Recommendation of the Committee; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant, BOBBY E. PANGBURN, be suspended 
from the practice oflaw in the State ofIdaho for a period of five (5) years, with three (3) years 
being withheld. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant, BOBBY E. PANGBURN, be placed on 
probation for a period of three (3) years following his reinstatement, if any, upon the following 
terms and conditions: 
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1. Probation should be imposed pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission 506( c). Probation 
under Rule 506(c) is appropriate since there is little likelihood that Defendant will harm 
the public during the period of probation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised by Bar Counsel's Office. Further, conditions of probation should 
include: (1) If Defendant admits or is found to have violated any of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct for which a public sanction is imposed for any conduct between the 
date of Defendant's actual suspension through the three year period of probation, 
regardless whether that admission or determination occurs after the expiration of the 
suspension and probation, then the withheld suspension should be immediately imposed 
and served by Defendant, in addition to any other sanction that is imposed for any such 
admission or determination of misconduct during that time. (Thus, by way of example, if 
Defendant admits or is found to have violated any of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct in any formal charge case relating to his conduct during the period of his actual 
suspension and probation, then the withheld portion of his suspension shall be 
automatically and immediately imposed upon Defendant regardless whether that 
admission or determination is after the expiration of his probation); (2) That Defendant 
conduct his practice and representation of his clients in a manner so as to avoid any 
grievances or complaints being submitted to Bar Counsel's Office. However, 
recognizing that such grievances and/or complaints are beyond the control of the 
attorney, Defendant must fully cooperate with Bar Counsel's Office in the investigation 
of any such complaints or grievances; (3) Defendant be required to maintain errors and 
omissions legal malpractice insurance during the probation period, providing at least 
$100,000/$300,000 coverage in a form that the reinstatement Hearing Committee 
determines is appropriate as a condition of Defendant's reinstatement; (4) Defendant 
should make arrangements satisfactory to the Idaho State Bar for a supervising attorney 
to supervise Defendant's law practice during the probationary period. In addition, 
Defendant should be required to comply with the following terms and conditions relating 
to such supervision during the period of probation: 
a.) The supervising attorney shall be approved by the Idaho State Bar and shall indicate 
to the Idaho State Bar his or her willingness to supervise Defendant during the term 
of his probation, consistent with the terms and conditions set forth above and that 
follow. The Hearing Committee recommends that the supervising attorney should not 
be expected to assume any personal responsibility for the handling of Defendant's 
cases nor serve as a co-counsel in the sense of counter signing pleadings; 
b.) Defendant shall meet on a regular basis, but no less than monthly, with the 
supervising attorney regarding Defendant's representation of clients to ensure that 
Defendant is acting with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his 
clients and that Defendant is keeping his clients reasonably informed about that status 
of their matters and promptly complying with any reasonable requests for information 
about Defendant's representation of his clients; 
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c.) The supervising attorney shall report to the Idaho State Bar, on a quarterly basis, that 
Defendant is complying with the previous condition and Defendant is arranging to 
meet with the supervising attorney on a regular, but not less than monthly, basis and 
that Defendant has demonstrated to the supervising attorney reasonable assurance that 
Defendant is complying with the conditions of probation; and 
d.) Defendant shall certify in writing to the Idaho State Bar, under oath on a monthly 
basis, that he is acting with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his 
clients, is keeping his clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and 
promptly complying with any reasonable requests for information about Defendant's 
representation of his clients, and that his representation of his clients is consistent 
with his responsibilities under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
2. To be reinstated, Defendant must show that he has fully complied with the requirements 
ofIdaho Bar Commission Rules 506(j) and 517(a)-(d). 
3. As a condition for reinstatement under LB.C.R. 518, Defendant shall be required to fully 
comply with LB.C.R. 517 and shall be required to take and pass the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination. 
4. The Hearing Committee recommends that as a condition of reinstatement, Defendant 
shall reimburse Plaintiff for the costs associated with this proceeding, including, without 
limitation, the costs of the hearing and the hearing transcript, certified mailings and all 
other expenses related to this disciplinary proceeding. 
Dated this I 7 day of January 2008. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ATTEST: 
cc: Bobby E. Pangburn, pro se 
Counsel of Record 
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1; Stephen W. Kenyon. Clerk of the sup~eme . ' 
Of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify 
above is 8 true and coneet copy of the ' 
ttntered in 1he above entIIIed cause and on 
record i~my offioe. : J :; ... ; S' 
'WITNESS my hand Sea~of this Cou~ 
lI. .. NW. 
$y:~~~~;ta~~2Ol1ie! Oepld}& 
Court Docket No. 34173 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON, ) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CV 2006-0324 
) 
) ORDER REGARDING POST-
) TRIAL BRIEFING AND 
) CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
") 
) 
THIS MATTER came before the court on the court's own motion. This 
case was tried between December 7 and December 10, 2010. At the conclusion of 
the trial the court set forth a post-trial briefing schedule and commented upon 
the need to review the 6000+ page transcript as part of this court's decision-
making process in the case. This court also referenced the need for counsel to 
"pin-point" the areas in the transcript where the issues are referenced and 
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supported. The court, having reviewed portions of the transcript, and 
considering the state of the record, feels that clarification is necessary and 
therefore modifies and/or clarifies its prior pronouncements as set forth herein. 
As Idaho's Court of Appeals has recently recognized: 
A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension 
of the criminal case from which it arises. Rather, it is a 
separate civil action in which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. . . . 
No part of the record from the criminal case becomes 
part of the record in the post-conviction proceeding 
unless it is entered as an exhibit. Exhibits, as well as 
transcripts of the pre-trial proceedings, the trial, and 
sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if 
previously prepared as a result of a direct appeal or 
otherwise, are not before the trial court in the post-
conviction proceeding and do not become part of the 
record on appeal unless presented to the trial court as 
exhibits, . .. or unless the trial court takes judicial 
notice of such records from the criminal case. . . . 
Although the district court may have reviewed 
portions of the record from the underlying criminal 
action on its own initiative, if the petitioner does not 
include such material in the record on appeal from 
the denial of post-conviction relief, the appellate court 
will not consider it. ... 
Esquivel v. State, __ Idaho --' --,233 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Thus, it is noteworthy that Ms. Johnson carries the burden of proof in this 
case. It is incumbent upon her to establish those parts of the record which 
support her claims. While this court may, "on its own initiative, review portions 
of the record from the underlying criminal action," such material must be 
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identified by the parties; "this Court will not go in search of it." LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 118-119,937 P.2d 427, 430 - 431 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Munster v. State, 129 Idaho 65,68,921 P.2d 765, 768 (Ct. App. 
1996». 
The court is concerned that it left the impression, direct or otherwise, that 
it was intending to read the entire transcript and search for the relevant evidence 
in this case. To the extent that the court left that impression with counsel, it 
erred. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that, as it pertains to motions for 
summary judgment, "the trial court is not required to search the record looking 
for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing 
the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court's 
attention./I Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 
919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008). 
In regard to a motion for summary dismissal in the post-conviction 
context, the Court of Appeals ruled similarly: I/[I]f the applicant facing such a 
motion fails to present evidence making a prima facie case, i.e., establishing each 
essential element of the claim, then summary dismissal is appropriate./I Barcella 
v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 475, 224 P.3d 536,542 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994». 
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Given a post-conviction applicant's burden to establish his or her claims 
by citation to admissible evidence at the summary judgment stage, it is even 
more incumbent upon an applicant to make such a showing at the trial stage. See 
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, __ Idaho --' --' 234 P.3d 699, 707 (2010) 
(where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and 
to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are 
too indefinite to be determined by the Court.); Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 
344, 179 P.3d 303,307 (2008) ("We will not require the trial court to search the 
record to determine if there is any new information that might change the 
specification of facts deemed to be established."); Cf Idaho Dept. of Health & 
Welfare v. Doe, 2010 WL 4342147, 8 (Idaho App. 2010) (A general attack on the 
findings and conclusions of a trial court, without specific reference to evidentiary 
or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.). 
Accordingly, this court does not intend to read the entire transcript of the 
criminal trial, although it was admitted into evidence. The court expects counsel 
to direct this court, with citations to the record!, to the evidence which supports 
that party's claims. This is particularly crucial regarding those claims which 
require a showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, the result would have been different, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 
I The "record" includes all evidence admitted at trial. Citations to any transcript must include the page 
number and relevant lines. 
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668,687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984), or a showing that newly discovered 
evidence, not previously presented and heard, "will probably produce an 
acquittal. . .. /1 State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 150-151, 191 P.3d 217,228 -
229 (2008) (quoting State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)). 
The court will therefore await receipt of the parties' post-trial memoranda, 
including citations to the record as specified herein, before continuing a review 
of the trial transcript from State v. Johnson. Should either party request 
clarification of this order, the court will schedule a status hearing at the earliest 
opportunity by telephone. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this /:2 ~ ofJan 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the Ja day of January, 2011, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or 
hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Mr. Christopher Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Ms. Jessica M. Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General and 
Special Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box R3720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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FILED~~ 7" 
JAN 2 7 2011 
,z. 
i::'?lt:96cf/:'* District 
,nB nty, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FlFIH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
. StATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SAR.lUI M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO) ) . 
) 
~ ______ ~Re==s~~m=rum=-t ________ ~) 
Case No~ CV -2006~324 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
RELATING TO BRIEFING . 
SCHEDULE 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, and the State~ by and through their 
ll~spective counsels of record, and file this STIPULATION RELATING TO BREIFn-IO 
SCHEDULE and state as follows: 
1.. Pc~titioner's Pt.wt.ition for Post-Conviction Rellef'was heard by this Court from. 
December 6,2010 through December to,201O. 
2. The Court aroered Petitioner and the State to file Proposed Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, as well as Rebuttal Briefs! to be filed on January 31, 2011, and 
February 14,2011, re:spectively. 
3. Due to unforeseen factual oircumstances beyond the control of either party or 
counsel,:the partiefi have mutually agreed to continue the deadline of January 31.2011, to 
. . 
Feb'nlary 14,2011, for the filing of Proposed Findings o~Facts and C~nclusions of Law 
alld for rebuttal briefing from February 14, 2011. to February 28, 2011. 
STIPULA.TION AND ORDER RELATING TO SCHEDULING 1 
i:OOO/7.0001l"l 
YVd L~:Ol TtOZ/9Z/10 
JAN-27-2011 THU 01:38 PM DISTRICT TCA FAX NO, 736 4002 p, 03 
JAN.26,2011 8:22AM IDAHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO. 302 P. j 
msSICA LORBLLO~ DBPUTY ATtORNEY G:ENERAL 
DAilID 
#J . 
SO ORDEaED'this ;Z?,. day ofJmum:y, 2011 
\:: 11/'1 n /!:" 011'10 IW\ 
COOo/~oool!l 
HONORABLE G~ lUCRAlID BEVAN 
Disttict Court Judge fur the F"tfth Jud.io.fal Dis'/rlet 
_ .... ft_" ___ -"'- ... - ............. .. 
FEB. 14.2011 4: 11PM 
LAWRENCE G. ,WASDEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
ATTY GENERAL-SPU 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Chief, Deputy A~omey General 
Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051 
Deputies Attorney General and 
Special prosecuting Attorneys 
P.O. Box 83720: 
Boise. Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 332-3096 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074 
NO. 343 P. 2 
FILE 
FEB 1 4 2011 
Jolynn Drags, Clerk DI6trlct 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHNSON ) 
) 
Petitioner,' ) Case No. CV-06·324 
) 
vs. ) RESPONDENT'S POST· 
) EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO. ) PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
) FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
Respondent ) OF LAW 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits the Respondent's Post-
EVidentiary Hearing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
BACKGROUND 
Johnson filed a Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (HPetltion") 
on January 11, 2010, alleging a number of different claims, The state moved for 
summary dismissal of Johnson's Petition and Johnson filed a cross-motion for summary 
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disposition. Following briefing and oral argument on the parties' motions, the Court 
denied Johnson's motion and granted in part, and denied in part, the state's motion for 
summary dismissal. The non-dismissed claims that proceeded to an evidentiary 
hearing were 1 ; 
Claim 4(a) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a 
FEB. 14.2011 4:11PM NO. 343 P. 4 
With respect to the claims that were the subject of the evidentiary hearing held 
December 7 -10,2010, the state now offers the following proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS Of FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Claim 41a} 
In Claim 4(a). Johnson contends trial counsel were ineffective for failing to move 
for a continuance after discovering "that a comforter, that would have contained physical 
evidence, had been discarded and not gathered as physical evidence." (Petition. pp.7-
8, 'If a.) According to Johnson, she was prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so 
because it left counsel "inadequately prepared to cross-examine the State's witnesses 
about the alleged comforter" and "[slpecifically, whether a hole on the comforter was a 
bullet hole and whether a sheet and or comforter covered the head of Diane Johnson 
thereby effecting blood spatter." (Petition, p.8, 1115.a.) Johnson failed to meet her 
burden of establishing deficient performance or prejudice to support this allegation. 
1. Proposed Factual Findings Relevant To Claim 4(a) 
At trial, Officer Ross Kirtley, the first member of law enforcement to arrive on the 
scene, and Marshal Randy Tremble, who arrived shortly after Officer Kirtley, testified 
that the comforter was covering Diane's head and Officer Kirtley had to use his asp to 
IIflip[ ] the covers back," (Trial Tr} Vol. III, p.1793, Ls.19-21.) The comforter from 
Diane and Alan Johnson's bed, where Diane was murdered, was not collected as 
evidence. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1986, L - p.1987, L.6, p.2016, Ls.21-24.) No evidence 
2 The trial transcript was admitted in CD form as Exhibit 2 at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing. 
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was presented regarding precisely when trial counsel, Bob Pangburn and Mark Rader, 
became aware of this fact; however, Mr. Rader testified at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing that it was "close" to trial, but he could not recall how close. (Tr., 
p.158, L.24 - p.!159, L.10.) Although counsel did not move for a continuance on the 
basis of the timing of counsels' discovery that the comforter had not been collected, the 
defense capitalized on the state's failure to collect the evidence, highlighting it as a 
deficiency in the state's case. (See,!!!WL., Trlal Tr., Vol. III, p.2073, L.7 - p.2075, L.24; 
Trial Tr., Vo!. IV, p.2464. L.3 - p.2467. L.17; Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p,4605, Ls.5-8.) 
When asked at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing why a continuance would 
have been helpful, Mr. Rader testified they could have "back[ed] up and re-examlne[d] 
some of this material and tr[ied] and find a better way of presenting it at trial," like 
"things involving what happens to a head when it's shot at close range, those kinds of 
things." (Tr. t p.161, L.6 - p.162" L.S.) Johnson did not, however, present any evidence 
at the post-conviction hearing indicating what additional evidence could have been 
submitted to the jury had such a request for a continuance been made, much Jess what 
information she could have presented to the court in order to get the continuance in the 
first instance. (See generally Tr.) 
2. Conolusions Of Law Relevant To Claim 4(a) 
In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Johnson was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsels' 
perlormance was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of 
hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is 
RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 4 
FEB,14,2011 4:12PM NO, 343 p, 6 
a strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance - that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). It was 
Johnson's burden to present evidence at the hearing sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" in order to establish that 
counsels' performance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Because "[s]trategic and tactical decisions will not be 
second-guessed or serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel," it was also Johnson's burden to prove that counsels' decisions 
were the result of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcoMings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372~373. 
941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 
(1994); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct.Ap,p. 1994»). In 
order to prove prejudice, Johnson was required to show that counsels' deficient 
performance actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for counsels' 
deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would 
have been different Strickland,466 U.S. at 693; Cowger Vo State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 
978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second element, Johnson had the 
burden of showing that her trial counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
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produced a just result." Strickland., 466 U.S. at 686; 'vey v. state. 123 Idaho 77,80,844 
P .2d 706, 709 (1992). 
When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to file 
a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the probability of 
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity 
constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. Sta.te, 127 Idaho 709,713,905 P.2d 
642, 646 (Ct. App_ 1995). As with other decisions made by counsel. Johnson must 
overcome the presumption that the decision not to file a particular motion was strategic 
ortactical. See ·Statev. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial 
counsel's choice of witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his 
lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions). 
Johnson failed to present any evidence at the post-conviction hearing to support 
her claim that counsel was ineffective for falling to request a continuance in order to 
"back up and re-examine" how to address the missing comforter. Specifically, there is 
no evidence from which this Court can conclude that a request for continuance on such 
vague grounds would have even been granted, much less that the continuance would 
have made a difference in the evidence presented or the approach taken at trial. It was 
objectively reasonable for counsel to do precisely what they did in this case - attack the 
state's failure to collect the comforter, along with other Items of evidence the state fajled 
to collect from the crime scene, rather than request a continuance on some vague, 
unsubstantiated basis. 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of demonstrating she is entitled to relief on 
Claim 4(a) and the claim should be dismissed. 
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B. Claim 4(c) 
In Claim 4(c), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective because, she asserts, 
they were «(inadequately prepared to present adequate support for [their] proffered 
expert testimony regarding the blood splattering [sic] evidence;" specifically, their 
"experiment using a coconut [to] re-create the alleged crime {sic]." (Petition, p.8, ~ 
15.c.) Johnson further asserts, as an "example," "Trial Counsel was unable to consult 
with any experts and properly present an experiment that would have met evidentiary 
standards and would have been admissible .... " (Id.) Relief should be denied on this 
claim because it is partially disproven by the record of the criminal trial and because 
Johnson otherwise failed to meet her burden of proving deficient performance or 
prejudice in relation to these allegations. 
1. Proposed Factual Findings ReJevant To Claim 4(c) 
The defense retained a number of experts, including three forensics experts, 
Michael Howard, Keith Inman, and Rocky Mink. (See Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp,4346-4482.) 
During trial, prior to the defense case-in-chief, the court conducted an extensive hearing 
on the state's motion to exclude an experiment conducted by the defense in an effort to 
replicate, using a coconut, the blood spatter that would have occurred when Johnson 
shot Diane in the head. (Tr., Vol. VI, pp.4291-4328; Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp,4336-4503.) 
The court ruled the experiment was inadmissible, crediting forensic pathologist Glen 
Graben's testimony that there was insufficient similarities between the coconut used in 
the experiment and a human head. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.4503-4508,) The court, 
however, advised the defense that if they wanted to "try to re-replicate th[e] test" in the 
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"proper environment," it would ''take another look at it." (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.4508, 
Ls.17-22.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Mr. Rader testified that, in response to 
the court's ruling, he asked his experts "to go back and find, see if there's something 
else [they] could do, n whether there was "some other object that [they] could shoot," but 
his experts "didn't come up with anything." (Tr., p.i66, L.i3 - p.167j L.2.) In hindsight, 
Mr. Rader testified he could have "gone out to ... various defender agencies in various 
places around the COUntlY" to usee if [he} could find different experts or different 
information somehow." (Tr., p.i69, Ls.9-24.) Johnson presented no evidence at the 
hearing regarding what experts counsel would have located had he "reached ouf' nor 
did she present any evidence on what other experiments or reconstruction options CQuid 
have been presented to the trial court. (See generally Tr.) 
2. Conclusions Of Law Relevant To Claim 4(0) 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she i$ entitled to relief on 
Claim 4(c). The trial record belies her assertion that counsel were "unable to consult 
with any experts.n (Petition, p.8, ,-r 15.c.) Counsel clearly had adequate time to consult 
with experts and, In fact, did so. Any request for additional time or resources for the 
purpose of consulting with additional experts would have certainly been denied. In any 
event, Mr. Rader's ideas about what he could have done differently does not establish 
that the actions he did take were anything but strategic or that they were based upon 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or any other shortcoming capable of 
objective evaluation. Indeed, Mr. Rader's assertion that he could have "reached out" 
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and probably "should have" (Tr., p.169, Ls.22-24), is precisely the sort of hindsight that 
is insufficient for establishing a claim of deficient perfonnance. 
Johnson also failed to prove she was prejudiced by counsels' alleged failure to 
"properly present an experiment that would have met evidentiary standards and would 
have been admissible" because she failed to present any evidence of what that 
experiment would have been, much less prove that it would have been admissible. Nor 
can Johnson establish that evidence of some other experiment, even if introduced. 
would have made a difference. This is particularly true in light of the fact that Johnson 
actually presented extensive evidence regarding how blood spatter would have gotten 
on the murderer, which was ultimately the point of the coconut experiment, but was 
clearly not persuasive to the jury in light of all the evidence presented. 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of showing error in relation to Claim 4(0) and 
the claim should be denied. 
C. Claim 4(e} 
In Claim 4(e), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective with respect to the cross-
examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkins, 
Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky 
Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 1f 16.) 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsels' decisions regarding cross-
examination were anything but strategic and tactical and objectively reasonable. 
Johnson also failed to meet her burden of proving a reasonable probability that any 
cross-examination she now believes shOUld have been conducted would have resulted 
in a different outcome. 
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1. Proposed Factual Findings And Conclusions Of Law Relevant To 
Claim 4(,) 
Of the fourteen witnesses Johnson claims were inadequately cross-examined, 
only seven were called as witnesses at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing - Walt 
Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Raul Ornelas. 
and Stu Robinson. (Tr., pp.2-3.) Johnson failed to call Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, KJell 
Eliison, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez. Becky Lopez. or Carlos Ayala and failed to 
present any evidence regarding counsels' decisions regarding their examination of 
these witnesses, or any substantive evidence of how their testimony would have been 
different. (See generally Tr.) Johnson, therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing 
counsel was ineffective in cross-examining these witnesses. 
With respect to those witnesses Johnson did call, the state proposes the 
following factual findings and conclusions of law: 
a. Walt FemJing 
In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "failed to adequately cross-examine 
the Blaine County Sheriff," Walt Femling who allegedly "made a statement during the 
early stages of tre investigation to the effect that it was vital that police find a suspect in 
order to prevent a negative perception of the Sun Valley area from outsiders who may 
have decided not to visit if the crime went unsolved." (Petition, pp.1 0-11, 1116.a.iii.) At 
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked Sheriff Femling whether he 
recalled "making statements to the press very shortly after [the murders], assuring the 
public that there was no concern for their public safety." (Tr., p.328, Ls.4-7.) Sheriff 
Femling answered: 
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Yes. J thought that was very important to let my community know 
that I did not believe that this was a random act of violence or we had 
some killers out there running, that were just randomly picking homes and, 
you know, shooting people. 
So the crime scene definitely told me that probably was not the 
case. 
P. 12 
(Tr., p.328,Ls.8-15.) Sheriff Femling further explained his initial impressions based 
upon the crime scene: 
I think what the crime scene was telling me pretty quick was that it 
was not committed from, by somebody from the outside as a random killer 
or killers that came into the scene. It was somebody that was familiar with 
the house and the contents of the house and that the information that I 
was getting from investigators who had talked to [Johnson] was n01 adding 
up to what the crime scene was telling me. So at that time, it was, you 
know, something's not right here from potentially my only witness to these 
two homiqides. 
(Tr., p.326, Ls.12-2.3.) 
\ 
Sheriff Femling also testified that he did not, on the day of the murders, "form[ ] 
the theory" that Johnson murdered her parents "out of revenge," (Tr., p.338, Ls.11-25.) 
In fact, it was ''weeks'' before Sheriff Femling ruled out Johnson's boyfriend, Bruno 
Santos, as a su~pect. and he did not want to believe Johnson committed the murders 
because she we.nt to school with his son and it was hard to believe that she could have 
done it, but a crucial piece of evidence leading him to believe she was involved "came in 
six weeks after thIe] case started." (Tr., p.340, L.17 - p.342, LA, p.350, L.20 - p.351, 
L.25.) That evidence was Johnson's DNA on lithe gloves that were wrapped in the 
bathrobe found in the garbage can." (Tr., p.341, Ls.10-14.) Sheriff Femllng further 
testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the scope of the investigation 
surrounding the murders: 
You know, I can't give you a time when I, you know, absolutely felt 
confident that it was - [Johnson] acted alone. I can tell you, once again, is 
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rsic] that we worked reaJly hard to make sure that we covered every basis 
that we could, and Bruno Santos was not involved. We believe very 
strongly that he was not involved. There is no evidence at all to put him at 
that scene of that crime . . .. 
(Tr., p.349, Ls.5-13.) 
p, 13 
In addition to investigating Santos, law enforcement also investigated (1) Janet 
Sylten, the cleaning lady Johnson claimed to have heard at 2:00 in the morning outside 
her house the morning of the murders (Tr., p.354, L.23 - p.356, L 1, p.358, Ls.2Q-22); 
(2) Mel Speegle, the owner of the murder weapon (Tr., p.356, Ls.2-7, p.361, L.3 -
p.362, L.1); (3) the possibility of a robbery, which there were no signs of at the 
residence (Tr., p.356, L.8-24); and (4) whether someone escaped up the embankment 
behind the house based on Johnson's claim that the killer went out the back door (Tr., 
p.356, L.25 - p.357, L.19). 
Consistent with his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Sheriff 
Femling testified at trial that, on the day of the murders, he identified four persons of 
interest - Speegle, Santos, Johnson, and the cleaning lady. (Trial Tr" Vol. IV, p.2417, 
L.10 - p.2418. L2.) Also consistent with his post-conviction testimony, Sheriff Femling 
testified at trial that he did hot want to believe Johnson committed the murders and he 
continued to investIgate other possibilities. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2424, Ls.1-7.) In fact, 
just as Sheriff Femling indicated at the post-conviction hearing, at trial he testified law 
enforcement interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, 
spent $517,000 investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, ass.igned 
3.5 people to the case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-Up on all 
investigative leads. (Tria! Tr., Vol. IV, p.2458, LA ~ p.2461, L.16.) 
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Mr. Rader cross-examined Sheriff Femling at trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2461· 
2496; VoL VI, ppA057 -4059.) Johnson did not ask Mr. Rader any questions at the post-
conviction evidentiary about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Sheriff 
Femling. (See generally Tr., pp.138-195.) 
Cross-examination of witnesses is a tactical deciSion. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 563, n.2, 199 P.3d 123, 138 n.2 (2008). As such, the scope of Mr. Rader's cross-
examination is entitled to the presumption that it was sound trial strategy. Johnson has 
failed to rebut that presumption. Indeed, Johnson failed to even Inquire of Mr. Rader 
regarding his strategic decisions regarding Sheriff Femling's testimony, much less prove 
that the strategy was objectively unreasonable. Johnson also failed to prove she was 
prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate cross-examination. In fact, given the 
similarities between Sheriff Femling's trial testimony regarding the scope of the 
investigation into the Johnson murders and his testimony at the post-conviction 
evidentiary heartng, It is difficult to imagine how Johnson could establish prejudice. She 
Is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
b. Steve Harkins 
At trial. in response to a question on direct about how many "calls or interviews" 
were conducted with Bruno, Detective Steve Harkins testified: "I don't know if 1 can give 
you an exact number. I talked to him a number of times. Numerous interviews. Weekly 
contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We made contact over the phone, met 
in person. I didn't document every contact I had with him." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2191, 
Ls.1-6.) Detective Harkins further testified he had spoken to Santos uover a hundred" 
times "[o]ver the last year and a half," "maybe a lot more." (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2114, 
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Ls.20·23.) Johnson alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to "adequately cross-
examine" Detective Harkins about this statement, claiming "police reports and 
supplements do not support this bald assertion." (Petition, p.10, 1]" 16.a.i.) 
Johnson further alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to adequately cross-
examine Detective Harkins "regarding the lack of depth to the search of Santos [sic] 
residence [or] outside dumpster," his "failure to acquire fingerprints from [Santos'} 
known associates," "the inconsistencies in statements made by Santos [sic] family 
members, including his mother and cousin," or about "the fact that .25 caliber 
ammunition was found in Bruno Santos [sic] residence and in the pink robe found in the 
trash can at the crime scene." (Petition, p.10,1l16.a.i, p.12, 11 16.a.vi.) 
At trial, Mr. Pangburn cross..examined Detective Harkins. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
pp.2169-2222, 2235-2244.) Mr. Pangburn did not cross-examine Detective Harkins 
about the number of times he indicated he had spoken with Santos. nor did Mr. 
Pangburn ask Detective Harkins about any alleged inconsistencies in statements made 
by Santos or his family members or the ammunition found in Santos' residence or the 
Johnson's garbage can. (See generally id.) Although Mr. Pangburn did not cross-
examine Detective Harklns about his failure to "fingerprint[ J' Santos' "known 
associates," Mr. Pangburn did ask Detective Harkins about his investigation of Santos' 
uassociates.1i3 Specifically, the following exchange occurred between Mr. Pangburn and 
Dete'ctive Harkins: 
Q: Did you make any efforts to -- You have described, I think, Christian 
Ayala, Carlos Ayala, maybe another person or two. How widely did you 
look into Bruno's associates? 
3 Marshal Tremble was also asked about his investigation bf Santos' "associates." (Trial 
Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1861, L 16 - p.1863, L.24.) 
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A: Pretty extensively. 
Q: How extensively? 
A: I would say - Well, we interviewed a number of kids at school that 
knew him. I would 'say real extensively. 
Q: What about people who may be law breakers, potentially? Did you 
find any of those? 
A: May be what? 
Q: May be law breakers, somebody who would do criminal activity? 
Did you find any of those related to Bruno? 
A: I'm not sure. I'm sure that we talked to some people that were 
involved in criminal activity, yes. 
Q: You're an experienced investigator. We have established that. If a 
person is a suspect regarding the oommission of a crime -- And you have 
indioated .that Bruno at some point was a suspect in this, as it relates to 
this case, correct? 
A: Initially, yes. 
Q: Okay, and is it fajr to say that you look into - When a person is a 
suspeot. you're trying to determine whether that person committed the 
crime, or was involved in a orime, like assisting a person committing a 
crime, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay, did you go to kind of [sic] next step - Is it fair to say that -
Have you ever known of a person who has had someone else 
commit a crime for them? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you do anything to try to figure that out as it related to Bruno 
Santos? 
A: I'm not sure I understand the question. 
Q: The question is did you look for someone who may, at the request 
of Bruno Santos, kill these people? 
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k I would say through the investigation, yes. We followed every lead 
we possibly had to exclude that or to see if It was true; if there was any, 
you know, truth to it. 
Q: Did you look - Did you establish some kind of protocol or a plan, 
course of action? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Wnat was the plan or course of action? 
A: Assigning leads to officers to track down people that knew him, 
conduct interviews; conduct 30, 40, 50 interviews at the high school. To 
gather information. 
Q: But did you look into his drug dealer connection? 
A: No·, I did not. 
Q: Okay, did you look into - How exten&ively did you look into his 
gang connections? I know you talked yesterday that you did some things. 
I think you said that someone contacted some people from Salt Lake, and 
someone contacted some officers form the Boise area. 
Did anybody that you know of - and you're the one looking into 
Bruno Santos, thafs what you have told us -- talk to anybody else about 
gang related activities on Bruno Santos' part? 
A:. The connections in - The contacts made in Boise and Salt Lake 
and through the Northwest Gang investigators Association was done 
primarily on the placement of the knives, where the knives were found. 
The contacts - or the connection with Bruno being involved in any 
gang related [sic] in Blaine County, we don't have a gang problem up 
there. And I did ask him, and I felt that was cleared. I'm pretty familiar 
with the area. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2198, L.17 - p.2202, L.15 (bolding omitted).) 
P. 17 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Mr. Pangburn any 
questions about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Detective Harkins. 
(See generally Tr., pp.237-279.) Johnson did, however, call Detective Harkins as a 
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witness at the post--conviction evidentiary hearing but did not ask him any questions 
about his testimony regarding the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See 
generally Tr .• pp.378441.) Johnson also did not introduce any "police reports" or 
"supplements" at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to rebut Detective Harkins' trial 
testimony about the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See generally Tr.) 
Johnson did ask Detective Harkins about the extent of his search of Santos' 
residence. Detective Harkins testified in that regard that he did not recall what his role 
in the search was, I.e., whether he "actually did the searching or instructed other officers 
to, to search the residence." (Tr., p.406, Ls.20-24.) DetectiVe Harkins acknowledged 
the "trash receptacles" at the apartment complex where Santos lived were not 
searched. (Tr., p.407, Ls.17-22.) Detective Harkins explained the "trash receptacles" 
were not searched "because [he] and ten other detectives probably didn't think it was 
necessary," (Tr .• p.410, Ls.1-3.) Johnson did not introduce any evidence regarding 
what a more extensive search of Santos' residence or a search of the "trash 
receptacles" would have uncovered. (See generally Tr.) 
Johnson also asked Detective Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
about whether .25 automatic shells were found at Santos' residence and Detective 
Harkins agreed that tho,se were found. (Tr .• p.410, Ls.11-25.) Detective Harkins further 
testified that he was aware that .25 shells were found in the pocket of the robe 
discovered in the garbage can at the Johnson's house.4 (Tr., p.411. Ls.1-6.) 
4 Exhibit 20, admitted at trial, was a photograph of five rounds of .25 ammunition found 
in the pocket of Johnson's robe. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1900, L.19 - p.1901, L.13.) Exhibit 
103, also admitted at trial. was a photograph of a box of Remington .25 automatic shells 
with five missing rounds. (Trial Tr" Vol. III, p.2048, Ls.1-16.) 
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With respect to his involvement in the investigation of Consuela Cedeno and 
Jane Lopez, D.etective Harkins testified at the evidentiary hearlng that he did not recall 
interviewing them, but he was sure he talked to them "at one point." (Tr., p.411, LS.10-
14.) Johnson did not ask Detective Harkins about any inconsistencies in Ms. Cedeno's 
testimony but did ask him questions about Jane Lopez's testimony. Specifically, 
Johnson asked: "[I)f I told you that those phone numbers [that were subpoenaed] 
verified that Jane Lopez did not in fact call Bruno nor the home phone number when 
she originally told you and when she testified before the court, do you think I'd be 
mistaken about that?" (Tr., p.413, Ls.7-12.) Detective Harkins responded that he had 
"an explanation of why they weren't recovered." (Tr., p.4i3, Ls.13-14.) That 
explanation was' that if a call was made from uQwest to Qwest numbers, local carriers, 
[they] would not be recorded," and that "in 2003 the whole valley's local phone carrier 
was Qwest." (Tr., p.414, Ls.3-5, 15-17.) So, If Jane Lopez had "called from the school 
to a home number, it wouldn't be recorded." (Tr. t p.416, Ls.3-4.) 
Johnson also asked Detective Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
whether he "learned quickly" who Santos' "close associates were." (Tr., p.422, LS.16-
18.) Detective Harkins answered: "I don't know which ones you're referring to. There 
was several interviewed that were friends of his." (Tr., p.422, Ls.19-21.) Johnson 
specifically asked about "Ayala," and Detective Harkins agreed he was Interviewed. 
(Tr., p.422, Ls.22-24.) Johnson then asked whether Detective Harkins ever "took any 
DNA swab from Ayala." (Tr., p.422, L.25 - p.423, L.1.) Detective Harkins testified that 
he could not recall. (Tr., p.423, lo3.) Johnson did not ask Detective Harkins about 
fingerprinting Ayala, nor did she ask him about any other of Santos' "associates.n (See 
generally Tr., pp.377-441.) 
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A review of the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
reveals Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's cross-examination 
of Detective Harkins at trial was anything but strategic and tactical. In fact, Johnson 
failed to present any evidence to support a number of the deficiencies she alleged in 
relation to Dete~ive Harkins' cross-examination. Johnson also failed to demonstrate 
any proof of prejudice resulting from the cross-examination that was conducted, 
particularly when Detective Harkins' trial testimony is compared to his post-conviction 
testimony. This claim should be dismissed. 
c, Bruno Santos 
Johnson's Petition alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine 
Bruno Santos about the "abundant information" that Santos "was dealing drugs," "had 
gang connections," and had "committed the crime of statutory rape." (Petition, p.13, ~ 
16.d.) 
At trial, prior to Santos testifying, the state moved, in limine, to preclude the 
defense from asking Santos about his arrest on October 30. 2004, or about "statutory 
rape" or "having sexual relations with Sarah Johnson." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2739, L.8-
p.2740, L.3.) The prosecutor objected to any inquiry on the arrest as irrelevant and on 
the grounds that Santos would "be claiming the Fifth" on any "pending case" and would 
also "invoke his privilege not to incriminate himself' on his sexual relationship with 
Johnson. (ld.) The state also objected to any questions on a previous battery charge 
when Santos was a juvenile. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2740, L24 - p.2741, L.7.) Counsel for 
Santos confirmed that he advised Santos to "invoke his privilege against self~ 
incrimination with respect to any questions relating to drug activity" and any questioning 
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regarcnng his sexual relationship with Johnson, (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2743, Ls.12-15, 
p.2751, L.24 - p.2752, L.18.) 
Mr. Rader responded to the state's motion and ultimately agreed not to inquire of 
Santos regarding his October 30 arrest or the "juvenile information." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2745,Ls.4-17.) Mr. Rader, however, stated he was "going to ask questions about 
[Santos'] gang involvement" and "the fact that he admitted having sexual relations with 
Sarah Johnson seven times, and she was a minor at the time and he was an adult." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2747, Ls.1-6; see also p.2748, L.1 - p.2749, L.6 (Mr. Rader 
explaining in detail why Santos' gang involvement and "other bad acts" should be 
admitted), p.2750, L.4 - p.2751, L 1 (Mr, Rader offering further argument regarding why 
he believes certain evidence relating to Santos should be admitted).) 
The court limited cross-examination of Santos as follows: 
, .. 1 will allow you to ask the questions outside the presence of the 
jury and make an offer of proof. 
What my research is is that if the defendant intends - I mean the 
witness intends to invoke the Fifth and you know that, you cannot ask him 
those questions; because the Fifth is not an answer -- it's not evidence, I 
mean. 
It's an answer, but it's not eVidence; and it's designed solely to 
support an improper inference in front of the jury. And I won't let you do 
that. 
You also represented that you have this same evidence available 
through other witnesses; and you have also - it's also in the record that 
this same evidence is before the jury, undisputed. 
So having Santos get on the stand and take the Fifth can only be, 
from my view, for an improper purpose, and that's to try to cause an 
improper inference in front of the jury. And that's why ( won't let you do it. 
You tell me that you have this evidence from a variety of sources, 
so we're not going to go there. But if you people want to reach that little 
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stipulated fact [that there was a sexual relationship between Santos and 
Johnson], then we'll go from there. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV. p.2754, L.21 - p.27S5, L 19.) 
P. 22 
Although the trial court limited the scope of cross-examination of Santos, much of 
the information that was subject to the state's motion in limine had already been elicited 
through cross-examination of other witnesses. For example, during cross-examination 
of Sheriff Femling. Mr. Rader elicited that Santos was a "look-out" for a fight, which 
resulted in a suspension. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2474, L.8 - p.2475, L.3.) Mr. Rader also 
asked Sheriff Femling about Santos' reported drug use, to which Sheriff Femling 
responded: "I think we did show that he does have involvement in drugs" and that he 
had "used illegal drugs." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2475. L.21 - p.2476., L.7.) 
On direct examination at trial, Santos testified (1) he was dating Johnson when 
the murders occurred (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2761, Ls.15-19); (2) Alan Johnson came to his 
apartment the weekend before the murders and threatened that if he did not "'eave his 
daughter alone, ... he was gOing to hit [him] and ... put [him] in jail" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.Z762, Ls.S-1B); (3) he saw Johnson the Monday before the murders and she was 
acting "weird" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2763, L.9 - p.2764, L.7); (4) he spent the night at 
home the night before the murders (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2764, Ls.16-20); (5) his cousin, 
Jane Lopez, called him about the murders the morning they occurred (Trial Tr' j Vol. IV, 
p.2764, L.24 - p.2765. L.S); (6) he was surprised about the murders and went to the 
Johnson's home to see what happened (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.Z765, L.6 - p.2766, L.9); (7) 
he allowed law enforcement to search his car and apartment, he submitted to fingerprint 
and blood testing, and gave them his clothes (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2766, L.16 - p.2767, 
L.3); (8) he saw Johnson at the hospital the day of the murders at which time she 
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hugged him and told him she loved him and said she was sorry and "not to worry" (Trial 
Tr. t Vol. IV, p.2768, L.7 - p.2768, L.5); (9) he was deported in September 2003 and 
returned to the United States to testify (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2768, L.17 - p.2769, L.4); 
(10) he was not at the Johnson's hOllse the night before the murders and did not 
remember Johnson telling him there were guns in the guest house (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2769, Ls.5-10); and (11) there was a wedding at the Johnson's house the weekend 
before the murders th.at Johnson wanted him to attend, but Alan would not let him, 
which upset Johnson (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2770. L.21 - p.2770, L6). Santos denied 
having anything to do with murdering Alan and Diane. (Trial Tr" Vol. IV, p.2769, Ls.11-
13.) 
When asked about details regarding his relationship with Johnson and her 
feelings towards: her parents, Santos was vague and non-commIttal: 
Q: Did Sarah ever talk to you, Bruno, about living together and buying 
a house, and your family coming to live with you? 
A:. On,e day, we were just playing around, and we were just saying 
things. . 
Q: Did Sarah eVer tell you, Bruno, that she wanted to move out of her 
parents' house? 
A: I don't remember. 
Q; Did Sarah ever talk to you about how she felt about her parents? 
A: A few times. I'm not really sure. 
Q: Was Sarah -- Did Sarah ever talk about being upset or not liking 
her dad? 
A: One time, I think. I'm not really sure. I don't know. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p_2770, Ls.7-21 (bold omitted).) 
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After Santos testified on direct examination, Mr. Rader advised the court that the 
defense "decided not to enter into a stipulation" and "decided not to cross examine Mr. 
Santos," (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2771. Ls.11-13.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked both Mr. Rader and 
Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to cross-examine Santos. Despite Mr. Raders 
vigorous response to the state's motion in limine regarding the scope of Santos' cross· 
examination, Mr. Rader claimed at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Pangburn would, 
without any "warning," have Mr. Rader cross..examine witnesses he had not planned on 
cross-examining. (Tr., p.172, Ls.19-24.) Although Mr. Rader could not recall how many 
witnesses he cross-examined, or even recall the witnesses he was responsible for, he 
claimed Mr. Pangburn gave him the responsibility of cross-examining Santos without 
any prior notice. (Tr., p.172, L13-p.173, L.2, p.188, L.5-p.189, L2.) 
Mr. Pangburn denied Mr. Rader's assertions, testifying that the deciSion to have 
Mr. Rader cross-examine Santos and other witnesses was not made at the last minute, 
and that Mr. Rader did not object to cross-examining any particular witness. (Tr., p.282, 
L.19 - p.283, L.19.) Mr. Pangburn's testimony in this regard is more credible than Mr. 
Rader's given Mr. Rader's Involvement in arguing the motion in limine, during which he 
demonstrated extensive knowledge of the information available on which Santos could 
be cross-examined and the reasons why he believed such cross-examination should 
have been permitted (see generally Trial Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2741-2743, 2747-2754), and in 
light of Mr. Rader's general inability to remember who he cross-examined; most 
significantly, Mr. Rader still believed at the time of the post-conviction hearing that he 
handled the fingerprint evidence even though the record clearly Indicates Mr. Pangburn 
handled that evidence (TL, p.188, L.S - p.189, L.2; Trial Tr' j Vol. V, pp.3058~3072; Vol. 
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VII, pp.5045-5100 (Mr. Pangburn examining witnesses regarding the fingerprint 
evidence).) 
Johnson also called Santos as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. (Tr., pp.472-490.) As the trial court did, this Court concluded that Santos 
could invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (See id.) When 
asked about his "gang connections," Santos did just that, declining to answer any 
questions on that subject. (Tr., p.482, Ls.10-14.) Johnson did not ask Santos about the 
other topics she claimed in her Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
inquIre into, i.e., "dealing drugs" and whether he had "committed the crime of statutory 
rape.'rS (Petition, p.13, 4fi 16.d; Tr., pp.472-490.) 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of proving counsel's decision not to cross-
examine Santos was anything but strategic or that the decision was objectively 
unreasonable in light of the testimony Santos offered on direct and the limitations on 
cross-examination. Johnson likewise failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the 
failure to cross-examine Santos, Santos provided no additional testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing that would have aided in Johnson's defense and there is no reason 
to conclude that cross-examination of Santos at trial would have resulted in a different 
outcome in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Johnson and the 
complete absence of any evidence implicating Santos in the murders. Johnson failed to 
meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief on her claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to cross-examine Santos. 
5 Nor did Johnson ask either Mr. Rader or Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to enter 
into a stipulation regardIng the sexual nature of Johnson's relationship with Santos. 
(See generally Tr., pp.138-187, 196-198, 237-279.) 
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d. Consuelo Cedeno 
With respect to Ms. Cedeno, Johnson alleges in her Petition: 
Mr~ Pangburn had been provided information based on prior 
statements of Consuelo Cedeno wherein she insisted her son Bruno 
Santos had not driven the car the morning of the murders because there 
was dew on the windshield. Further, Ms. Cedeno asserted in pre.trial 
statements that she checked the mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno 
was lying about where he had been .... Ms. Cedeno testified at trial that 
she didn't pay attention to such thjngs. Yet, Trial Counsel failed to cross-
examine Ms. Cedeno. 
(Petition, p.12. ~ 16.a.v. (capitalization original. citations omitted).) 
p, 26 
At trial, Ms. Cedeno testified (through an interpreter), in relevant part, as follows: 
Q: Okay, the morning Alan and Diane Johnson were killed, Tuesday 
morning, did you go to work that morning? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do' you recall seeing Bruno in the house that morning when you 
went to work? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was he dOing? 
A: He was sleeping. 
Q: All right, and about what time do you go to work? 
A: Well, exactly, I couldn't really tell you, I don't remember, but I think 
around 7:30, 8:00. I always leave around 7:30 or 8:00. 
Q: Okay, where was Bruno sleeping at that time? 
A: In a mattress in the living room. And then my bedroom is right next 
to it. 
Q: And when you left to work that morning, the morning Alan and 
Diane were killed, did you see Bruno's car in the parking lot? 
A: It's actually my car, and I always take it; and sometimes he does 
take it, too. But it's usually just me, because I am the one that has the 
key I so it was parked. 
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Q: And could you tell whether or not It looked like the car had been 
driven that morning before you got into it? 
A: No. 
Q: And how could she tell? 
A: Because I have the key. r have the key. 
Q: Miss Cedeno, was there anything on the window, was there dew on 
the window? 
A: Well, no, no. I don't pay attention to things like that. But no, I didn't 
look. 
Q: But it's her car and she had the keys to it? It's your car, and you 
had the keys to it, is that correct? 
A: Always. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.277 4, L.19 - p.2776, L.9.) 
Mr. Rader indicated the defense would not be cross-examining Ms. Cedeno. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2ne, Ls.12-13.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Pat Dunn, trial counsels' lead 
investigator, testified that he made counsel aware of information that Ms. Cedeno "gave 
statements to the police concerning ... the condition of Bruno's vehicle, which was 
actually her vehicle," that there was "dew on the window, that she checked the odmoter, 
and various things like that." (Tr., p.62, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Dunn also testified that he 
"consulted with some weather people and found out that there was, in fact, no dew in 
the Hailey area on the other side of the airport that day, so there would have been no 
dew on the windows," (Tr., p.63, Ls.3-7.) 
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While examining Mr. Rader at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson 
asked Mr. Rader about his decision not to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno. (Tr., p.178, 
Ls.15-21.) Mr. Rader testified that he did not "remember doing that. but [he] wouldn't b.e 
surprised if [he] did." (Tr., p.178, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Rader further testified that, although he 
did not remember that Ms. Cedeno made certain statements to police about keeping 
track of the mileage on the car or that Stantos "was always lying to her," he was not 
prepared 'to cross-examine her because Mr. Pangburn "handed off that witness." (Tr., 
p.179, L.i3 - p.180, L.5.) 
Johnson called Ms. Cedeno as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. (Tr., pp.457-468.) Ms. Cedeno largely denied any recollection of the events 
surrounding the murders of Alan and Diane. (Tr., pp.460-468.) With respect to the only 
claim in Johnson's Petition regarding the cross-examination of Ms. Cedeno - that 
counsel failed to cross-examine her regarding her statements to law enforcement that 
she checked the mileage on the car and saw dew on the windshield the morning of the 
murders - Ms. Cedeno testified she did not remember making either statement to law 
enforcement. (Tr., p.464, L.7 p.468, L.7.) 
Regardless of whether Mr. Rader felt prepared to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno, 
Johnson has failed to establish he was deficient for failing to impeach her regarding a 
pre-trail statement she made to law enforcement that she directly contradicted on direct 
examination. Johnson also failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Mr. Rader's 
failure to inquire into this topic at trial because, regardless of what Ms. Cedeno's answer 
would have been at that time, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of 
Johnson's trial would have been different as a result. This claim should be dismissed. 
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e. Jane Lopez 
AS to Jane Lopez, Johnson's Petition alleges: 
[A] discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial testimony and proof to 
the contrary found in phone records, indicating Bruno Santos was not at 
his mother's house. Trial Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, 
yet, Trial Counsel failed to utilize the records on cross-examination. 
(Petition, p,12, 1f 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted).) 
P. 29 
At trial, Ms. Lopez, who is Santos' cousin, and who worked at the Blaine County 
High School at the time of the murders, testified that after she heard about the murders, 
she called Santos around 8:30. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV~ p.2789. L 14 - p.2791, L.20.) Ms. 
Lopez testified that first she called Santos' house, i'and he didn't answer," so she "called 
his cell phone, and he answered." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791, Ls.22-24.) She asked 
Santos "where he was, and he said, 'At home.'" (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791, Ls.24-25.) 
When Ms. Lopez asked why he did not answer the home phone, Santos stated he was 
sleeping and told Ms. Lopez that if she did not believe him, she should call him again at 
the home number. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV. p.2791, L25 - p.2792, L.S.) Ms. Lopez testified 
that she then did call Santos at home, "he answered the phone," and she told him about 
the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p,2792, Ls.S-B.) According to Ms. Lopez, Santos 
"seemed really surprised and really shocked." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2792, Ls.22-25.) 
Mr. Rader cross-examined Ms. Lopez at trial. asking whether those were the 
"only phone calls" she made to Santos. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2794, Ls.6-7.) Ms. Lopez 
answered. "yeah." (Trial Tr .. Vol. IV, p.2794. L.15.) 
Ms. Lopez reiterated this version of events at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. (Tr., p.370, L.22 - p.372, L.10, p.374, L.19 - p.375, L1.) Ms. Lopez did not, 
however. remember the actual phone numbers she called. (Tr., p.375. Ls.1-25.) 
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Johnson did not attempt to impeach Ms. Lopez with any phone records. (Tr., pp.368-
376.) 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's decision regarding 
the cross-examination of Ms. Lopez was anything but strategic, much less that it was 
defioient, and she failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Mr. Rader's failure to 
try and impeach Ms. Lopez with the phone records. Indeed, Johnson did not even 
attempt to do so at the post~conviction evidentiary hearing. Consequently, she cannot 
demonstrate hoW any such impeachment would have made a difference. Because 
Johnson has falted to meet her burden of showing counsel was ineffective in his cross-
examination of Ms, Lopez, this claim should be dismissed. 
f. Raul Ornelas 
Johnson's Petition alleges trial counsel "faIlIed} to adequately cross-examine 
Officer Raul Ornelas who testified regarding footprints allegedly observed in wet grass 
in the back yard." and U[s)pecifically, ... failed to point out the [sic] Tim Richards, the 
neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked the very area of the back yard 
later observed by Ornelas," and counsel ''further failed to highlight the fact that Ornelas 
concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, thereby pointing 
blame from fjohnson1 alone and onto unidentified murders." (Petition, p.10, 11 16.a.ii.) 
At trial, TIm Richards, who was not called as a witness at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing, testified that after Johnson came to his home reporting that her 
parents had been shot, he walked down the "gravel road" by the Johnson residence and 
"peered into the backyard," then "went around the back side of the guest house" where 
"there's a little bit more gravel." (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1586, Ls.7.1D, p.1607, Ls.15-25.) 
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Mr. Richards further testified that there is a dirt hill behind the guest house and that he 
did not see any footprints going up the hill. (Trial Tr" Vol. III, p.1608. Ls.4.18.) 
With respect to footprints, Officer Ornelas testified on direct examination at trial 
that, after responding to the Johnson residence, he was "looking around" and "noticed 
that there were tracks in the lawn." (Trial Tr., Vol. 11/, p.1735, Ls.17-18.) The prints 
were IIdue north 'to the back of th[e] guesthouse" and "disappeared there by the stairs." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. III. p.1736, Ls.10-12.) In all, Officer Ornelas saw "two or three sets of 
footprints" because the grass was dewy, "including "footprints that led back to the 
garage." (Trial Tr., Vol. III. p.1736, L.20 - p.1737, L.15.) Officer Ornelas could not, 
however. tell whether the prints belonged to more than one person. (Trial Tr., Vol. /II, 
p.1737, Ls.20-22.) Officer Ornelas did not observe any footprints going up the 
embankment behind the house or from the "patio that leads off of the bedroom ... on 
the northeast side." (Tria/Tr., Vol. III, p.1738, Ls.14-25, p.1739, Ls.11-19.) 
Mr. Pangburn cross-examined Officer Ornelas at trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. /Il, pp.1759-
1772.) On cross-examination, Mr. Pangburn specifically asked Officer Ornelas about 
the footprints he observed in the yard and his failure to conduct an "extensive search" of 
the hillside for footprints. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, pp.1765-1771.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary healing, Johnson did not ask Mr. Pangburn 
about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Officer Ornelas. (See Q..enerally 
Tr., pp.239-279.) Johnson did, however. inquire of Officer Ornelas regarding his 
recollection of the footprints he observed on the morning of the murder. (Tr., 
p.205,Ls.15-18.) Officer Ornelas reiterated that he observed footprints in the backyard 
and again described those plints. (Tr., pp.205-209.) Officer Ornelas further testified 
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that he was not aware of "anybody else" who had "been in the backyard looking for a 
possible perpetrator prior to [his} arrivaL" (Tr., p.209, Ls.8-1S.) 
Contrary to the assertions in Johnson's Petition, there is no evidence that Mr. 
Richards "walked the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas." Rather, 
Mr. Richards only testified that he walked down the gravel road, not that he walked in 
the grass, whicA is where Officer Ornelas obseNed the footprints. Also contrary to 
Johnson's assertion, Officer Ornelas did not "conclude[ ] the footprints were made by 
more than one person;') in fact, he specifically testified that he could not tell. Thus, 
Johnson failed to prove it was either deficient performance or prejudicial to fail to I'point 
out'l or "highlight" Information that was not actually in evidence. Further, Johnson failed 
to offer any evidence, let alone prove, that Mr. Pangburn's cross--examination of Officer 
Ornelas was anything but tactical. Johnson's claim regarding Officer Ornelas should be 
dismissed. 
g. ~tu Robinson 
In her Petition, Johnson alleges trial counsel "should have been aware" that 
"Officer Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted that no latent prints were found 
at the crime scene" but "[d]lscoverable documentsI J made absolutely clear that this 
testimony was inaccurate and false testimony, in that the record reveals that thirty nine 
(39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (Petition, p.13, 1T 16.b.) 
Mr. Rader cross-examined Mr. Robin'son at trial and did not attempt to impeach 
him with his grand jury testimony. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, pp.2069-2082.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson read the following excerpt 
from his grand jury testimony to Mr. Robinson: 
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Mr. Robinson, that [grand} juror asked: You say you found a .264 
casing in the garage and one in the chamber. r'm wondering If any prints 
were taken and found on those casings. 
[fhe prosecutor] interjected, as it's his right to do, and said: Good 
point. Let me ask you this, Detective Robinson. Did you collect the gun, 
the scope, the casings, and probably a whole host of other things to send 
for fingerprint analysis? 
And you said at that time - this is back in October of 2003 -- yes, 
we did. 
Question [by the prosecutor]: Now, on the gun and the scope and 
the casing, did your Idaho State Police lab do that analysis or attempt to 
do that analysis? 
Mr. Robinson: Yes, that's correct. 
[The prosecutor] asked you the question: Now, based On your - on 
your, I guess, investigation and as part of your case review, as far as you 
know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the scope, or the 
casings? 
And you answered: They could not locate any prints that could be 
identified . 
(Tr., p.230, L.19 - p.231, L.17.) 
p, 33 
Johnson then asked Mr. Robinson to agree that the testimony was inaccurate. 
(fr., p.232, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Robinson did not agree and explained that, contrary to 
Johnson's interpretation of the testimony, his testimony accurately stated that the prints 
could not. at that time, be identified. (Tr., p.232. L.18 - p.234, l,2; see also Tr., p.236, 
L.21 - p.237, L.3.) 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Mr. Rader about 
his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Mr. Robinson. (See generally Tr., 
pp.138-187, 196-199.) Johnson, therefore, failed to establish Mr. Raders decisions 
regarding cross-examination of Mr. Robinson were anything but tactical. Johnson also 
failed to prove any prejudice resulting from Mr. Rader's failure to attempt to impeach Mr. 
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Robinson based upor1 post-oonviction oounsel's erroneous Interpretation of Mr. 
Robinsonis grand jury testimony. This olaim should be dismissed. 
Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing either defioient 
perionnanoe .or prejudjce with respect to the cross-examination .of any witness, the 
Court should dismiss Claim 4(e) in its entirety. 
D. Claim 4(f) 
In Claim '4(f), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present 
evidence .of an audio reoording that allegedly illustrates the police IIfocused" on Jchnson 
''to the exclusion of all .other pcssible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] was the 
easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 11 16.c.) The recording tc which Johnsen presumably 
refers was a recording from Officer Kirtley's micr.ophone and dashboard camera, which 
recorded from the moment he was dispatched to the crime scene to approximately two 
hours later, when he was still at the scene. (Exhibit 12.) The audio porticn of the 
recording reveals a number of conversations among members .of law enforcement, 
many of which are inaudIble. (Id.) Johnson played the entirety of the recording at the 
evidentiary hearing (Tr., p.332, L.18, p.334, L.13), and asked Sheriff Femling about 
some of the voices he could identffy en the recording (Tr., p.335, L 17 - p.336, L12). 
Johnson then inquired about Sheriff Femling's theory about what happened, the details 
of which are set forth in Section C.1.a., supra, and are incorporated by reference herein. 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of proving that Officer Kirtley's audio recording 
demonstrates any "f.ocus" other than an effort to "follow the evidence" as opposed to 
jump to conclusions that there was a murder-suicide - a theory not even the defense 
pursued, Further, Johnson failed to establish that the decision not to introduce such 
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evidence was objectively unreasonable or that introduction of such evidence, assuming 
it could even be correctly characterized as Johnson has chara'cterlzed it, would remotely 
undermine confidence in the outcome of her case. 
Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel was 
ineffective for failing to introduce the entirety of Officer Kirtley's audio, the Court should 
deny relief on Claim 4(f). 
E. Claim 12' 
In Claim 12, Johnson alleges there is newly discovered evidence Warranting a 
new trial. (Petition, pp.22-25, mr 27-30.) Specifically, she alleges that latent fingerprints 
on Mel Speegle's rifle, scope and an insert on a box of .264 caliber ammunition were 
identified as belonging to Christopher Kevin Hill. Johnson failed to meet her burden of 
establishing the identification of Mr. Hill's fingerprints requires a neW trial. 
1. Proposed Factual Findings Relevant To Claim 12 
At trial, TIna Walthall, a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho State Police, testified 
that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, Alan Johnson, Diane 
Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), Russell Nux (the cleaning 
lady's boyfriend). and Robin LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer). (Trial Tr. t Vol. V, 
p.3009, Ls.16-2Q.) Ms. Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted 
from the crime scene.s (Trial Tr., Vol. V j p.3018, Ls.2-5.) After those comparisons, 
certain fingerprints taken from the crime scene remained unidentified, including 
fingerprints found on the stock of the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3027, L.20 - p.3028, L.22) , 
e None of the fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched Santos or Sylten. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. V, p.3020. Ls.15~24.) 
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the scope from the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3042, L.Z2 - p.3044. L.2), and two boxes of 
.264 shells (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3049, L.8 - p.3052, L.3). A search of the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System prior to trial using three of the unidentified prints also 
revealed no matches to any of the unidentified fingerprints. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3045, 
L.1 - p.3046, L.10, p.30S3, Ls.5-11, p.3066, Ls.1-13.) 
Ms. Walthall also repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to 
determine when it was left (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3028. Ls.13-17, p.3044, Ls.22-25, p.3052, 
Ls.22-25, p.305S, L.19-p.3062. L.11, p.3073, Ls.5-15.) Ms. Walthall specifically stated: 
(1) "many, many years can pass and you might still find usable fingerprints on" paper or 
cardboard (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3060, Ls.1 0-11); (2) she has discovered prints off of 
nonporous surfaces more than a year later (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, Ls.4-5); (3) one 
would expect to' find fingerprints more than a year old if nothing happened between 
"when they were deposited and when [they were] processed" (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, 
Ls.20-25); and (4) "it is probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a 
year, providing there has been rrothlng to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which 
is true even on a nonporous surface (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3062, Ls.3-6). 
Johnson called Robert Kerchusky at trial to rebut Ms. Walthall's testimony. (See 
generally Trial Tr .. Vol. VII, pp.5044-5132.) With respect to the length of time a 
fingerprint will remain on a gun, Mr. Kerchusky testified: "WeU, we can't be sure how 
long they're going to last. The only thing. as far as a gun is concerned, pretty much on 
my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm concerned." (Trial Tr" 
VoL VII, p.5070, Ls.9-12; ~ also Tr., Vol. V, p.5128, L.22 - p.5129, L.1.) Mr. 
Kerchusky, howevert acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on nonporous surfaces is 
a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far as weather, where it's 
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located. I mean there's so many things that come into It, there's no way in the world 
anybody could write any article on it." (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5107, Ls.3-6.) Mr. 
Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can last for years 
and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent prlnt that was over a year old 
could be found on a nonporous surface. (Trial Tr .. Vol. VII, p.5130, Ls.8-16.) Mr. 
Kerchusky further testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, 
he "stili would have an opinion as far as whether ifs a fresh print or not." (Triar Tr., Vol. 
VII, p.5108, Ls.1 u 6.) 
Mel Speegle, the owner of the .264 rifle Johnson used to murder her parents, 
testified at trial that (1) he kept the rffie in his closet along with three other guns (Triar 
Tr., Vol. IV, p.2702, L.B - p.2703, L.2); (2) the guns were not locked (Trial Tr. t Vol. IV, 
p.2703, Ls.3-8); (3) he saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the 
scope was still on the .264 rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2704, L.6 - p.2706, L.B); (4) he had 
only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2706, Ls.17-21); (5) 
he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (Trial Tr" Vol. IV, p.2708, Ls.2-9); and (6) he has no idea 
how many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a friend helped him move into 
the guesthouse (Trial TL, Vol. IV, p.2707, Ls.11-22). Mr. Speegle also testified that 
Johnson had access to his apartment, that Johnson knew he would be gone the 
weekend before the murders, and that the .264 rifle, as well as his other guns and 
ammunition, were in the closet when Johnson cleaned his apartment and stayed there 
with friends. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2693, Ls.17-20, p.2694, L.25 - p.2696, L.6, p.2715, 
Ls.12-25.) 
In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial. Ms, Walthall 
compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr. Hill. 
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(fr., p.652, Ls.2-21.) Ms. Walthall testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, Mr. Hill's matched those that were found 
on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and the rifle. (fr., p.654, Ls.2·22; see also 
p.SS9, Ls.11-14.) Ms. Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging" 
fingerprints and how long fingerprints can last. (See generally Tr., pp.661--67D.) Ms. 
Walthall reiterated the opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last 
longer than a year. (Tr., p.670, Ls.4-11.) 
Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (fL, 
pp.538-638.) Mr. Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was substantially similar to his 
trial testimony in that he testlfled that fingerprints left on nonporous surfaces "will be 
gone within a year." (fr., , p.553, L.15 - p.554, L1D.) Mr. Kerchusky also referred to 
the prints on the rIfle, scope, and ammunition as "fresh" because, according to him, any 
prints left on the gun before Mr. Speegle put them in his closet would have been wiped 
off by the clothes hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched.» (Tr., 
p.589, Ls.2-15; see also Tr., p.609, L.22 - p.610, L 17, p.612, L.21 - p.613, L21.) With 
respect to the new information that some of the previously unidentified fingerprints had 
been matched to Mr. Hill, Mr. Kerchusky testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Hill was the 
last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Mr. Hill who removed the 
scope. (Tr., p.615, L23 - p.616. L.19.) However, Mr. Kerchusky admitted on cross-
examination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints are 
placed on any given item. (Tr., p.627, Ls.1117.) 
Mr. Speegle and Mr. Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. (fr., pp.699-724. 726-739.) Mr. Speegle testified that he moved into the guest 
house on the Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (fL, p.699, Ls.10-15,) Mr, Hill 
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helped Mr. Speegle move from his uranch house" into the Johnson guest house. (fr., 
p.700, Ls.18·20, p.703, Ls.20-23.) Mr. Hill was a "good friend" of Mr. Speegle's and had 
been a caretaker at Mr. Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Mr. Speelge's 
.264 rifle. (Tr., p.704, Ls.1-4, 11·13, p.724, Ls.10-20.) To Mr. Speegle's knowledge, 
Mr. Hill did no have access to the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.704, Ls.8-10.) 
Mr. Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Mr. Speegle's ranch and that he 
helped Mr. Speegle move Ita few things" into the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.726, 
Ls.14-17, p.727, Ls.S.12.) Mr. Hill also confinned that he did not have access to the 
guest house. (Tr., p.727, Ls.13-16.) Mr. Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any 
involvement in the murders of Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the 
murders until about one week after they occurred because he had been camping. (Tr., 
p.728, Ls.5~20.) In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than 
having possibly left them when he helped Mr. Speegle move, Mr. HilI testified that, 
during the springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Mr. Speegle's ranch. he "took 
it out, tried to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Mr. Speegle's ammunition. 
(fr., p.728, L.21- p.729, L.7; ~also p.729. L.24 - p.731, L21.) 
2. Conclusions Of Law Relevant To Claim 4(eJ 
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme 
Court arttculated a four-part test a defendant must satisfy In order to be entitled to a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show 
that the evidence offered (1) is "newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at 
the time of trial"; (2) is material. not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably 
produce an acquittal; and (4) could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
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diligence on the part of the defendant. ld. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this 
four~part test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure 
and specifically noted his comment, "after a man has had his day in court, and has been 
fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial." Id. (citation omitted). 
Consistent with. the four-part test in Drapeau and Professor Wright's comment, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence known to the defendant at the 
time of trial cannot be considered newly discovered. See,.§,Jh, State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 
404,410,273 P:2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which defendant was aware of prior to trial 
but chose not to present is not newly discovered); State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99, 11 
P.2d 619, 622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial is not newly discovered); State v. 
Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts unknown at time of trial could be 
considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 Po 240, 242 (1907) 
(concluding evidence that colts were not stolen but actually belonged to rancher for 
which defendants worked was not newly discovered). 
Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing that the discovery that Mr. 
Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and ammunition boxes is material or would 
likely produce an acquittal. At trial, evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the 
scope, the box and elsewhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (Trial Tr., Vol. 
VII, p.5045, L.15 - p.5132, L15; Vol. VIII, p.580a, L.1 - p.5843, LA; p.5846, L16-
p.5858, L17; Vol. V, p.2994, L10 - p.3077, L25.) It was establ·ished that unidentified 
fingerprints were on the scope, gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the 
shells. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3077, Ls.1-17.) Thus, it was established at tria! that Johnson 
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Because evidence that people other than Johnson had at some point handled the 
scope and the ammunition box, and had left fingerprints thereon. was well established 
at trial, the only evidence that is even arguably newly discovered is the identity of one of 
the previously unidentified persons to handle the scope and the box of ammunition. 
Knowing his name, however, is not material to this case or likely to produce an acquittal. 
Evidence at trial that someone (who was unknown at that time) other than Johnson had 
touched the scope and ammunition bOle did not create a reasonable doubt as to 
Johnson's guilt. . The jury had no reasonable doubt that the person who had deposited 
those fingerprints was in fact the actual killer, instead of Johnson - otherwise the Jury 
would have acqUitted. Knowing a name to associate with those prints does not change 
that calculus in the slightest 
In addition, both Mr. Speegle and Hill testified at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing regarding When, how and where Mr. Hill had touched the gun. Being able to do 
so made the fingerprint evidence of even Jess value to Johnson than it was at trial when 
the state was not able to provide any information about how the unknown fingerprints 
could have gotten where they were found. Even Mr. Kerchusky acknowledged at the 
evidentiary hearing that fingerprints alone are not evidence of guilt; rather, prints are 
often obtained, as they were in this case, for the purpose of eliminating individuals as 
suspects. (Tr., pp.632-635.) Matching the previously unidentified prints to Mr. Hill, in 
conjunction with the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
regarding his whereabouts at the time of the murders and his (and Mr. Speegle's) 
credible explanations regarding why Mr. Hill's prints would be found on the rifle, scope, 
and ammunition, does nothing to aid Johnson's defense. 
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Indeed, whether an unknown person who had left fingerprints on the scope and 
ammunition box could have been the killer was one of the issues at trial. The jury 
clearly rejected the argument that the prints created reasonable doubt as to Johnson's 
guilt. That we now know the source of at least some of those prints in no way indicates 
that a jury would view the presence of those prints any differently. Because the jury 
necessarily rejected the argument that the "real killer" left the fingerprints, newly 
discovered evidence that the prints belong to a friend of the gun owner who used the 
.264 rifle well before the murders is not material or Hkely to produce an acquittal. 
Johnson also alleges the newly discovered fingerprint evidence somehow shows 
that uTina Walthall's trial testimony asserting that Ms. Eguren has provided all latent 
print lift cards was false" and that jf "this truth" had been known it is "reasonably likely" 
that she would not have been convicted? (Petition, p.23, ~ 28a.) Johnson, however, 
failed to establish Ms. Walthall's trial testimony was false and there are no reasonable 
g·rounds to believe that any evidence regarding what fingerprint cards Ms. Eguren was 
provided would have in any way been important to the verdict. 
Because Johnson is not entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered 
evidence, the Court should deny relief on Claim 12 as well as all other claims that have 
not been previously dismissed. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2011. 
7 Maria Eguren works for the idaho State Police and is responsible for "entering latents 
in theAFIS system." (Tr., p.492, Ls.11-12.) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=e=nt~ ___________ ) 
Case No: CV-006-324 
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & 
ORDER 
COMES NOW Petitioner and files this, her PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and in support thereof states as follows; 
THIS MATTER having come on for bench trial before the undersigned judge on 
December 6, 2010 for adjudication of a Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, plaintiff appearing personally and with her attorney, Christopher P. Simms, and 
the State appearing by Deputy Idaho Attorneys General, Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth 
K. Jorgensen, acting as Special Prosecuting Attorneys, and the Court having heard 
testimony and received certain documents, deposition testimony, recorded statements and 
events into evidence, and having considered same, 
NOW THEREFORE the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order: 
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Petitioner, Sarah Johnson, was tried and convicted by an Ada County jury of two 
counts of Murder in the First Degree, with Firearm Enhancement, in Blaine County Case 
No. CR-2003-1820, as a result of the death of her parents. 
2. On or about June 30, 2005 Petitioner was sentenced to two (2) terms of 
Determinate Life, Plus Fifteen years. 
3. Trial Counsel failed to timely file notice of appeal. 
4. On or about April 19,2006 Petitioner filed her initial Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, from which relief was granted, to pursue direct appeal, with proceedings on other 
issues stayed. 
5. On or about June 26, 2008 the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming 
convictions in State v. Johnson, Case No. 33312, which decision can be found at 188 
PJd 912 (ID 2008). 
6. On or about August 15, 2008 this Court lifted the previously entered stay and 
thereafter granted leave to file a First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
7. On or about December 28, 2009 this Court entered its Order granting leave to file 
a Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
8. On or about February 8, 2010 Petitioner and the State filed Cross-Motions for 
Summary Disposition. 
9. On or about April 30, 2010 oral argument was heard relating to said motions for 
summary disposition, after which certain matters were taken under advisement and 
certain matters ruled upon from the bench with a request to counsel to submit a proposed 
order as directed. 
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10. On or about May 20, 2010 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement, and thereafter on or about July 19,2010, 
the court issued it Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Disposition. 
11. The State filed a Motion for Reconsideration which motion was granted on or 
about December 2, 2010, by this Court's Memorandum Decision Granting Respondent's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
12. On December 6, 2010, Petitioner filed her Memorandum Dismissing Claim. 
13. The remaining claims at issue for trial were those asserted in the Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief paragraphs 14, ISa., IS.c., 16.a.i., 16.a.ii., 
16.a.iii.,16.v., 16.vi., 16.b., 16.c., 16.d., 18.vi., I8.vii., and 29 and summarized as follows: 
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall lack of 
diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, 
chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, 
including trial, all of which together resulted, cumulatively and 
individually, a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict; 
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a 
continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine state's 
expert, after learning the comforter had not been collected as 
evidence; 
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately 
investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing 
on blood splatter opinion evidence; 
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d. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately cross-
examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry 
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela 
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, 
Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart 
Robinson; 
e. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present evidence 
of an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross 
Kirtley, which recording clearly proved the theory that police 
focused on Petitioner Sarah Johnson, to the exclusion of all other 
possible suspects and theories, because she was the easiest target; 
f. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether 
certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh;" 
g. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of 
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously 
unidentified latent prints. 
UNDISPUTED UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE FACTS 
14. On the morning of September 2, 2003, Alan and Diane Johnson were found shot 
to death in their home, where they lived with their sixteen year old daughter, Sarah. 
(!Inderlying Murder Trial Transcript "UMTT" pp. 1512-1514, 1593-1605) 
15. Almost immediately after the rifle blasts Sarah Johnson ran from the house 
screaming that someone had shot her parents. CUMTT pp. 1518-20) 
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16. The first people at the house, initially neighbors and then police, found a 
gruesome scene of blood and tissue literally dripping from the walls and ceilings of the 
master bedroom and adjoining hallway. (UMTT pp. 1593-1605, 1654-1663) Mrs. 
Johnson's body was found in the bed, with her head almost entirely blown off. (UMTT 
pp. 1667-1668, 1795) Mr. Johnson's wet, naked body was found by the side of the bed, 
with the master bath shower running. (UMTT pp. 1662, 1792) 
17. A .264 caliber rifle was on the floor in the doorway of the master bathroom. 
(UMTT pp. 1600 & 1849, Exhibit 36) 
18. A more complete inventory of the crime scene located a pink robe, a pair of 
surgical gloves, and five (5) .25 caliber automatic rounds in a trash can by the curb. 
(UMTT pp. 1673, 1894, 1900-01, 1949-52, Exhibit 37, see also property/evidence 
location diagram Exhibit 35) A scope, which had been attached to the .264 caliber rifle, 
was found on the bed in the garage apartment. (UMTT pp. 2057, Exhibit 38) 
Ammunition for the .264 was found in the closet of the garage apartment. (UMTT pp. 
2029, Exhibit 39) In Sarah's room, across the hallway from the master bedroom, were 
found a leather glove, two (2) live .264 rounds, and a 9mm magazine wrapped in a red 
bandana. (UMTT pp. 2038-2040) In the garage attached to the main house a .22 rifle 
was found sitting on top of a freezer with a box of .25 auto rounds, and a spent .264 
casing was found on the floor. (UMTT pp. 1730,2038-49,5705) 
19. Further investigation revealed that one Mel Speegle was renting the garage 
apartment, where he normally stayed from Sunday through Wednesday. The .264 murder 
weapon belonged to Mr. Speegle. Speegle moved into the apartment approximately one 
year prior to the murders. Speegle told police and testified he moved the .264 rifle into 
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the apartment; and a few weeks prior to the murders, had held it and generally checked it 
out. (Exhibit 40, Exhibit 41, Exhibit 42 & UMTT pp. 2694-2721) 
20. Sarah Johnson had been dating one Bruno Santos, an adult illegal immigrant, who 
had been threatened with statutory rape prosecution in the weeks prior to the murders. 
(UMTT pp. 3358-59, 5433-34) A search of Bruno's home revealed .25 automatic rounds 
in the closet of his bedroom. (Exhibit 13) The surgical gloves held DNA from Sarah 
Johnson. (UMTT pp. 3096-3110) The robe was spotted with a mixture of DNA, Mr. and 
Mrs. Johnson's, Sarah's and an unknown male. The blood spots on the robe were from 
Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and the same unknown person. (UMTT pp. 3436-3451) The .264 
rifle, ammunition and ammunition containers, as well as the scope all had unidentified 
latent finger and or palm prints, which have now been identified as those of one 
Christopher Kevin Hill. (Exhibit 43, Exhibit 44, Exhibit 45, Exhibit 46 & Exhibit 47) 
21. During the underlying murder trial Bruno Santos testified that in August of 2003 
he was dating Sarah Johnson; that Sarah had stayed the night at his house; that Sarah's 
father came over and threatened him with bodily injury and jail if Bruno didn't leave 
Sarah alone; that he was not at the Johnson home the night/morning of the murders, but 
was at his house with his mother, sister and brother-in-law; that he was sleeping at home 
when his cousin called on the phone, woke him and told him of the murders; that he was 
not aware of any guns at the Johnson residence; that he had nothing to do with the 
murders. (UMTT pp. 2760-2770) 
22. The defense team did not cross examine Bruno Santos. (UMTT pg. 2771) 
23. During the underlying murder trial Bruno Santos mother, Consuela Cedeno 
testified that Sarah Johnson stayed over night at her house the weekend of the murders; 
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that Sarah's father came over Saturday morning; denied that Mr. Johnson and Bruno had 
a fight, or discussed that Bruno shouldn't be seeing Sarah because she was only sixteen 
years old; that Bruno was at her house all afternoon 'and evening the day before the 
murders; that Bruno was sleeping in her apartment when she woke up the morning of the 
murders around 7:30 or 8:00 a.m.; that she couldn't tell whether her car had been driven 
overnight because she didn't pay attention to things like dew on the windshield. (UMTT 
pp. 2772-2776) 
24. The defense team did not cross examine Bruno Santos mother Consuela Cedeno. 
(UMTT pg. 2776) 
25. During the underlying murder trial Bruno Santos cousin, Jane Lopez testified that 
she learned of the murder of Sarah's parents by an announcement at Wood River High 
School where she worked; that, at approximately 8:30 a.m., she called Bruno at the home 
number, got no answer so she called on his cell phone, which he answered; that she didn't 
believe Bruno was at home so she called him back on the home land line and spoke with 
Bruno. (UMTT pp. 2789-2793) 
26. The defense team did not present documentary evidence that purportedly proved 
Jane Lopez did not make the phone calls to Bruno as she claimed. (UMTT pg. 2794) 
27. During the underlying murder trial Robert Kerchusky, fingerprint expert, testified 
on behalf of the defense. Lead trial counsel, Bobby Eugene Pangburn did not inquire of 
Kerchusky his expert opinion that latent unidentified fingerprints found 011 the murder 
weapon, scope, and ammunition packaging, were "fresh" prints. (TT 5045-5130) 
28. Petitioner was represented at the underlying murder trial by Bobby Eugene 
Pangburn, as lead trial counsel, who testified before this Court at the post-conviction trial. 
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29. Petitioner was represented at underlying murder trial, by Mark Rader, as co-
counsel, who testified before this Court at the post-conviction triaL 
30. Patrick Dunn worked for trial counsel as the Defense investigator and testified 
before this Court at the trial on Petition for post-conviction relief. 
SUMMARY OF POST-CONVICTION TESTIMONY & EVIDENCE 
31. Mr. Pangburn is suspended from the practice of law in the State of Idaho, and in 
the State of Oregon. Mr. Pangburn testified at the Post-Conviction trial (hereinafter 
referred to as and/or cited as, "PCT" or "PCTT" £,ost Conviction Trial Transcript) and 
denied the loss of his license to practice law was due to a charge of dishonesty, deceit or 
misrepresentation, including conversion of client funds. However, Exhibit 15, Idaho 
Supreme Court Disciplinary Order In the Matter of Bobby E. Pangburn, conclusively 
establishes that the suspension of Mr. Pangburn's license to practice law was a result of a 
violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit of misrepresentation; and rule 1.16( d), " ... refunding any 
advance payment of fee or expense not earned ... " 
32. Mr. Dunn testified that Mr. Pangburn failed to share discovery; attend defense 
team meetings, and that Pangburn was unprepared, almost never present or was 
chronically late. (PCTT pp. 40,41,42,44,94) 
a. Mr. Dunn testified that the lawyers agreed Mr. Rader would deal with 
forensic witnesses and examine those witnesses at trial while Pangburn, 
would deal with and examine at trial all lay witnesses. (PCTT pg. 46) 
b. Mr. Dunn testified the Defense team lacked a well communicated working 
strategy but it was understood "they wanted to go after Bruno Santos," an 
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adult illegal immigrant who was having a sexual relationship with Sarah 
Johnson, and had been threatened with statutory rape prosecution. (peTT 
46,48,51) 
c. Mr. Dunn testified upon review of the pre-trial statements by Bruno 
Santos that Santos told police he had been into the Johnson residence prior 
to the day of the murders; that he'd had sex with Sarah Johnson; initially 
that Alan Johnson hadn't threatened him with a statutory rape charge, but 
later admitted to the threat; that he had admitted owning guns and trading 
for "weed"; that Santos' car may have been in the area of the Johnson 
residence the night of the murders; and that this information was given to 
the trial lawyers. (peTT pp. 82, 83, 84, 85,90, 91, Exhibit 34, 35, 36, 37) 
d. Mr. Dunn testified upon review of pre-trial statements by Jane Lopez, 
Bruno Santos' cousin, and review of documentary phone records, it 
became apparent Ms. Lopez testimony providing an alibi for Bruno Santos 
was false, and could not exclude Bruno Santos from the scene of the 
murders, which information was given to the trial lawyers. (peTT pp. 75, 
76, 77, UMTT pp. 2789, 2791, 2792, peT Exhibits 9, 10, 11, & 40) 
1. Specifically, Ms. Lopez testified at the underlying trial, consistent 
with her pretrial statements that she called and spoke with Santos 
on his cell phone at 8:30 a.m. the morning of the murders; 
immediately thereafter called and spoke with Santos on the home 
phone he shared with his mother, and that Santos seemed shocked 
by the news that Mr. and Mrs. Johnson had been murdered. 
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(UMTT pp.2791-2793) The phone records Dunn made Pangburn 
aware of would have shown the phone calls were not made, yet 
trial counsel failed to utilize this evidence for cross-examination. 
(PCTT pp. 71-78, UMTT pg. 2794) 
e. Mr. Dunn testified upon review of the pre-trial statements of Consuela 
Cedeno, Bruno Santos mother, it became apparent the statements were 
obviously inconsistent with testimony Cedeno provided at trial, which 
information was given to Pangburn. (PCTT pg. 60, 61 Exhibit 13, UMTT 
2776) 
1. Specifically, Ms. Cedeno told police that her son Bruno always ran 
around at night, and that she checked the odometer on the car, and 
dew on the windshield. Dunn tabbed pages of the prior statements 
and pointed out to trial counsel during trial the inconsistencies with 
Cedeno's trial testimony, that she doesn't pay attention to things 
like that. (PCTT pg. 62, 79, UMTT pg. 2776) 
f. Mr. Dunn testified he prepared witness books for trial that included pre-
trial statements, and documentary evidence, indexed and highlighted for 
use by trial counsel during examination of witnesses, that included the 
PCT Exhibits 1, 11, 13,29,34,35,36,37,40. (PCTT pp. 77, 92, 93) 
g. Mr. Dunn testified that at the last minute Pangburn decided not to examine 
Bruno Santos and family, and without warning handed the witnesses off to 
Rader to examine. (PCTT pp. 96-97) 
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h. Mr. Dunn testified he came into possession of an audio visual recording 
made by Officer Ross Kirtley depicting police conversations during the 
initial call to the murder scene on September 2,2003, which Dunn caused 
to be enhanced for audio clarity. According to Dunn the enhanced 
recording clearly showed Sheriff Femling told other officers to 
concentrate on the girl, they had to act fast, worried the community would 
think a murderer was running around, which information was made known 
to the trial lawyers. (PCTT, pp. 97-106) Additionally, officers could be 
heard stating they didn't think it was possible for Sarah to have committed 
the crime because she didn't have blood on her, when blood was 
everywhere in the bedroom where the murders occured, which was made 
known to the trial lawyers. (PCTT pg. 104) 
33. Mr. Rader testified that Mr. Pangburn made it clear that he, Pangburn, was lead 
counsel; that Pangburn failed to communicate with the defense team but assured Mr. 
Rader he was prepared. (PCTT pp. 150, 151, 153, 154) 
a. Rader testified that the defense team was not competent. (PCTT 181-82) 
b. Rader and Pangburn agreed Rader would handle and examine at trial 
expert and forensic witnesses while Pangburn would handle and examine 
attriallay witnesses. (PCTT pp. 152-153) 
c. A few days prior to the time Robert Kerchusky, defense fingerprint expert, 
was to testify Pangburn informed Rader he, Pangburn, would examine the 
witness at trial. (PCTT pg. 153-54) 
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d. Without warning, during trial, Pangburn demanded Rader examine Bruno 
Santos, when Rader had not reviewed all the material, and was not 
prepared to cross-examine the witness. (PCTT pp.173-174, 178) 
e. Rader was not prepared to cross-examine Santos family members, when 
Pangburn, without warning, demanded he do so. (PCTT pp. 172, 173, 
179-181) 
f. Rader testified he did no legal research as to the legal standard for 
admission into evidence of the blood splatter recreation test which was not 
allowed to be shown to the jury. (PCTT pg 170) 
34. During the post-conviction trial, Petitioner offered into evidence, and played for 
the Court, Exhibit 12, the recording, made by Officer Ross Kirtley during his initial 
response to the scene of the murders beginning at approximately 6:30 a.m. on September 
2,2003. The enhanced audio quality version of the recording was lost, thus the recording 
played was the original. (PCTT pg. 1350) 
a. The recording did not clearly depict Sheriff Femling stating the police 
should focus on Sarah 10hnson to the exclusion of other witnesses, but 
does clearly show police officers stating they didn't think Sarah could 
have done it because she had no blood on her, and the murder scene was a 
"rainstorm of blood." The recording does portray Sheriff Femling 
expressmg SusplClOn of Sarah 10hnson not providing complete 
information, and concern with involvement with Bruno Santos, within one 
half hour of his arrival at the scene. (PCT Exhibit 12) 
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35. Steve Harkins, a Blaine County Sheriffs Detective during the underlying Johnson 
murder investigation testified during the post-conviction trial. 
a. Harkins testified he concluded Sarah Johnson was the prime target of the 
investigation by 11.30 a.m., the day of the murders. 
1. Harkins confirmed he told Bruno Santos he was not a suspect in 
the murders on September 3, 2003. (PCTT pp. 391- 394, Exhibit 
34) 
11. Harkins admitted that Bruno Santos told him during the September 
3,2003, interrogation that Santos car might have been the area the 
night of the murders; that Santos had prior gang affiliations yet he 
denied same during examination at the underlying trial; that Santos 
told him he might find .25 caliber ammunition in his apartment, 
which were in fact found; and that Santos had owned a gun and 
traded for weed. (PCTT pp. 396- 421, Exhibit 34) 
111. Harkins testified the trash receptacles at Santos residence were not 
searched because the police didn't think there was any evidence to 
be gathered. (PCTT pp. 407-408) 
b. Harkins confirmed he was the officer who performed the investigation into 
the newly discovered fingerprint identification evidence verifying the 
previously unknown latent fingerprints on the murder weapon, the scope 
and ammunition packaging were those of one Christopher Kevin Hill. 
(PCTT pg. 427) 
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1. Harkins testified he did not find any inconsistency with the 
statements given to police by Mel Speegle and Christopher Hill, 
even though Hill told police his prints must have gotten on the gun, 
scope and ammunition packaging when he took the murder 
weapon from Speegle's home in the Spring of 2000 and shot it, 
and Speegle told police Hill's prints must be on the stuff because 
Hill helped him move it into the apartment over the Johnson's 
garage. (PCTT pp. 427-436) 
11. Harkins testified that police did not attempt to confirm; Hill's 
statement that his prints got on the murder weapon, scope and 
ammunition packaging when he shot the murder weapon; Hill's 
whereabouts at the time of the murders; Hill's known associations; 
or work history. (PCTT pp. 432 - 436) 
36. During the post-conviction trial Sheriff Walt Femling, who was the lead law 
enforcement officer overseeing the Johnson murder prosecution, testified at the post-
conviction trial. (PCTT pp. 308-366) 
a. Sheriff Femling admitted he concluded, after being at the scene for 
approximately an hour, there was an issue and a problem with a boy friend 
named Bruno Santos, (PCTT pg. 337) who was ruled out as a suspect 
because no evidence could be found to place him at the scene. (PCTT pp. 
340-342) 
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37. During the post-conviction trial Officer Raul Ornelas, who was one of the first 
law enforcement personal to arrive at the murder scene, testified at the post-conviction 
trial. (PCTT pp. 201-217) 
a. Officer Ornelas, who observed Sarah Johnson very early on the morning 
of the murders, saw no blood on her person, with the single exception of 
the on the bottom of her socks. (PCTT pg. 215) 
b. Officer Ornelas testified he did not know neighbors had walked around the 
backyard, earlier in the morning. (PCTT pg. 207) Officer Ornelas testified 
the foot tracks visible in the matted grass came to an end where the grass 
ended towards the northeast comer of the Johnsons yard. (PCTT pg 208) 
38. During the post-conviction trial Officer Stuart Robinson, who was a lead law 
enforcement officer overseeing evidence collection during the Johnson murder 
prosecution, testified at the post-conviction trial. (PCTT pp. 218-237) 
a. Officer Robinson was asked about his Grand Jury Testimony wherein he 
testified that no identifiable fingerprints had been found on the gun, scope 
or casings. (PCTT pp. 230-23, Exhibit 1, pg 189-190) Robinson denied 
the Grand Jury testimony was inaccurate despite the fact that latent 
identifiable fingerprints were found by Idaho State Police Laboratory prior 
to his testimony. 
39. During the post-conviction trial recordings of police interviews of Mel Speegle 
and Christopher Kevin Hill, conducted February 10 & 11,2009, dealing with the newly 
discovered fingerprint identification evidence, were accepted into evidence as Exhibits 29 
and 30, and played for the Court. 
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a. Mel Speegle told police Chris Hill was a family friend who had lived with 
Speegle for a few years prior to his move to the Johnson apartment in 
2002, when he recalled Hill helping him move items, including his guns 
and ammunition. (Exhibit 29) 
b. Christopher Hill told police he had helped Speegle move large items to 
Boise; didn't remember moving anything to the Johnson apartment; but 
that he had handled the murder weapon years before the murders in order 
( 
to site the rifle. Police, during the interview, told Hill where his 
fingerprints were found (Exhibit 30) 
40. Consuela Cedeno, Bruno Santos mother, testified during the post-conviction trial. 
Ms. Cedeno claimed not to know why she had been called to testify; to use multiple 
names; to have no memory of having testified in the underlying murder trial; that she 
didn't remember telling police her son Bruno lied to all the time, checked odometer 
readings, and dew on the windshield, to see if Bruno had driven the car in the overnight 
hours; that Bruno was always out late at night. (PCTT pp. 457- 468; Exhibit 13) 
41. Bruno Santos testified during the post-conviction trial. Mr. Santos refused to 
answer a host of questions that may have led to direct or circumstantial evidence of 
criminal conduct or clues leading to evidence of criminal conduct if he would have 
answered, including; whether he was born in the U.S.A; how long he had been in the 
U.S.A.; whether Sarah Johnson was his girlfriend; whether the police found him at the 
scene of the crime on the morning of the murders; whether he was found by police to 
possess .25 caliber rounds of ammunition; whether he once belonged to a gang; whether 
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he has a number "13" tattooed on his body; whether he had lied to the police during an 
investigative interview. (PCTT pp. 472-490) 
42. Maria Eguren, Idaho State Police Latent Fingerprint Identification Unit staff 
person, testified at the post-conviction trial. Ms. Eguren testified that in January of 2008 
she identified a match of previously unidentified latent fingerprints in the Johnson case, 
to be those of Christopher Kevin Hill. (PCTT 524-531) 
43. Robert Kerchusky, fingerprint expert, testified at the post-conviction trial. 
Kerchusky testified he began his fingerprint career with the FBI in 1952, with work 
experience including District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Idaho State 
Police and private consulting. (PCTT pp. 540-542) 
a. Kerchusky testified he reviewed certain materials as part of his work for 
the trial defense team including the Grand Jury transcript wherein Officer 
Stuart Robinson testified no latent prints of value were found at the scene, 
which information he highlighted to the trial lawyers. (PCCT 577-581, 
Grand J.ury Transcript "GJT" pp. 189-90) 
b. Kerchusky testified regarding the attributes of a "quality print" including 
quality of "ridge detail" clarity for purposes of identification. (PCTT pp. 
549-551) Kerchusky testified regarding environmental conditions that 
impact the a latent print over time, and concluded latent prints left on a 
non-porous surface, that are not "etched prints" are gone within a year. 
(PCTT pp. 551-554, 558-559, 567-570) Kerchusky testified that the 
pattern of latent prints on an object can explain how a person touched or 
grasped an object. (PCTT pp. 568) Kerchusky testified that over time a 
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latent print left on a non-porous surface will lose quality. (PCTT pp. 555-
556) 
c. Kerchusky testified that latent fingerprints found on the murder weapon, 
rifle scope, inner plastic box of Winchester Super-X .264 ammunition, and 
live round, were "fresh prints," which opinion was based upon the fact that 
Mel Speegle stated he had handled the weapon within a few weeks of the 
murders, that Mel Speegle's prints were not on the gun or scope, that the 
weapon had been moved more than a year prior the murders, that clothing 
or material had been used to cover and uncover the rifle in the closet, high 
print quality indicating lack of dissipation over time, and that the latent 
prints were not "etched prints," indicating the acids had not yet had time to 
set into the metal. (PCTT pp.587-591) Kerchusky emphasized to the trial 
lawyers that his opinion regarding the "freshness" the latent prints was the 
most important fingerprint issue. (PCTT pp. 592-593) Kerchusky 
testified that he told trial counsel Pangburn after he had testified at the 
underlying murder trial that Pangburn had forgotten to inquire regarding 
Kerchusky's opinion as to "freshness" of the latent prints, yet Pangburn 
did not recall his expert. (PCTT pp. 593-594) 
d. Kerchusky testified that he concurred with the Idaho State Police opinion 
that previously unidentified latent prints found on scope were those of 
Christopher Kevin Hill. (PCTT pp. 608-609 ) Kerchusky confirmed his 
opinion the prints found on the scope were "fresh" and in a position 
indicated it had been held tight while Hill was unscrewing the scope, not 
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 18 
attempting to site the scope. (PCTT pp. 610-612) Kerchusky testified that 
Hill's print on the live .264 round was fresh, based upon the fact that it 
was of high quality and not an etched print. (PCTT pp. 612-614) 
Kerchuusky testified Hill's latent palm print on the stock of the .264 
murder weapon was fresh, based on the stated history of handling, being 
draped with clothing, and the high quality of the print. (PCTT pg 614) 
Kerchusky testified that in his opinion it was Christopher Kevin Hill who 
removed the scope from the rifle and who was the last person to touch the 
murder weapon. (PCTT pg. 616) 
44. Tina Walthall, an Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory Scientist testified at the 
post-conviction trial on behalf of the State. 
a. Ms. Walthall testified, and Exhibits 21, 22 & 23 confirm, that in early 
2009 she compared and matched three latent prints found on the rifle 
scope, three latent prints from .264 ammunition packaging, and a latent 
print from the stock of a .264 caliber murder weapon and a live .264 
round, to the known prints of Christopher Kevin Hill. (PCTT pp.654) 
More specifically, two of Mr. Hill's right middle finger prints and a right 
ring finger prints were found on the rifle scope, Mr. Hill's left thumb print 
was found on the .264 live round of ammunition, Mr. Hill's right middle 
finger prints were found on two different ammunition package inserts, and 
Mr. Hill's left palm print was found on the stock of the murder weapon. 
(PCTT pp. 654-661) 
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b. Walthall testified that the scientific literature reveals two cases where 
prints lasted on objects more than a year. (PCTT pg 668) Ms. Walthall 
provided her opinion that under the circumstances of this case it was 
possible that Hill's prints could have remained on the evidence for more 
than one year. (PCTT pp. 669-670) Ms. Walthall also testified that she 
was not made aware the murder weapon had been wrapped and 
unwrapped and rewrapped with clothing, and handled by Mr. Speegle 
within a few weeks of the murders, and these factors could obliterate 
latent prints. (PCTT pp. 682-686) Ms. Walthall agreed with Mr. 
Kerchusky that Hill's prints on the scope were of excellent quality. (PCTT 
pg. 687) Ms. Walthall testified that etched prints on metal shell casings 
are relatively common. (PCTT pg 692) 
45. Mel Speegle, who lived in the Johnson garage apartment at the time of the 
murders, and who owned the murder weapon, testified at the post-conviction trial. 
a. Mr. Speegle testified he did not have specific recollection of Christopher 
Kevin Hill touching the murder weapon, while moving nor was he ever 
told Hill had ever fired the .264 rifle used in the murders. (PCTT pp. 699-
725) 
46. Christopher Kevin Hill, who had been the care taker for Mel Speegle Bellevue 
ranch residence prior to Speegle's move to the Johnson garage apartment, testified at the 
post-conviction trial. 
a. Mr. Hill testified he assisted Mel Speegle with moving of large items from 
Speegle's ranch to a Boise residence. (PCTT pp. 727) 
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b. Mr. Hill testified that in the Spring of 2000 he took a .264 rifle from the 
ranch residence and shot it six or seven times, and he might have touched 
the scope, but he did not specifically recall having done so, nor did he 
remember removing the end caps. (PCTT pp. 728-734) 
c. Mr. Hill was arrested for Driving Under the Influence in 2002 and was 
without an address during the summer of 2003 while he lived in his pick-
up truck at Magic Reservoir. (PCTT pp. 735-737) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
47. Bobby E. Pangburn is not a credible witness. 
48. The post-conviction trial testimony of Patrick Dunn and Mark Rader, regarding 
inadequate preparation of the underlying murder trial defense team is unrebutted and 
reliable. 
49. The attorneys in the underlying murder trial were inadequately prepared and 
ignorant of relevant law and fact due to an incomplete investigation. 
a. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of 
Bruno Santos to be prepared to effectively cross-examine the witness. 
Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the law concerning witness's 
assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in light 
of the trial judge's ruling on the subject, to effectively cross-examine 
Bruno Santos. 
i. Bruno Santos is not a credible witness. 
b. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of 
Consuela Cedeno to be prepared to effectively cross-examine the witness. 
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1. Consuela Cedeno is not a credible witness. 
c. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of 
Jane Lopez, and documentary evidence relating to phone records, to be 
prepared to effectively cross-examine the witness. 
i. Jane Lopez is not a credible witness. 
d. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the pre-trial statements of 
Bruno Santos to be prepared to effectively cross-examine Detective Steve 
Harkins. 
e. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the content of the Kirtley 
recording in order to make an informed strategic decision whether or not 
to play said recording to the jury. 
f. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the law concerning the legal 
standard for admission of the blood splatter recreation test which test was 
not allowed into evidence. 
g. Trial counsel was not sufficiently apprised of the facts and law concerning 
fingerprint evidence and therefore failed to inquire of their expert witness 
regarding the freshness of unidentified latent prints found on the murder 
weapon, a live .264 caliber round of ammunition, the scope and .264 
ammunition packaging. 
h. The thumb print on the live .264 round was not an etched print, nor 
allegedly touched since the spring of 2000, leads to the only reasonable 
conclusion that the print was left more recently than the spring of 2000 
and was in fact a fresh print. 
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1. The fmgerprints of the scope were not etched prints, and the scope and 
weapon were covered, uncovered and recovered with clothes, and handled 
leading to the only reasonable conclusion that the prints on the scope were 
left more recently than the Spring of 2000 and were in fact fresh prints. 
J. The palm print of the stock of the .264 rifle used to kill Alan and Diane 
Johnson were covered, uncovered and recovered with clothes, and handled 
within weeks of the murder, leading to the only reasonable conclusion that 
the prints on the scope were left more recently than the spring of2000 and 
were in fact fresh prints. 
k. The fingerprints found on the murder weapon, scope and ammunition 
packaging were those of Christopher Kevin HilL 
1. The latent fingerprints found on the murder weapon, scope and 
ammunition packaging were unidentified at the time of the trial, were 
found to match Christopher Kevin Hill in early 2009. 
m. Christopher Kevin Hill is not a credible witness. 
LEGAL STANDARDS & CRITERIA 
(GENERAL STANDARDS) 
46. The Idaho Supreme Court in Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 177 P.3d 362 
(2008), stated, "An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction 
relief is based. Baldwin at 367. [citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 79-80, 57 
P.3d 787, 790-91 (2002).] A court is required to accept the petitioner's umebutted 
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allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Saykhamchone v. 
State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995). 
(INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL) 
47. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant 
must show the attorney's performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by 
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-
65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984) To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the 
burden of showing the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) To 
establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. 
No bright line test for deficient performance of counsel, or prejudice exists. 
Clearly, trial counsel's strategic decisions will not be second guessed. In Murphy v. 
State, 143 Idaho 139 at 747-48, 139 P.3d 741 (2006), the court elaborated on and 
clarified the standards as follows; 
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffectiveness is "whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result." It is well established that we will not attempt to second-guess trial 
counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions are made upon the 
basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 
181,184-85,579 P.2d 127, 130-31(1978); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,10, 
539 P.2d 556, 562 (1975). Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be 
sufficient to show deprivation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10, 539 P.2d at 562. Strategic choices made 
after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far as reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2541, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 492 
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(2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2463, 
162 L.Ed.2d 360, 372 (2005) (failure to investigate material relied upon by 
prosecution was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 
120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, 419 (2000) (unreasonable failure 
to conduct thorough investigation); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 
107 S.Ct. 3114,3125,97 L.Ed.2d 638, 657 (1987). 
In addition to those standards and criteria referenced by the Murphy Court it 
should be noted that evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a close 
examination of the evidence, both the evidence which was admitted during trial and that 
which was not. Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649 at 653, 946 P.2d 71(Idaho App. 1997) 
FurthernlOre, in assessing the potential prejudice the Court will consider in aggregate the 
various decisions and omissions of defense counsel that are alleged to have been 
unreasonable. The Court should also take into account the totality of the evidence that 
was before the jury in the criminal trial. Milburn at 653. The Court cautioned that each 
case must be judged according to the significance of the evidence each witness has to 
offer. Id at 654. 
In summary, the Murphy and Milburn opinions leave this court with the essential 
question: Considering all the circumstances ofthe case, was justice served? 
(NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE) 
50. Newly discovered evidence will warrant a new trial only if it satisfies a four-part 
test, showing that: (l) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the 
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Hayes, 
144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 288 (Idaho App. 2007) citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 
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691,551 P.2d 972,978 (1976); State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 146, 730 P.2d 1064, 1066 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
51. Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall lack 
of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic tardiness and 
unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all of which together resulted, 
cumulatively and individually, in a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict. Petitioner 
supports the general claim with several specific instances of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. These arguments are well taken. Petitioner has met her burden and proven, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsels' performance was deficient, and she 
was thereby prejudiced. 
52. Had counsel performed up to the objective standard of reasonableness, the jury 
would have viewed crucial blood splatter evidence, cross-examination of several very 
important witnesses, and critically, heard the persuasive expert opinion of Robert 
Kerchusky, that the fingerprints on the tools of murder were fresh. Together, this 
evidence is likely to have produced a different jury verdict. 
53. This Court has no reason to question the veracity of trial co-counsel, Mark Rader, 
or Patrick Dunn, the investigator. Bobby Eugen Pangburn, on the other hand, is 
suspended from the practice of law, and was proven to have given false testimony to this 
court regarding the reason he no longer practices law. Both Rader and Dunn testified 
Pangburn failed to communicate with the team and doubted Pangburn's preparedness. 
Rader and Dunn both testified Pangburn had agreed he would be examining the lay 
witnesses, yet when the time came he utterly failed at this task. Clearly, the defense was 
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not properly prepared. Failure to raise the proper issues during cross-examinations 
cannot be said to be a matter of informed strategy. Nor, can the decision not to cross-
examine witnesses be considered tactical, based upon full knowledge of the facts. 
Likewise, no reasonable defense strategy, only unpreparedness, can explain the failure to 
elicit the defense expert's ultimate opinion, or to have admitted into evidence the defense 
blood splatter experiment evidence. 
54. During the post-conviction trial several of these witnesses were cross-examined, 
and the crime scene recording was played. The witnesses were confronted with 
inconsistencies in their trial testimony with pre-trial statements. Petitioner presented her 
fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky, who gave convincing testimony regarding the 
freshness of prints on the murder weapon and associated items of evidence. Had the jury 
experienced a proper cross-examination of Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Jane Lopez, 
Sheriff Femling, Detective Harkins, Officer Robinson, Officer Ornelas, together with 
having viewed the crime scene recording and heard the expert's opinion, it is reasonably 
probable the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758 (1988), Murphv v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 P.3d 741 (2006), Milburn v. State, 130 
Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71, (Id. App. 1997), State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 
(1975). Given the bare circumstantial evidence upon which Petitioner was convicted, 
presentation of the above evidence is likely to have produced reasonable doubt, and 
prevented conviction as charged. 
55. Petitioner's prayer for relief IS granted based on the claims contained in 
paragraphs 14, 15.c, 16 and 18, of her Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief. 
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56. Petitioner also claims entitlement to a new trial based upon the discovery of new 
evidence early the year, 2009, when previously unidentified latent fingerprints found on 
the .264 caliber rifle used in the murders, .264 ammunition packaging, a live .264 round, 
and on the scope removed from the murder weapon, were determined to be those of one 
Christopher Kevin Hill. Petitioner argues that had the jury known, first that these 
unidentified latent prints were fresh, that fact alone would have changed the jury's 
verdict. Petitioner further argues, had the jury also known the prints were those of a 
homeless man, with possible motive of financial gain, access to the scene of the crime, no 
alibi, and whose explanation of how his prints got on the tools of murder was highly 
unlikely, reasonable doubt would have prevented conviction. Again, this argument is 
well taken. 
57. Clearly, the identification of previously unknown latent fingerprints on the tools 
of murder is "newly discovered" material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, under 
the Drapeau standard. The State, not the Defense, has complete control of the known 
inked fingerprint data base. Failure to discover that the latent prints belonged to 
Christopher Kevin Hill was in no part due to a lack of diligence by the Defense. The 
final test, whether the evidence would probably produce an acquittal, is a more difficult 
assessment. If considered with the "freshness" opinion evidence, the conclusion is 
clearly, yes. Given the State's expert opinion, that it is only "possible" for a latent print 
to last more than a year, can a jury reach the standard, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Coupled with the fact that the print on the live .264 round is not an etched print and the 
pattern of prints on the removed scope, too much doubt is present to be confident justice 
was served. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV-006-324 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
__________ ~R=e~sp~o=n=d=e=nt~ ___________ ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, by and through counsel, and files this, her Reply to 
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in support thereof 
states as follows; 
INTRODUCTION 
1. On or about the 14th day of February 2011, Respondent, in compliance with the 
Court's order filed its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law subsequent to 
the trial of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief over four (4) 
days beginning on December 6, 2010. This memorandum is intended to comply with the 
Court's direction to file final reply briefs to be submitted on or before February 28, 2011. 
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RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
2. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE - PREJUDICE BY AGGREGATE OF ERROR: 
The State ignores Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from 
an overall lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic 
tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all of which together 
resulted, cumulatively and individually, in a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict. 
The State attempts to isolate each of Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, as if each such act or omission occurred in isolation of the others. Clearly, the 
theater of trial is an integrated set of acts built chronologically, all interdependent upon 
one another, designed to persuade a jury. This concept is supported by the standard for 
evaluating prejudice, "the court must consider the totality of the evidence before the 
judge or jury." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, (1963); State v. 
Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 173, 857 P.2d 649, 652 (Ct. App. 1993) 
In State v. Milburn, l30 Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71 (Idaho App. 1997) the Court 
stated "review of Milburn's claim requires a close examination of the evidence, both the 
evidence which was presented at trial and that which was not." The prejudice prong of 
the Strickland test was described thus, "(t)o satisfy the prejudice element, an applicant 
must show a reasonable probability that but for the attorney's unprofessional errors, the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. This does not require proof that 
counsel's errors more likely than not altered the outcome of the case. Rather, a 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
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outcome." Milburn, at 658-659. Critically, the Milburn court stated, "In assessing the 
potential prejudice in Milburn's case, we will consider in aggregate the various 
decisions and omissions of defense counsel that are alleged to have been 
unreasonable. We also take into account the totality of the evidence that is before 
the jury in the criminal trial." Id at 659. (emphasis added) 
3. ADMISSION OF BLOOD SPATTER RECREATION: The State seems to 
misconstrue Petitioner's argument and the evidence in support of the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as asserted in paragraph 15(c) of her Second Amended Petition. 
The claim includes both a failure to become knowledgeable of the relevant law regarding 
the necessary foundation for admission of the scientific evidence, and a failure to 
adequately investigate or consult with experts in order to present an experiment that 
would have rebutted the State's expert opinion evidence regarding blood spatter. The 
State addresses only the second prong of the claim. 
Rader testified he did no legal research as to the legal standard for admission of 
the experiment. (PCCT pg 170) Had the research been accomplished the defense would 
have known the law, and could have more effectively argued for its admission. In fact, 
the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to admit the proffered experiment, when 
the proper ruling would have been to admit the evidence, and allow jury argument 
regarding the weight to be given the experiment. Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 40 
P.3d 11 0 (Idaho 2002), State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Idaho App. 1988), 
Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538 (Idaho 1983), The state argues that the 
Defense offered extensive blood spatter evidence, and this somehow offsets the failure to 
have admitted a test that would have conclusively proven the murders could not have 
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occurred in the manner opined by the State's experts. No amount of expert opinion 
evidence can replace a visual depiction of the spherical mist of explosive force created 
by a contact shot on a closed surface, such as a skull, or a coconut. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 
4. SHERIFF FEMLING: The State argues that Petitioner's claim that trial counsel 
failed to adequately cross-examine Sheriff Femling must fail essentially because cross-
examination is a tactical decision, not subject to review. The State completely ignores 
the testimony of Patrick Dunn and Mark Rader that lead trial counsel was unprepared, 
and that Rader was unprepared when Pangburn, without warning handed over lay 
witnesses for Rader to examine. (PCCT pp. 96-97, 154, 172-73) The State ignores the 
testimony of Patrick Dunn regarding the content of the lost enhanced version of the 
Kirtley recording, and the content of the unenhanced Kirtley recorded admitted to 
evidence at the post-conviction trial. (PCCT pg. 135) 
5. DETECTIVE HARKINS: In regard to effectiveness of trial counsel's cross-
examination of Detective Harkin, the State again concludes simply that Petitioner 
" ... failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's cross-examination of Detective 
Harkins at trial was anything but strategic and tactical." The State argues that because 
trial counsel, during post-conviction trial examination, did not admit failure due to ill 
preparedness, or otherwise, the burden cannot be met. On the contrary. Here, DmID and 
Rader both testified that Pangburn was unprepared. The only prospect of placing before 
the jury Bruno Santos' dishonesty, prior bad acts, gang affiliation, motive, and 
opportunity to commit the murders was lost when trial counsel did not ask Detective 
Harkins about the statements made to him by Santos. The post-conviction court received 
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in evidence Exhibits 34,35,36 and 37 containing damning pre-trial statements of Bruno 
Santos. The Court observed the cross-examination of Detective Harkins and revelation 
I 
of Santos statements. \Vhile Detective Harkins attempted to downplay the seriousness of 
the statements, the information would have been before the jury, had a complete cross-
examination been conducted at the underlying murder trial. Why would any trial lawyer, 
who is truly familiar with such statements, not get that information to a jury? Only 
unpreparedness can explain such a failure. Presented with perhaps the only opportunity 
to prove Bruno Santos gang affiliation, past drug and weapon's possession, commission 
of statutory rape, trial counsel did not perform up to a minimum standard. 
6. BRUNO SANTOS: The question of whether the failure to cross-examine Bruno 
Santos constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is complicated by the fact that the 
trial court entered an order prohibiting trial counsel from calling Santos for the sole 
purpose of having him invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
(TT pg 2739-2758) Yet, Santos was permitted to testify at trial on direct examination as 
to "direct" matters without challenge. (TT pp 2760-2771) The law in this area is clearly 
stated in State v. Mantanez, 523 P.2d 410 (Kan. 1974) quoting extensively from United 
States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2nd Cir. (1963), " ... where the assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination prevents effective confrontation of the witness by the accused, 
the situation is remedied by striking the testimony of the witness." The trial defense 
team did not move to strike, nor call Santos to confront him for bias, or improper motive. 
It should also be noted that once a matter is inquired into on direct examination, the door 
has been opened and the witness cannot decline to answer on the topic during cross. 
Mantanez, Cardillo, and Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624. (5th Cir. 1967) The 
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record is void of any indication the trial defense team even attempted to assert 
Defendant's right to confront Santos given these standards of law. The evidence in this 
regard is limited to Rader's unrebutted testimony that he was not prepared to cross-
examine Bruno Santos. 
7. CONSUELO CEDENO: The State concludes that Petitioner has failed to 
establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to cross-examine Consuelo 
Cedeno, due to failure to utilize pre-trial statements directly contradictory to her trial 
testimony. Ms. Cedeno's demeanor and comportment during her post-conviction 
testimony was clearly untrustworthy. It is clear that Rader's unpreparedness led to the 
failure to challenge Cedeno for bias, interest or motive in front of the jury. Had the jury 
witnessed a proper cross-examination the jury it is reasonably probable the trial outcome 
would have been different. 
8. JANE LOPEZ: The state argues, that Petitioner did not attempt to impeach Ms. 
Lopez with any phone records, citing to the PCTT pp. 368-376. The State ignores 
Petitioner's post-conviction Exhibit 9, identified and admitted during the testimony of 
Patrick Dunn, and utilized during the testimony of Jane Lopez. The State also ignores 
the fact that Exhibits 10, 11 and 40, were admitted into evidence during the post-
conviction testimony of Patrick Dunn, and that the records prove the Lopez testimony 
was and is false. (PCCT pp. 61, 75-77, 372-375) Clearly, the phone calls Ms. Lopez 
claims to have made to Bruno Santos on the morning of the murders did not occur. 
Because Ms. Lopez claimed not remember the relevant phone numbers during her post-
conviction trial testimony does not change the facts, or the impact that could have been 
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made at the underlying murder trial had the proper cross-examination and phone record 
evidence been offered. 
9. STU ROBINSON: The State concludes that Petitioner failed to establish that 
decisions regarding cross-examination of Stu Robinson were anything but tactical. 
Again this conclusion completely ignores Rader and Dunn's testimony that Rader was 
not prepared to cross-examine lay witnesses. Stu Robinson was examined, during the 
post-conviction trial, on the topic of his inconsistent grand jury testimony, and he was 
not credible. Clearly, Robinson attempted to and succeeded in misleading the grand jury 
regarding the fingerprint evidence. The record is empty of any reason for counsel's 
omission in this regard. Again, small items such as this, compounded over the course of 
trial, add up to "reasonable doubt." Creating any doubt regarding the credibility of the 
State's witnesses, especially police officers, is critical in finding hesitation to convict 
among Jurors. 
10. FAILURE TO PLAY KIRTLEY RECORDING: Once more, the State, 
reviewing the claim in isolation, only for the purpose of impeaching Sheriff Femling, 
concludes Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Trial Counsel Rader testified at the post-conviction trial he had not reviewed 
the recording, either the lost enhanced version or the original, and he was unaware 
whether Pangburn had personally reviewed the recording. (PCCT pg 184-185) The 
enhanced recording has been lost. (PCCT. Pg.135) Patrick Dunn testified with 
unrebutted clarity, that Sheriff Femling could be heard making a statement to the effect, 
"that he was concerned about the community, or the valley, being concerned with a 
murderer running around, that they had a -- had to act fast on this, and they should 
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concentrate on the girl." (PCCT pp. 106) The unenhanced recording was offered into 
evidence and played during the post-conviction trial, and officers could be clearly heard 
repeatedly stating, the girl could not have done it because she had no blood on her. 
Obviously, these statements straight from the mouths ofthe first officers on the scene are 
extraordinary and hyper beneficial to the defense when the defense theme is "no blood 
no guilt." Yet, lead defense counsel did not play the recording for the jury. The record is 
silent for an explanation why the recording was not played. Clearly, Bob Pangburn had 
not bothered to sit through the several hour recording in order to apprise himself of its 
contents. 
11. FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE: Petitioner rruses two related claims involving 
fingerprint issues. The first, as ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to inquire 
of his fingerprint expert regarding the "freshness" of latent prints found on the tools of 
murder. The second, as a newly discovered evidence claim, based on the identification 
of a local homeless man as the person whose prints matched the previously unidentified 
latent prints found on the murder weapon. The State does not address the first claim in 
its proposed findings, but deals extensively with the second. The State concludes, 
essentially, that because the unidentified latent prints were known of at trial, the mere 
identification of those prints is neither material nor likely to produce an acquittal, 
reasoning these prints were dealt with extensively at trial. 
It is true the jury became aware that unidentified latent prints were found on the 
murder weapon, scope and ammunition packaging during the underlying trial. It is also 
true the jury was presented with opinion testimony by the State's expert, Tina Walthall, 
to the effect, latent prints cannot be precisely dated. However, and notably, the jury did 
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not hear the defense expert's opinion that the prints were fresh, because trial counsel was 
not prepared to examine his witness. 
The post-conviction court had an opportunity to view both experts fully discuss 
this issue. Robert Kerchusky candidly stated that a latent print, without additional 
information cannot be dated, but under most conditions will not last a year. (PCCT pp. 
551-556, 558-559, 567-570) Kerchusky at length discussed conditions and 
circumstances that impact whether a latent print will remain on a particular item of 
evidence, and recounted the basis of his opinion that the prints on the tools of murder in 
this case were fresh. (PCCT pp. 587-591) Furthermore, Kerchusky described in detail 
the basis of his opinion that the prints of Christopher Kevin Hill, found on the scope 
removed from .264 caliber rifle used to murder Diane and Alan Johnson, were left when 
the scope was being removed from the rifle. (PCCT pp. 568) 
The jury heard none of these opinions, nor did the jury hear decisive nuanced 
opinion testimony from Tina Walthall, elicited at the post-conviction triaL Ms. Walthall 
could point to only two cases in the literature where latent prints in field, lasted more 
than a year. (PCCT pp.667-668) Ms. Walthall agreed that a whole host of factors can 
adversely affect a latent print. (PCCT pg. 675) Ms. Walthall was unable to describe the 
details of the environmental conditions or other circumstances of the case studies cited. 
(PCCT pg. 678) Ms. Walthall conceded that etched prints are often seen on soft metal. 
(PCCT pp. 680-681) Ms. Walthall conceded she had not reviewed the police reports or 
witness statements and therefore had no knowledge of how the tools of murder had been 
handled or stored. (PCCT pp. 682-685) Ms. Walthall testified that it was possible that 
Mel Speegle's handling and wrapping of the murder weapon and scope would wipe off 
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old prints. (PCCT pp. 684-685) Ms. Walthall agreed with Kerchusky that the latent 
prints were of excellent quality, (PCCT pp 686-687) and that is only "possible" that the 
latent prints were more than a year old. (PCCT pg 669-670) 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate question for this Court to consider is whether it is confident the 
underlying trial concluded with a just result. Two thirds of the trial defense team has set 
ego aside and confessed to its incompetence. The defense presentation was riddled by 
errors and omissions, all of which can be explained only by unpreparedness of counseL 
Taken in the aggregate can this court be confident in the outcome of the trial, knowing 
the person or persons who pulled the trigger have not been brought to justice. 
YATLAW 
~~g!1 
DATED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH JOHN.sON ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-06-324 
) 
vs. ) RESPONSE TO 
) PETITIONER'S PROPOSED 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & 
Respondent ) ORDER 
\'-
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special 
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits its response to I'Petltioner's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law & Order [sic]" (hereinafter 
"Petitioner's Brief'). 
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A. Johnson's "Undisputed Underly,ing Substantive Facts" Are- Not Entirely 
Accurate 
Beginning at page four of Petitioner's Brief, Johnson sets forth a number of 
assertions she characterizes as "undisputed underlying substantive facts." (Petitioner's 
Brief, pp.4~8.) These ''facts'' are not, however, entirely accurate.1 Specifically, the state 
notes the following dIscrepancies and omissions with respect to Johnson's "undisputed 
underlying substantive facts:" 
1. Johnson contends a "more complete inventory of the crime scene located 
a pink robe, a pair of surgical gloves. and five (5) .25 caliber automatic rounds in a trash 
can by the curb." (Petitioner's Brief, p.5, 'U 18.) The gloves found in the trash can 
where not, however, "a pair of surgical gloves, ,I as Johnson claims; rather, there was 
one latex glove and one brown leather glove, both of which were wrapped inside of the 
robe. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.' 894, L22 - p. , 895, L3.) The matching leather glove was 
found in Johnson's bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2036. Ls.1-9; Trial Exhibit 83.) 
Further, and not insignificantly, the five rounds of .25 ammunition in the garbage can 
were found in the pocket of the pink robe, which robe belonged to Johnson. (Trial Tr., 
VoL II, p.1901, Ls.9-13.) While Johnson notes there was a box of .25 ammunition found 
on the freezer at the Johnson residence (Petitioner's Brief, p.5, 1118), she fails to note 
the box of ammunition was missing five rounds (Trial Tr., Vol. III. p.2048, Ls.4-21). 
Which could account for the five rounds found in the garbage can. 
1 Also inaccurate is the statement in the opening paragraph of Johnson's brief in which 
she states the Court "received certain documents,n including "deposition testimony." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.1.) While Johnson included Bob Pangburn's deposition transcript in 
her list of exhibits for the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the transcript was never 
admitted as an exhibit at the hearing ~ Tr., ppA-5); as such, the transcript was not 
"received" for any evidentiary purpose and may not be considered as evidence. 
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2. Johnson claims Bruno Santos "had been threatened with statutory rape 
prosecution in the weeks prior to the murders" (Petitioner's Brief, p,6, ~ 20), implying 
that there was a threat made to Mr. Santos personally. This is not entirely incorrect. 
While Linda Vavold, Diane Johnson's sister, testified that she encouraged Diane to 
"press charges" if she wanted Mr. Santos and Johnson to stop seeing each other (Trial 
Tr., Vol. V, p.3358j Ls.3-15), Mr. Santos testified only that Alan, when confronting Mr. 
Santos about Johnson staying the night at his house, told him if he "didn't lave his 
daughter alone, that he was going to hit me and that he was going to put me in jail." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2762, Ls.16-18).2 
3. Johnson asserts the "blood spots on the robe were from Mr. and Mrs. 
Johnson and [an] unknown person." (Petitioners Brief, p.S, 1120.) While there were a 
number of "stains" tested from the robe, all of the DNA present did not necessarily 
indicate blood;'rath'er, the DNA could have been from skin cells, saliva, tears, urine, or 
other bodily fluids. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3440, L.16 - p.3441, L.1.) Although Johnson 
fails to mention it, the unknown DNA found on the robe was only a partial profile, with 
just a "few minor arleles" that were not consistent with any of the known samples, which 
included not only Alan and Diane, but also Mr. Santos. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3441, L2-
p. 3442, L1.) Notably, Johnson's DNA was also discovered on the robe. (See, e.g., 
Trial Tr. t Vol. V, p.3442, Ls.11-1S.) 
2 In support of this assertion, Johnson cites Mrs. Vavold's testimony as well as pages 
5433-5434 of the trial transcript, but does not cite to Mr. Santos' testimony. Pages 
5433-5434 of the trial transcript are unrelated to any threats made by Alan Johnson (or 
anyone else) to Mr. Santos. Those pages of the transcript relate the testimony of Gina 
Thomas, an acquaintance of Johnson's, who claimed that one time in grade school, a 
kid named "Andy" threatened to kill her and Johnson if they told anyone he had a gun. 
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4. Johnson asserts that Jane Lopez, Mr. Santos' cousin, testified at trial that 
when she called Mr. Santos at home after learning about the murders "she didn't 
believeD Mr. Santos when he answered his cell phone and said that he WaS at home. 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.7, 4f125.) Ms. Lopez's actual testimony was that she first called Mr. 
Santos on the home phone and he did not answer, so she called him on his cell phone. 
which he answered. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791, Ls.22-24.) When he answered, she 
asked him where he was and he said he was home and did not answer the home phone 
because he was sleeping. (rrial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2791. L.24 - p.2792, L.1.) Ms. Lopez 
then hung up and called Mr. Santos again on the home phone after Mr. Santos said, "If 
you don't believe me, call me at home." (Trial Tr. t Vol. IV, p.2792, Ls.2-5.) While one 
could infer that Ms. Lopez called Mr. Santos back on the home phone because she did 
not "believe" he was at home. it is not uundlsputedtf that this Is, in fact, true. Moreover, 
the inference Joh~son undoubtedly seeks from this testimony - that Mr. Santos' trial 
testimony was not credible - is disputed. 
5. In paragraph 26, Johnson asserts: liThe defense team did not present 
documentary evidence that purportedly proved Jane Lopez did not make the phone 
calls to Bruno as she claimed." (Petitioners Brief, p.7.) The state does not dispute the 
defense did not present "documentary evidence" of the phone calls between Ms. Lopez 
and Mr. Santos but does dispute that such documentary evidence exists. 
6. According to Johnson, Mr. Pangburn "did not inquire" of Robert 
Kerchusky, the defense fingerprint expert, regarding his "opinion that latent unidentified 
fingerprints found on the murder weapon, scope, and ammunition packaging, were 
'fesh' prints." (Petitioner's Brief, p.7, 4f127.) While Mr. Pangburn never asked a question 
using the word "fresh prints," it is not "undisputed" that he never inquired into the subject 
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of the freshness prints. Clearly, he did. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5070. L.6 - p.5074, L.9, 
p.5128, L.18 - p.5129, L.16.) 
B. Johnson's "Summary of Post-Conviction Testimony &. Evidence" Is Not 
Entirely Accurate 
Beginning at page eight of Petitioner's Brief, Johnson purports to summarize the 
testimony and evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
(Petitioner's Brief, pp.8-21.) The state disputes Johnson1s summarl and 
characterization of the testimony and evidence as follows: 
1. Johnson asserts "Mr. Pangburn is suspended from the practice of law in 
the State of Idaho, and in the State of Oregon. Mr. Pangburn testified at the Post-
Conviction Trial . . . and denied the loss of his license to practice law was due to a 
charge of dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, including conversion of client funds." 
(Petitioners Brief, p,e, 1T 31.) To be clear, Mr. Pangburn testified that he surrendered 
his license to practtce law in the State of Oregon during his representation of Johnson 
because he did not want any issues related to his licensing status in that state to 
interfere with his representation of Johnson. (Tr., p.240, L.12 - p.241, L.18.) The only 
information provided to the Court regarding the nature of the Oregon State Bar 
proceedings involving Mr. Pangburn, other than his testimony that he surrendered his 
license, was the Disciplinary Order of the Idaho Supreme Court entered in conjunction 
with Mr. Pangburn's Idaho license suspension that states Mr. Pangburn ~fanled] to 
cooperate and fail[ed] to respond to disciplinary authorities" in Oregon (Exhibit 15), 
3 Of course, Johnson's "summary" of the evidence and testimony presented at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing is not an actual summary of all the evidence and 
testimony, but purports to be a summary of the evidence and testimony she believes is 
favorable to her claims. 
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which is not inconsistent with Mr. Pangburn's testimony that he surrendered his Oregon 
license. Thus, any implication by Johnson that Mr. Pangburn was suspended in Oregon 
"due to a charge of dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, inoluding conversion of 
client fundsn Is unsupported by any evidence. (Petitioner's Brief, p.S. 1f 31.) 
2. Johnson incorrectly claims that Patrick Dunn, the defense Investigator in 
her underlying criminal case, testified that Mr. Pangburn "failed to share discovery." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.8, 1f 32.) Mr. Dunn's actual testimony was that Mr. Pangburn 
''would obtain discovery, and he would carry it around in his trunk for sometimes 
weeks." (Tr., p.42, Ls.17M 19.) While Mr. Dunn may have believed he should have 
received discovery sooner, he never testified that he did not reoeive discovery and, in 
fact, admitted he was unaware of any information that he did not receive. (Tr., p.119, 
Ls.22-24.) As for Johnson's assertion that Mr. Dunn testified Mr. Pangburn was 
"unprepared, almost never present or was chronically late" (Petitioners Brief, p.8, 1132), 
Mr. Dunn's actual testimony was that he thought Mr. Pangburn was unprepared (Tr., 
p.41, L.22 - p.42, L.1), although he offered no actual evidence of unpreparedness; he 
met with Mark Rader. Mr. Pangburn's co-oounsel more than he met with Mr. Pangburn 
(Tr., p.40, Ls.15-17); and Mr. Pangburn did not meet with him and Mr. Rader on the 
mornings before trial like Mr. Dunn thought he should (Tr., p.94, Ls.6~21). 
3. Although Mr. Dunn testified, as did Mr. Rader and Mr. Pangburn, that the 
general division of labor between the attorneys was that Mr. Rader would handle expert 
witnesses and Mr. Pangburn would handle lay witnesses (Tr., pA6, Ls. 3-7) , Mr. Dunn 
had no personal knowledge of all conversations between Mr. Rader and Mr. Pangburn 
regardIng any changes to that arrangement (Tr., p.121, L.24 - p.122, L.22). 
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4. In purporting to summarize the testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing, Johnson asserts Mr. Dunn testified that the defense wanted to "go after Bruno 
Santos." (Tr., p.46, Ls.23-35.) This is true insofar as it goes. What Johnson fails to 
mention is that, although the defense wanted to "go after Bruno Santos." a point with 
which Mr. Pangburn agreed (Tr., p.256, L.24 - p.257, L.2), in the end there was no 
evidence implicating Mr. Santos in the murders (see id.; p.341, Ls.3-9 (Sheriff Femling 
testifying that law enforcement "worked very, very hard to put Bruno at that scene of 
that crime. And every piece of evidence that we tried to uncover to put him at that 
scene of the crime, we were unable to. We were unable to put him there, any way, any 
how. There was absolutely no evidence."». Thus, the defense strategy ultimately 
focused not on Mr. Santos, but on the absence of any blood on Johnson (the same 
theory Johnson relies on in post-conviction), and the deficiencies in the state's 
evidence. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.4603-4610 (defense opening statement).) 
5. In paragraph 32.c., Johnson asserts "Mr. Dunn testified upon review of the 
pre-trial statements by Bruno Santos" that Santos made a number of statements, which 
he advised "the trial lawyers" about, namely, that Mr. Santos said he had been in the 
Johnson residence the day of the murders, he had had sex with Johnson. he "admitted" 
Alan "threatened him with a statutory rape charge," he "admitted owning guns and 
trading for 'weed,·n and that his "car may have been in the area of the Johnson 
residence the night of the murders." (Petitioner's Brief, p.9.) However, Mr. Dunn did not 
actually testify that Santos "admitted" Alan "threatened him with a statutory rape charge" 
- Mr. Dunn testified that he recalled drawing counsels' attention to the fact that Mr. 
Santos told police Alan had not "threatened him to stay away from [Johnson] the 
weekend prior to the murders." (Tr., p.83, L.23 - p.84. L.3.) Nor did Mr. Dunn testify 
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that he told counsel Mr. Santos "admItted" his car was "in the area of the Johnson 
residence the niyht of the murders." In fact, Mr. Dunn's testimony was quite the 
opposite - he testified that he did not remember drawing counsels' attention to Mr. 
Santos' alleged statement that ((his car might have been in the area of the murders on 
that morning." (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83. L.5.) Most importantly, none of Mr. Santos' pre-
trial statements were admitted at the post-conviction hearing for the truth of the matter 
asserted. (Tr., p.66, Ls.4-20, p.82, Ls.18-21 (interviews not admitted for truth of matter 
asserted but "for the basis that rMr. Dunn] took some steps based upon what was 
contained In them").) 
6. According to Johnson, Mr. Dunn also testified that "upon review of pre-trial 
statements by Jane Lopez .. " and review of documentary phone records, it became 
apparent Ms. Lopez [sic] testimony providing an alibi for Bruno Santos was false, and 
could not exclude Bruno Santos from the scene of the murders, which Information was 
given to trial lawyers." (Petitioners Brief, p.e, 11 32.d.) While Mr. Dunn testified to his 
belief that the phone records he obtained "indicated to [him] ... that Jane Lopez was 
not telling, not -- was lying" (TL, p.76, Ls.14-15), the assertion that the phone records t in 
fact, established that (Petitioners Brief, p.10, 11 32.dJ.), Is unsupported by any actual 
evidence for at least two reasons. First, the phone records admitted at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing were not admitted for the truth of any information 
contained therein (Tr., p.70, Ls,14-19), nor was there any testimony attributing any 
particular phone number to any particular person or location other than Mr. Dunn 
testified that he believed he recailed Mr. Santos' cell phone number (Tr., p.71, Ls.13-
18). Second, Detective Harkins testified that calls from the school to Mr. Santos' home 
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phone were likely not logged because both numbers were "Qwest to Qwest numbers, 
local carriers, [and} would not be recorded." (Tr., pA14, Ls.3-17.) 
7. Johnson asserts the audio recording made by Trooper Ross Kirtley when 
he first responded to the murder scene, "portray[s] Sheriff Femling expressing suspicion 
of Sarah Johnson not providing complete information, and concern with involvement 
with Bruno Santos, within one half hour of his arrival at the scene." (Petitioner's Brief, 
p.12, 11' 34.a.) Although Johnson played the audio recording (Exhibit 12). at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing (Tr., p.332, L.18, p.334, L.13). Johnson did not link any 
particular statement made on the recording to any particular individual at the hearing, 
nor does she cite to any portion of the transcript in which she did so (see Petitioner's 
Brief, p.12, 1[ 34.s (only citing Exhibit 12»). 
8. Johnson incorrectly contends that Detective Harkins c'testified he 
concluded Sarah Johnson was the prime target of the investigation by 11 :30 a.m., the 
day of the murders." (Petitioner's Brief, p.13, 11 35.a.) Detective Harkins' actual 
testimony on this point was that he considered Johnson a suspect at that time, not the 
"prime target." (Tr., p.388, Ls.2-24.) 
9. Although Johnson correctly notes that Detective Harkins told Mr. Santos 
that law enforcement did not think he was involved in the murders when they 
interviewed him on September 3, 2003 (Petitioner's Brief, p.13. ~ 35.a.), Johnson falls to 
also note that Detective Harkins explained at the evidentiary hearing that Just because 
he told Mr. Santos that at the time of the interview, does not mean he did not view Mr. 
Santos as a suspect at that time (Tr., pADS, Ls.3-23). In fact, Detective Harkins 
testified that Mr. Santos ('was a suspect in thee] investigation." (Tr., p.4D5, Ls.12-13.) 
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10. Johnson incorrectly characterizes Detective Harkins' testimony at the 
post-convlction hearIng regarding what Mr. Santos told him prior to trial. Detective 
Harkins did not "admit[ ] that Bruno Santos told him during the September 3, 2003, 
interrogation that Santos [sic] car might have been [sic] the area the night of the 
murders." (Petitioner's Brief, p.13, 11 35.a.ll.) Although Detective Harkins acknowledged 
Mr. Santos made a statement relating to his car being seen in the area the night of the 
murders, he also testified that post-conviction counsel was taking the conversation out 
of context. (Tr., p.396, L8 - p.397, L.2.) During an interview of Mr. Santos> Detective 
Harkins asked, "What if I told you that someone said that they seen your velUcie in the 
area that morning?" (Exhibit 34, p.13.) Mr. Santos said, "I don't know, maybe 
someone, some guy get my car I don't know, I don't think so. I was sleep on 
(inaudibie)." (Exhibit 34, p.13 (verbatim).) Detective Harkins explained at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing that the question to Mr. Santos suggesting that someone 
saw his car in the area was a "lie" he used as an "interview technique" because "[n]o 
one ever told [him] that." (fr., p.409, Ls.15-22.) With respect to Mr. Santos admitting 
"prior gang affiliations" (Petitioner's Brief, p.13, 1l 35.a.iL), Detective Harkins explained 
that while Mr. Santos flsaid that he was involved in a gang," there was no actual, 
documented gang of which Mr. Santos was a member (fr., p.401, L.S - pAOS, L.2), 
which was consistent with his trial testimony. Johnson also incorrectly claims that 
Detective Harkins "admitted that Bruno Santos told him during the September 3, 2003, 
interrogation" that "he might find .25 caliber ammunition in his apartment. , . and that 
Santos had owned a gun and traded for weed," (Petitioner'S Brief, p.13, 11 35.a.Ii.) 
What actually happened at the evidentiary hearing was post-conviction counsel read 
from the interview transcript (although he left out portions), and at times had Detective 
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Harkins read excerpts from the transcript, which Included references to bullets, guns, 
and weed. (Tr., p.417, L.4 - p.420, L.S.) Detective Harkins testified he only "[v)aguely" 
remembered the interview and did not recall the "exact details of it." (Tr., p.420, LS.6-
17.) Moreover, none of Mr. Santos' statements made during the Interview were 
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.84, Ls.14-22.) Thus, any reliance 
on Mr. Santos' statements as substantive evidence is improper. 
11. Johnson's claim that there is an inconsistency between Mel Speegle's 
statements relating to when Christopher HIlI may have left his prints on the .264 rilfe, the 
scope, and the ammunition, and Mr. Hili's statements regarding the same is 
unsupported by the portion of the transcript she cites for that assertion (Petitioners 
Brief, p.14, 11 35.bj.), or by any other evidence. 
12. Johnson asserts Detective Harkins "testified that police did not attempt to 
confirm: Hill's statement that his prints got on the murder weapon, scope and 
ammunition packaging when he shot the murder weapon; ,Hili's whereabouts at the time 
of the murders; Hill's known associations." (Petitioner's Brief, p.14, 11 3S.h.H. 
(punctuation original).) What Detective Harkins actually testified to was (a) he did not 
remember asking where Mr. Hill had taken the gun to sight it in because he did not "see 
what there would be to gain from that" since Mr. Hili could have done that "out in a field" 
(Tr., p.434, L.a - pA35, L.1); (b) to the best of his recollection, Mr. Hill did not remember 
where he was at the time of the murders "because it would have been six years before" 
(Tr., p.435, Ls.2~6); and (c) of Mr. Hill's "known associates," he did look into Mr. 
Speegle, but did not look into anyone else because he "didn't think there was a reason" 
(Tr., p.435, Ls.15~20). 
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13. In paragraph 36.a., Johnson states: "Sheriff Femling admttted he 
concluded, after being at the scene for approximately an hour, there was an issue and a 
problem with a boyfriend named Bruno Santos, who was ruled out as a suspect 
because no evidence cpuld be found to place him at the scene. n (Petitioner's Brief, 
p.14.) While Sheriff Femling undoubtedly testified that, while at the scene, he was 
"getting statements that there was an issue and a problem with a boyfriend named 
Bruno Santos" (Tr., p.337, Ls.10-12), to the extent Johnson is implying that Mr. Santos 
was "ruled out as a suspect" that same day, any such claim is not supported by the 
evidence. 
14. Johnson's characterization of Stu Robinson's grand Jury testimony as 
"inaccurate" Is Incorrect and contradicted by the record. (Petitioner's Brief, p.15. , 
38.a.) 
15. Johnson correctly states that the recorded interviews of Mr. Hill and Mr. 
Speegle, conducted in 2009, were admitted into evidence. (Petitioner's Brief, p.15, 11 
39.) However, those recordings were admitted "solery for the purpose of establishing 
th[e] alleged inconsistency [asserted In the Second Amended Petition] and the scope of 
the investigation. The assertions made as to their truth are not going to be relied on by 
the [C]ourt." (Tr., p.440, L.16 - p.441 , LA.) 
16. Contrary to Johnson's assertion, Conseulo Cedeno did not testify that she 
uses "multiple names." (Petitioner's Brief, p.16, 1140.) Rather, Ms. Cedeno testified that 
her "name in Mexico is Maria Dominguez," but when she came to the United States she 
was told she "couldn't use [her] name." (Tr., pA58, Ls.7-12.) Ms. Cedeno denied uSing 
any other names. (Tr., pAS9, Ls.18-21.) Johnson also cites Exhibit 13, which is the 
transcript of the interview of Consuelo Cedeno conducted on September 12, 2003, in a 
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manner that suggests she is doing so for the truth of the statements Ms. Cedeno made 
during that interview. (Petitioner's Brief, p.16, ,-r 40.) However, as with the other 
interview transcripts I Exhibit 13 was not admitted for the truth of any statements made 
during that interview, "but only for the basis that [Mr. Dunnl took some steps based 
upon what was contained in them." (Tr., p.66, Ls.16-22.) 
17 _ In paragraph 41, Johnson asserts that, at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing, Mr. Santos Hrefused to answer a host of questions that may have led to direct 
or circumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or clues leading to evidence of criminal 
conduct If he would have answered." (Petitioners Brief, p.16.) Johnson's assertion that 
Mr. Santos' answers would have led to such evidence or such "clues" is entirely 
speculative. 
18. Mr. Kerchusky did not testify at the post-conviction hearing. nor did Mr. 
Robinson testify at the grand jury, that uno latent prints of va rue were found at the 
scene." (Petitioners Brief, p.17, ~ 43.a.) Mr. Robinson testified before the grand jury 
that the Idaho State Police "could not locate any prints that could be identified" on the 
gun, the scope\ or the casings. (Exhibit 1, p.189, Ls.17 -22.) At the post-conviction 
hearing I Mr. Kerchusky characterized this testimony as stating ''there was no latent 
fingerprints of value." (Tr .• p.578, Ls.14-15.) 
19. Johnson's assertion that the rifle was "wrapped and unwrapped and 
rewrapped with clothing" is not a correct statement of the testimony. (Petitioner's Brief, 
p.20, ,-r 44.b.) Mr. Speegle never testified that he uwrapped" his .264 rifle in clothing. 
Mr. Speegle's testimony at trial was that the guns in his closet were "in the corner with 
Clothes, robes covering them." (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2702, Ls.17-20.) At the post-
conviction hearing, counsel simply re-read Mr. Speegle's trial testimony and had him 
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agree that was what he said. (Tr., p.705, L.16-p.707, l,1, p.713, Ls.6-17.) Thatpost-
conviction counsel attempted to characterize Mr. Speegle's actions as IIwrapping it in 
clothingll does not mean Mr. Speegle testified to that effect; in fact) he did not. (See Tr., 
p.723, Ls.2-8; see also p.702, Ls.11-13 (denying he used clothes as a ''wrap'').} 
20. While Johnson correctly notes that Tina Walthall testified that etched 
prints are "relatively common" on "metal types of casings," she omits Ms. Walthall's 
testimony that "it's very rare that you get one thafs very good quality," and there's "no 
guarantee" that touching such a casing will leave an etched print. (Tr., p.691, L.25 -
p.692, L.9; see also Tr., p.690, L.24 - p.691, L.22 (discussing "highly variable factors" 
that effect whether an etched print will be left).) 
21. Mr. Hill did not testify, as Johnson claims, that he only helped Mr. Speegle 
move "large items from Speegle's ranch to a Boise residence." (Petitioner's Brief, p.20, 
1l46.a.) Rather, he testified he helped Mr. Speegle move some "things" to Boise and 
helped him "move a few things" to the apartment on the Johnson property. (Tr" p.726, 
L.24 - p.727. L.12.) 
22. Although Mr. Hill testified that he "lived in his pick-up truckn "during the 
summer of 2003" (see Petitioner's Brief, p.21! ~ 46.c.), he was doing so "by choice 
[because hel was camping out" during that period on BlM land located on East Magic 
Road (Tr., p.7367 l.18 - p.737, L.12). 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER - J 4 
FEB. 28, 2011 4: 16PM IDAHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU NO. 360 p, 16 
C. Johnson's Proposed Findings Of Fact Contain Assertions That Are Not 
Supported By The Evidence 
Johnson's proposed findings of fact contain the following assertions that are not 
supported by any evidence:4 
1. Contrary to Johnson's assertion, U[t)he post-convidlon trial testimony of 
Patrick Dunn and Mark Rader, regarding inadequate preparation of the undertying 
murder trial defense team" is not "unrebutted." (Petitioner's Brief, p.21, 1148.) Mr. Dunn 
certainly never characterized his performance as inadequate. To the contrary, the 
entire gist of Mr. Dunn's testimony was that he was very prepared and made efforts to 
prepare counsel as well based upon the information he obtained. While Mr. Rader was 
willing to "fall on his sword" in relation to certain things, the record of the underlying 
criminal case reveals counsel were, in fact, prepared, Further, Mr. Pangburn testified 
that he was prepared and devoted a large amount of time to Johnson's defense, 
spending ''{h]undreds and hundreds" of hours on the case. (Ir., p.279, L,25 - p.280, 
L20.) 
2. The evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing does not support 
Johnson's claims that counsel were not "sufficiently apprised" of "the pre-trial 
statements of Bruno Santos," "the law concerning [sic} witness's assertion of [sic] Fifth 
Amendment prMlege against self-incrimination," "pre-trial statements of Consuela {sic] 
Cedeno," "pre-trial statements of Jane Lopez, and documentary evidence relating to 
phone records," "the content of the Kirtley recording," lithe law concerning the legal 
4 Included within her proposed factual findings, Johnson asserts the following witnesses 
are not credible: Bob Pangburn, Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Jane Lopez, and 
Christopher Hill. (Petitioner's Brief, pp.21-23, m1 47, 49.a.i., 49.b.i., 49.o.i., 49.m.) 
Credibility is, of course, ultimately to be decided by the Court; however, the state 
obviously disputes Johnson's blanket assertions that these witnesses are not credible. 
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standard for admission of the blood splatter [sic] recreation [sic] test/' or "the facts and 
law concerning fingerprint evidence,175 (Petitioner's Brief, pp.21-23, 1f 49.) To the 
contrary, with respect to most of this information, Mr. Dunn testified that he told counsel 
about this information and that the Information was available to counsel in the witness 
notebooks he prepared. Regarding the fingerprint evidence, Mr. Kerchusky insisted he 
made counsel aware of the "important" information regarding such evidence. (Tr. y 
pp.591-594.) Further, with respect to most of the information Johnson claims counsel 
was not "apprised" of, she failed to even ask counsel about their knowledge of the 
Information. That post-conviction counsel thinks trial counsel should have used the 
information available to counsel differently does not mean counsel was not "sufficiently 
apprised" of the information. 
3. Contrary to Johnson's assertions, the "only reasonable conclusion," based 
on the evidence presented, is not Mr. Kerchusky's opinion that Mr. Hill was the last 
person to touch the .2.64 rifle, scope, and ammunition, or that he did so within one year 
ofthe murders. (Petitioner's Brief, pp.22-23, W 49.h.-49.j.) 
D. Johnson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Establishing She Is Entitled To 
Post-Conviction Relief On Any Of Her Claims 
In its Respondent's Post-Evidentiary Hearing Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Respondent's Brief'), filed February 14, 2011, the state set forth, 
in detail, on a claim-by-claim basis, the reasons Johnson has failed to meet her burden 
of establishing she is entitled to post-conviction relief. Johnson has articulated nothing 
5 The state is unaware of what "law" Johnson thinks counsel should have been 
"apprised" of in relation to the fingerprint eVidence, nor did she present any evidence or 
argument of what that law might be. 
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in her Petitioner~ Brief that would compel a contrary conclusion. In addition to citing an 
incorrect legal standard (Petitioner's Brief, p.25 (claiming the "essential question" is 
whether "justice [was] served")), Johnson's "Conclusions of Law" are just as bare and 
conclusory as are the allegations in her Second Amended Petition (see Petitioner's 
Brief, pp.26-28). 
For example, Johnson quotes the general allegation that counsel was ineffective 
as alleged in paragraph 14 of her Second Amended' Petition and then states: "These 
arguments are well taken. Petitioner has met her burden and proven, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsels' performance was deficient. and she 
was thereby prejudiced." (Petitioner's Brief, p.26, f( 51.) Not only has Johnson failed to 
rebut the presumption that counsels' decisions were strategic and tactical, she has 
failed to explain, as she must (see Order Regarding Post-Trial Briefing and Citations to 
the Record, dated January 12, 2011), how the result of her trial would have been 
different but for counsels' alleged deficiencies. Rather, she simply argues, in 
conclusory fashion: 
During the post-conviction trial several of these witnesses were cross-
examined and the crime scene recording was played. The witnesses 
were confronted with inconsistencies in their trial testimony with pre-trIal 
statements. Petitioner presented her fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky, 
who gave convincing testimony regarding the freshness of prints on the 
murder weapon and associated Items of evidence. Had the jury 
experienced a proper cross-examination of Bruno Santos, Consuela [sicJ 
Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Sheriff Femling, Detective Harkins, Officer 
Robinson, Officer Omelas, together with having viewed the crime scene 
recording and heard the expert's opinion, it is reasonably probable the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. 
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(Petitioner's Brief, p.27.6) 
Johnson falls to explain why or how playing the crime scene recording would 
have made a difference (assuming the trial court would have even admitted it), nor does 
she explain how using the word "fresh" would have actually made a difference in Mr. 
Kerchusky's trial testimony. Finally, Johnson has failed to explain why there is a 
reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different had trial counsel 
conducted the same cross-examination post-conviction counsel conducted. This is 
particularly true in light of the answers that were given in conjunction with post-
conviction counsefs cross-examination, which answers revealed nothing that would 
undermine confidence in the verdicts. See Harrington v. Richte!. 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 
(2011) (citation and quotations omitted) ("It is not enough to show that the errors had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."). 
Johnson also claims that 'ThJad counsel performed up to the objective standard 
of reaso.nableness, the jury would have viewed crucial blo.od splatter [sic] evidence." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.26, ~ 52.) However, as was noted in the Respondent's Brief, 
counsel attempted to admit an experiment relating to blood spatter, but the trial court, 
after an extensive hearing, ruled the experiment was inadmissible, crediting forensic 
pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between the 
6 Because Johnson failed to offer any evidence to support her claim that counsel were 
Ineffective in cross-examining Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, KJeli Eliison, Glenda Osunor 
Luis Ramirez. Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala and because Johnson fails to address the 
cross-examination of those individuals in her brief, the state assumes she is abandoning 
those claims and no further argument is necessary with respect to those allegations. It 
also appears Johnson has abandoned her claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to 
seek a continuance because she has offered no proposed findings or conclusions with 
respect to that allegation. 
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coconut used in the experiment and a human head. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.4503-4508.) 
While Mr. Rader testified at the post-conviction hearing that he could have "gone out to . 
. . various defender agencies in various places around the country" to "see if [he] could 
find different experts or different information somehown (Tr., p.169, Ls.9-24), Johnson 
presented no evidence at the hearing regarding what experts counsel would have 
located had he "reached ouf nor did she present any evidence on what other 
experiments or reconstruction options could have been presented to the trial court. 
(See generally Tr.) As suchj her claim that some unknown "blood splatter [sic] 
evidence" should have been presented and that such unknown evidence would have 
made a difference is unsupported by any actual evidence and falls far short of 
establishing she is entitled to relief based upon her claim that counsel were deficient In 
this regard. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated: 
Sunnounting strickland'S high bar is never an easy task. An 
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of 
waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 50 the 
Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest intrusive 
post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the 
right to counsel is meant to serve. 
Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Simply put, Johnson has failed to surmount the "high bar" under Strickland with 
respect to any of her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As such, this Court 
should deny relief on all such claims. 
Johnson has likewise failed to establish she is entitled to a new trial based upon 
the discovery of the identity of the individual who left the previously unidentified prints 
on the .264 rifle, the scope, and a box of ammunition. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.34-
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41.) Nevertheless, Johnson argues "that had the jury known, first that these unidentified 
latent prints were fresh, that fact alone would have changed the jury's verdict." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p.28, ~ 56.) This argument, however, relies on the false premise that 
the jury was not aware of Mr. Kerchusky's opinion in this regard. This premise is belied 
by the record. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5070, L6 - p.5074, L9, p.5128, L 18 - p.5129, 
L16.) 
Johnson further argues, "had the jury also known the prints were those of a 
homeJess man, with possible motivation of financial gain, access to the scene of the 
crime, no alibi, and whose explanation of how his prints got on the tools of the murder 
was highly unlikely, reasonable doubt would have prevented conviction." (Petitioner's 
Brief, p.28, 1T 56.) These assertions are not only contradicted by the evidence 
presented at the post-conviction hearing they are, frankly, borderline ridiculous. That 
Mr. Hill decided to spend his summer camping does not make him a "homeless man" as 
Johnson asserts or as that term is commonly understood. Johnson's claim of a 
upossible motivation of financial gain" is without any evidentiary support and appears to 
be based solely on her false characterization of Mr. Hill as a "homeless man." It is also 
Inconsistent with the uncontradicted testimony that there was absolutely no evidence 
that Diane's and Alan's deaths were the result of a robbery or any other financial 
motivation. (Tr., p.356, Ls.14-24.) Aiso contrary to Johnson's attack on Mr. Hill is the 
fact that Mr. Speegle specifically denied Mr. Hili had access to his apartment on the 
Johnson property. (Tr., p.704, Ls.8-10.) Indeed, Mr. Hill had no greater "access to the 
scene of the crime" than anyone else who lived in Bellevue, and his access was 
certainly not as great as Johnson's. As for Johnson's assertion that Mr. Hill had "no 
alibi," this is simply incorrect to the extent she is implying that he had no explanation for 
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his whereabouts at the time of the murders - he clearly did. (Tr., p.728, Ls.S-14, p.736, 
L18 - p,738, L19.) Finally, there is nothing "unlikely" much less "highly unlikely" about 
Mr. Hill's explanation as to how his prints were found on Mr. Speegle's property. Both 
Mr. Speegle and Mr. Hill testified that Mr. Hill was the caretaker of Mr. Speegle's ranch 
at one time and had access to all of his property, including his guns. Both also testified 
that Mr. Hili helped Mr, Speegle move, at which time he could have touched Mr. 
Speegle's guns and ammunition. In addition, Mr. Hill testified that, while staying at Mr. 
, 
Speegle's ranch, he got "bored" and took Mr. Speegle's gun "to the Muldoon Canyon 
Gun Range" and shot it ''six or seven times." (fr., p.729, L24 - p.730, L.7.) That it 
does not behoove Johnson to believe Mr. Hill's and Mr. Speegle's perfectly reasonable 
explanations does not mean an objective jury would have the same difficulty, 
particularly in light of the weight of the evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that 
Johnson was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence proving' Johnson was involved7 in the murder of her parents was 
overwhelming. Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her 
relationship with Bruno Santos, a nineteen-year-old illegal immigrant, who they planned on 
reporting to law enforcement the day they were murdered. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2505, L 14 
- p.2509, L6; Vol. V. p.3337. Ls.7-18; p.3342, L13 - p.3343, L.6; p.3345, LSA-18; 
p.3357, L 15 - p.3359, L.6.) Shortly after the murders, Johnson fled to a neighbor's 
house, where she reported that both her parents had been shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1512, 
La - p.1519, L5; p.1554, L.5 - p.1555, L25; p.i58S. L.i8 - p.iS86, L.10.) Although 
7 The jury was instructed that Johnson could be found guilty of first-degree murder 
regardless of whether she pulled the trigger or aided and abetted another in the 
murders. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). 
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Johnson denied any involvement, she gave several different accounts of what she 
allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what she heard just prior to and after the murders. 
Johnson initially claimed she heard a gunshot while she was in her room asleep, that she 
sat up in bed, then heard a second shot, went to her parents' bedroom door, called for her 
mother, then fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1519, L.6 - p.1521, L.7; p.1558, Ls.3.;.19.) 
She stated she had not seen anything, however. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1521, Ls.3-7.) The 
second time she told the story, shortly thereafter, her report differed: she stated she heard 
her father in the shower before the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1528, Ls.3-18.) (See also 
Tr., Vol. yl, p.S6S6, L.6 - p.3701, L15; p.3739, L24 - p.3742, L.22 (another version of 
events told by Johnson).) 
Upon being asked the first time by police what had happened, just a few minutes 
later, she tried to reconcile these statements, stating that her father starting the shower 
Initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was re-awakened again by the first 
shot (Trial Tr. t Vol. III, p.1811, L.21 - p.1813, L.6; p. 2099, L.17 - p.2103, L21.) In this 
statement she also for the first time claimed she had opened the door of the master 
bedroom before fleeing the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1850, Ls.1~23.) She later told a 
friend that she had ImmedIately fled the house upon hearing the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, 
p.3297. L.22 - p.3298, l,22.) She told this friend's mother that, after hearing a shot and 
going to her parent's closed bedroom door, she heard arguing, called out to her mother, 
and then fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3529, L.10 - p.3530, l,15.) (See also Trial 
Tr., Vol. III, p.2106, L.7 - p.2112, l,23 (version of events Johnson gave police a few hours 
later).) Later that day, Johnson told her brother that she woke up upon hearing the first 
shot, went to her parents' closed door and called out for them, then heard the second shot 
and fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.4545, L.16 - p.4548. L.12.) 
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Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2424, L.16 - p.2426, L.7.) She stated she woke up when she heard the shower come 
on, and then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2426, L.8 - p.2428, 
L4,) She got out of bed, went through her bathroom into the guest bedroom, out into the 
hall, and to the door of the master bedroom. (Trial Tr., VoL IV, p.2428, LS - p.2429, L.9.) 
She stated her bedroom door was either closed or open only a crack. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2429, Ls.10-13.) In this interview, Johnson claimed she heard the second shot while 
standing outside the master bedroom door, but that the doors were open because her 
parents propped it open with a pillow, and Johnson again stated she did not see or hear 
anything indicating a struggle. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2429, L,14 - p.2432, L.1.) About 25 
days after the murders Sarah told another version of events. She told a relative that the 
first shot woke her up; she heard a second shot, ran to her parents' bedroom. and saw 
blood on the walls and floor. (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3684, L22 ~ p.3690. L 12.) 
Johnson's Inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did, and heard around 
the time of the murders were significant in relation to other evidence. For example, 
several of the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted her hair and 
appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep In bed when the 
murders occurred. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1545, L.20 - p.1547, L.18; p.1559, L14 - p.1560, 
L.11; p.1818, L.19 - p,1819, L19; p.2520, L15 - p.2521 , L.23,) Johnson's claim that her 
parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door had been closed was also inconsistent wlth 
the presence of Diane's blood and brain matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the 
hallway and part of Diane's skull being in the hallway outside the master bedroom, (Trial 
Tr" Vol. III, p.1619, lo20 - p.1620, lo10; p.1637, Ls.5-15; p.1655, lo2 - p.1657, L.9; 
p.1868, L6.2~18; p.2019, L24 - p.2020, lo18; p.2020, lo24 - p.2022, lo3; p.2121, L7-
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p.2124, L.4; Vol. v, p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.20.) In addition, Diane's blood was found on 
the socks Johnson was wearing the morning of the murders. (Trial Tr. t Vol. III, p.1755, L.8 
- p.1759, L.8; Vol. V, p.3120, L.21 - p.3122, L.13; p.3423, Ls.8-14; p.3475, L.19 - p.3476, 
L.3.) Johnson also had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent with a recent 
impact, such as shotgun recoiLs (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2248, L.3 - p.2250, L.9; p.2317, L.6 -
p2318, L. 18.) 
During the interview that took place the day after the murder, Johnson admitted 
owning a pink bathrobe (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2436, Ls.7-18), admitted that a right-handed leather 
glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother and was usually in the car 
(Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2036, L.1 - p.2037, L.6; Vol. IV, p.2436, L 19 - p2437, L.1; Vol. VI, 
p.3596, L.20 - p.3598, L.1), and claimed there should not have been any bullets in her 
room (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2437, Ls.2-17). However, unspent cartridges of the type used in 
the murders were found in her bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2033, L.11 - p.2034, L.18.) 
On them was Diane's blood. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.24.) In addition, 
the police found the spent casings to rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and 
the master bedroom (still in the rifle). (Trial Tr .• Yol. \fI, p.1840. L.15 - p.1842, L.12; 
p.1843, L24 - p.944, L15; p.1954, L.11 - p.1956, L.21; p.2051, L.3 - p.2053, L.8; Vol. V, 
p.2912, L.6 - p.2954, L 16.) Also significant was evidence law enforcement found in a 
trash can set out on the street for collection the morning of the murders: one latex glove 
and one left-hand leather glove, which matched the glove found in Johnson's bedroom, 
wrapped in the pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1672, L.16 -
Q Johnson claimed the bruises came from falling and hitting a table at Mr. Santos' house 
when she stayed there two days before the murder. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2444, Ls.7-15.) 
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p.1673, L17; p.1826, L.16 - p.1832, L.14; p.1893. L.19 - p.1902, L.17; Vol. VI, p.4566, 
l,16 - p.4568, L.25.) Inside the robe were paint chips that matched paint on the shirt 
Johnson was wearing the morning of the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1755, l.8 - p.1758, 
L.S; Vol. VI, p.3574, L.1 - p.35e7, L.21.) Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present 
inside the latex glove (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p. 310S, L.5 - p.2114, L.1), and the robe Itself 
tested positive for blood and DNA from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3114, L.2 - p.3117, L.11; 
p.3434, L.11 - p.3459, L.3; p.3473. L.13 - p.3475, L.2), DNA possibly from Alan (Trial Tr., 
Vol. V, p.3434, L11 - p.3459, L.3), gun shot residue (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3229, L.15 -
p.3238, L.20), and tissue from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3446, L.19 - p.3448, L 18; p.3454, 
L.16 - p.3455, L.Z3). The blood on the robe was consistent with the shooter having worn 
it, backwards, during the shooting. (Trial Tr., vol. VI, p.4194, L.S - p.4211, L.21.) 
With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had been 
hidden in a closet in the guesthouse. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2418, L.8 - p.2419, L.22; 
p.2702, L.3 - p.2706, L.1.) Johnson had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there 
several times, including the days immediately preceding the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, 
p.20S7, L.7 - p.2038, L.6; Vol. IV, p.2257, L.7 - p.2258, l,10; p.2437, L.18 - p.2439, L.23; 
p.2688 , 1.25 - p.2690, L.6; p.2715, L.12 - p.2716, L.6; Vol. V, p.3274, Ls.11-25; p.3285, 
L.6 - p.3293, L.7; p.3335, L.14 - p.3336, l,22.) The scope from the murder weapon was 
still in the guesthouse on the bed, and officers initially at the scene observed footprints in 
the dew on the lawn going to and from the Johnson home and the guesthouse, which was 
an apartment above the detached garage on the Johnson properly. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, 
p.1733, L.20-p.1738, L.25, p.1842, 1.8-p.1843, l,3; p.2056, L.2-p.2057, L.22;VoI.IV, 
p.2706, Ls.2-16, p.2685, L 12 - p.2686, L.25.) A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from 
the guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2038, L.7 -
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p.2040, L.10.) A nine-mIllimeter handgun matching the magazine was in a gun safe in the 
guesthouse (Trial Tr., Vol. III, L.7 - p.2062, L.12). and a .22 rifle from the guesthouse 
closet was also found in the garage (Trial Tr .• Vol. /II, p.1728, L.20 - p.1731, L2Q; p.2047, 
L18 - p.2050, L.18; Va!. N, p.2708, L13- p.2709, L.14). Johnson had asked her parents 
for a key to the family's gun safe two days before the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3336, 
Ls.10-22.) 
The trial court's observations regarding the likelihood of an alternate perpetrator 
or the lack of Johnson1s involvement, given the evidence presented. are also 
informative: 
[TJo suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody off of the 
street could come and find that gun in the guest house, find those bullets 
in the guest house, know when the parents were going to be there; find 
the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the one knife that's hidden 
behind the microwave or brad box, whatever it was, in the dark no less; go 
out past the family dog that the evidence was would bark, and the dog 
didn't bark. 
Take the same route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took 
out of the house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her 
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not awaken her or 
bother her. 
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the parents' 
bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this in the dark and not 
disturb the parents just defies common sense. 
I think a reasonable jury could clearly find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here. The jury heard all of the 
evidence about the robe. 
The jury doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly the 
way the defense theory is that it occurred. The argument of no blood, no 
guilt; well, the converse of that Is if there's blood, there is guilt. And 
there's blood. There's blood all over the robe, blood on the socks. 
Your whole theory. it seems to be, the whole defense theory is an 
aiding and abetting theory, because the defendanfs there and there's no 
evidence that excludes the defendant. There's not one piece of evidence 
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that excludes the defendant from the commission of this crime that , 
heard. She's right there. And her defense-
I mean her defense people, Howard and Mink, testify - and Inman, 
I believe, all three -- at least two of them testified that the doors were 
open. The door to the parents' bedroom, which Is propped open by the 
pillows, and the door to Sarah Johnson's room is open. 
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was taken 
out of the Suburban, that's something else that this unnamed killer would 
have had to have known, is where the gloves were located, the mother's 
gloves in the Suburban. Located those in the dark. as well, and brought 
them into the house to help commit this crime. 
And leave one in Sarah Johnson's room with two cartridges for the 
.264; unspent, unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her 
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah Johnson's 
room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it just doesn't make sense to 
me. 
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of the 
leather gloves found In her room, the other one found out - wrapped up In 
the trash can inside the pink robe. That's what I mean by the 
circumstantial evidence here, and she admits being there. 
The evidence here is overwhelming .... 
(Supplemental Trial Tr., p.449, L.9 - p.451, L.19.) 
The trial court further commented: 
[N]ot to mention whoever this supposed killer is, what the motive is. 
The jury heard a ton of evidence in this case about a motive with the 
defendant, Sarah Johnson. 
But I keep going back to the fact that she's present, and not 
excluded. And no one else. 
The fact that there's some stray DNA evidence in the house where 
there were 80 people in the house a week before for a wedding, and using 
a common bathroom, it's not surprising that there would be some stray 
DNA in the house. 
The fact that Sarah Johnson's fingerprints were not found on the 
scope or the rifle when gloves are found in her bathrobe, rolled up in the 
trash can outside the house, is not surprising. 
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Everybody that testified in that trial said that the pink bathrobe was 
present in the environment where the shootings occurred. So eJther 
Sarah Johnson put that bathrobe in the trash can, or somebody else did. 
Sarah Johnson says she went out of the house where the trash can 
is, $0 either Sarah Johnson went out by the trash can by herself; or 
Sarah Johnson went out to the trash can with somebody else out there 
putting the robe in the trash can, based on the time frame presented. . .. 
The evidence is involvement. I don't know how else to say It. The 
jurors heard that. 
(Supplemental Trial Tr., p,453, L 15 - p,454, L 17.) 
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Johnson is not entitled to a new trial. Her claims la'ck merit and her petition 
should be dismissed, 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-1 
THIS MATTER came before the court for evidentiary hearing beginning 
Tuesday, December 7,2010. The petitioner Sarah Johnson was present throughout the 
hearing, represented by her counset Christopher P. Simms. The respondent, state of 
Idaho was represented by Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputies 
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorneys for the state of Idaho. 
The hearing was conducted over four days, concluding December 10, 2010. The 
parties requested to submit closing arguments in writing, which were received by the 
court and reviewed as part of this court's fact-finding process. The matter was taken 
under advisement on March 16, 2011, and the court hereby enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to LR.C.P. 52(a). 
BACKGROUND 
This case presents an application for post-conviction relief brought by the 
petitioner, Sarah Johnson Oohnson) in her Second Amended Petition, filed January 11, 
2010. This court previously ruled on dispositive motions in this case on or about July 
19 and December 2,2010. Johnson also voluntarily dismissed certain claims prior to 
trial. At this juncture the following seven claims remain for resolution by this court: 
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall 
lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, 
chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including 
triat all of which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, in a 
manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict; 
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2. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a 
continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after 
learning a comforter had not been collected as evidence; 
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately 
investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on 
blood splatter opinion evidence; 
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately 
cross-examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry 
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela 
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos 
Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson; 
5. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present 
evidence of an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross 
Kirtley, which recording allegedly proved the theory that police focused 
on Petitioner Sarah Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possible suspects 
and theories, because she was the easiest target; 
6. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire 
whether certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh"; and 
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\~ 
7. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent 
identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously 
unidentified latent fingerprints. 
While the state has not delineated two of these issues specifically in its proposed 
findings herein, it has acknowledged all seven of these claims in its arguments. This 
court will therefore discuss the issues as set forth above and, excepting the cumulative 
error issue, in the order presented by Johnson in her post-hearing memoranda. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ON POST CONVICTION 
1. Trial counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal after Johnson was 
sentenced. 
2. On or about April 19, 2006, Johnson filed her initial Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief from which she was granted relief to pursue a direct appeal, with the 
remaining post-conviction issues stayed. 
3. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's conviction on or about June 
26,2008. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). 
4. On or about August IS, 2008, this court lifted the previously entered stay 
and thereafter granted leave for Johnson to file a First Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
5. On or about December 28,2009, this court granted Johnson leave to file a 
Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
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6. On or about February B, 2010, Johnson and the state of Idaho filed cross 
motions for summary disposition. 
7. The motions were heard on April 20, 2010. This court ruled from the 
bench, dismissing some of Johnson's claims. The court took further issues under 
advisement and issued a memorandum decision and order on May 20, 2010, regarding 
those claims. The court's order concerning those claims was entered on July 19, 2010. 
B. The state filed a motion for reconsideration as to two issues. This court 
granted relief in part on December 2,2010, dismissing Johnson's claim regarding 
appellate counsel. 
9. On December 6, 2010, Johnson filed a memorandum dismissing an 
additional claim. 
10. This court conducted an evidentiary hearing/trial (hereinafter referred to 
as evidentiary) from December 7 through December 10, 2010. 
11. This court heard from the following witnesses during the evidentiary: 
Patrick Dunn; Mark Rader; Raul Cornelas; Stuart Robinson; Bob Pangburn; Jerry Walt 
Femling; Jane Lopez; Steve Harkins; Consuelo Cedeno; Bruno Santos; Maria Eguren; 
Robert Kerchusky; Tina Walthall; Mel Speegle; and Christopher Kevin Hill. 
12. These witnesses varied in their abilities to remember and relate facts of 
consequence in this case. The court notes its particular ability to observe each witness' 
demeanor and credibility in making the factual findings set forth herein. 
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13. Counsel filed post-hearing briefing on or about February 14, 2011, and 
again on or about February 28, 2011. The court took this matter under advisement as of 
March 16, 2011. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The following Findings of Fact are based upon this court's review of the 
evidence admitted at the trial of this cause, along with the court's unique opportunity to 
view and observe each witness who testified, thereby making observations regarding 
each witness' demeanor, credibility and reliability.l 
2. On the morning of September 2,2003, Alan and Diane Johnson were 
found shot to death in their home, where they lived with their daughter Sarah Oohnson) 
(See Exhibit 2 (hereinafter Trial Transcript (TT) 1645:9-1663:6; 1887:1-1889:9); see also 
Post- Conviction Evidentiary Hearing (PCH) Exhibit 12). 
3. Early on the morning of September 2, a neighbor of the Johnsons, Kim 
Richards, was awakened by her daughter Rachel, indicating that she heard screaming. 
Mrs. Richards" got out of bed and ran to the front door" and "turned on the front porch 
light and unlocked and opened the front door," when she saw Johnson running down 
their driveway toward their house. (TT 1518:2-11). 
I The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are all matters solely within the province of this court. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 4483675, 2 (Idaho 
App. 2010) (citing Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also l.R.C.P 52(a). 
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4. Mrs. Richards and Rachel attempted to find out what was happening. 
Johnson was screaming and breathing heavily, stating that someone had shot both of 
her parents. (TT 1518:18-1519:23). 
5. Immediately before coming to the Richards' home Johnson had been to 
the homes of two neighbors who did not answer the door when Johnson knocked. (IT 
1537:11-15; 1518:8-11). 
6. Although Johnson denied any involvement in the shooting, she gave 
several different accounts of what she allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what she 
heard just prior to and after the murders. 
7. Johnson initially claimed she heard a gunshot while she was in her room 
asleep, that she sat up in bed, then heard a second shot, went to her parents' bedroom 
door, called for her mother, then fled the house. (TT 1519:6-1521:7; 1558:3-19). Johnson 
initially stated she had not seen anything before leaving the home. (Id., 1521:3-7). 
8. The second time Johnson told the story, a short time later, her report 
differed: she stated she was awakened by the sound of her father in the shower before 
she heard any shots. (TT 1528:3-18). 
9. Johnson told yet another version of events a short time later. (TT 3696:6-
3701:15; 3739:24-3742:22). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 7 
10. Upon being asked the first time by the police what had happened, just a 
few minutes later, Johnson attempted to reconcile her statements, stating that her 
father's starting the shower initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was 
re-awakened again by the first shot. (TT 1811:21 -1813:6; 2099:17 - 2103:21). 
11. In this statement, Johnson also claimed for the first time she had opened 
the door of the master bedroom before fleeing the house. (TT 1850:1-23). 
12. Johnson later told a friend that she had immediately fled the house upon 
hearing the shots. (TT 3297:22 - 3298:22). She told this friend's mother that, after 
hearing a shot and going to her parent's closed bedroom door, she heard arguing, called 
out to her mother, and then fled the house. (Id., 3529:10 - 3530:15). 
13. Johnson was interviewed approximately three hours later by Detective 
Steve Harkins of the Blaine County Sheriff's Office. Detective Harkins gave Johnson her 
Miranda warnings. (TT 2107:15-23). Johnson then gave additional details during this 
interview. (See generally id., 2106-2111). 
14. Later that day, Johnson told her brother Matt that she was awakened 
upon hearing the first shot, went to her parents' closed door and called out for them, 
then heard the second shot and fled the house. (TT 4545:16 - 4548:12). 
15. Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (TT 2424:16-
2426:7). Johnson stated she was awakened when she heard the shower come on, and 
then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Id.,2426:8-2428:4). She got out of bed, went 
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through her bathroom into the guest bedroom, out into the hall, and to the door of the 
master bedroom. (Id., 2428:5-2429:9). Johnson stated her bedroom door was either 
closed or open only a crack. (Id., 2429:10-13). 
16. In this interview Johnson claimed she heard the second shot while 
standing outside the maste.r bedroom door, but that the doors were open because her 
parents propped their door open with a pillow. Johnson stated she did not see or hear 
anything indicating a struggle. (TT 2429:14 - 2432:1). 
17. Law enforcement arrived at the Johnson home shortly after Johnson 
arrived at the Richards' residence. 
18. Trooper Ross Kirtley, (Kirtley) an Idaho State Police officer was the first to 
arrive on the scene. (TT 1645:24 -1652:11). He was followed shortly thereafter by 
Bellevue Marshall Randy Tremble (Tremble). Officer Raul Ornelas (Ornelas) and 
Deputy Jamie Shaw (Shaw) arrived soon thereafter. (Id.,1686:21-24). 
19. Kirtley and Tremble did a security search of the north-half of the house. 
(TT 1787:4-13). 
20. Diane Johnson's body was located in a bed in the master bedroom. A 
cream colored comforter covered her body. (TT 1792:16 -1793:3). Kirtley pulled the 
comforter back with his asp, revealing Diane's body with most of the head missing. 
(Id., 1793:19-21). 
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21. The comforter was not collected as evidence, (TT 1986:23 -1987:6), which 
was, in retrospect, a mistake. (Id., 2016:21 - 24). 
22. About twenty-five days after the murders Johnson told yet another 
version of events. She told a relative that the first shot woke her up; she heard a second 
shot, ran to her parents' bedroom, and saw blood on the walls and floor. (TT 3684:22-
3690:12). 
23. Johnson's inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did and heard 
around the time of the murders are significant in relation to other evidence. Several of 
the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted her hair and 
appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep in bed when the 
murders occurred. (TT 1545:20-1547:18; 1559:14-1560:11; 1818:19-1819:19; 2520:15-
2521:23). 
24. Johnson's claim that her parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door 
had been dosed was also inconsistent with the presence of Diane's blood and brain 
matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the hallway from her parents' room. Part of 
Diane's skull was also found in the hallway outside the master bedroom. (TT 1619:20-
1620:10; 1637:5-15; 1655:2-1657:9; 1868:2-18; 2019:24-2020:18; 2020:24-2022:3; 2121:7-
2124:4; 3122:11-3123:20). 
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25. Additionally, Diane's blood was found on the socks Johnson was wearing 
the morning of the murders. (1755:8 -1759:8; 3120:21- 3122: 13; 3423:8-14; 3475:19-
3476:3). 
26. Johnson had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent with a recent 
impact, such as a rifle recoil. (TT 2248:3 - 2250:9; 2317:6 - 2318:18). 
27. Johnson admitted owning a pink bathrobe (TT 2436:7-18). She admitted 
that a right-handed leather glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother 
and was usually in the car (Id., 2036:1-2037:6; 2436:19-2437:1; 3596:20-3598:1), and 
Johnson claimed there should not have been any bullets in her room (2437:2-17). 
28. It is notable, however, that two unspent .264 caliber cartridges of the type 
used in the murders were found in Johnson's bedroom. (IT 2033:11-2034:18). Diane's 
blood was found on the cartridges. (Id. / 3122:11-3123:24). In addition, the police found 
the spent casings from the rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and in the 
master bedroom (still in the rifle). (Id., 1840:15-1842:12; 1843:24-1844:15; 1954:11-
1956:21; 2051:3-2053:8; 2912:6-2954:16). 
29. Also significant was evidence law enforcement found in a trash can set 
out on the street for collection the morning of the murders. The trash can was pulled 
back from the curb by law enforcement shortly before it would have been collected. (TT 
1672:19-1673:11). Found in the trash can were: one latex glove and one left-hand 
leather glove, (which matched the right-hand glove found in Johnson's bedroom), 
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wrapped in a pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Id., 1672:16-1673:17; 1826:16-
1832:14; 1893:19-1902:17; 4566:16-4568:17). Five .25-caliber shells were also found in the 
pocket of the robe. (Id.,1900:19-1901:13). Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present 
inside the latex glove. (Id., 3106:5 -3110:3). 
30. Inside the robe were paint chips that matched paint on the shirt Johnson 
was wearing the morning of the murders. (TT 1755:8-1758:13; 3574:1-3587:21). 
31. The pink robe itself tested positive for blood and DNA from Diane (TT 
3114:2-3117:11; 3434:11-3459:3; 3473:13-3475:2), DNA possibly from Alan (id., 3434:11-
3459:3), gunshot residue (id., 3229:15-3238:20), and tissue from Diane. (Id., 3446:19-
3448:18; 3454:16-3455:23). The blood on the robe was consistent with the shooter 
having worn it backwards during the shooting. (Id., 4194:5-4211:21). 
32. With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had 
been stored in a closet in a guesthouse located near the Johnson residence. (TT 2418:8-
2419:22; 2702:3-2706:1). 
33. The guesthouse was an apartment above the detached garage on the 
Johnson property. Johnson had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there several 
times, including the days immediately preceding the murders. (Id., 2037:7-2038:6; 
2257:7- 2258:10; 2437:18-2439:23; 2688:25-2690:6; 2715:12-2716:6; 3274:11-25; 3285:6-
3293:7; 3335:14-3336:22). 
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34. Officers obtained a search warrant on the day of the murders and served it 
a short time later. While searching the officers located the scope from the murder 
weapon in the guesthouse on the bed, and Officer Cornelas observed human footprints 
in the dew on the lawn going to and from the Johnson home and the guesthouse. (Id., 
1733:20-1738:25; 1842:8-1843:3; 2056:2-2057:22; 2685:12-2686:25; 2706:2-16; Post-
Conviction Hearing Transcript (PCHT) 206:6-208:25). 
35. A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from the guesthouse was also found 
in Johnson's bedroom, wrapped in a red bandana on the shelf below where the two 
.264-caliber shells were found. (IT 2038:7-2040:10). A nine-millimeter handgun 
matching the magazine was in a gun safe in the guesthouse (Id., 2061:11-2062:12). 
Johnson had asked her parents for a key to the family's gun safe two days before the 
murders. (Id.,3336:10-22). A key to the guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room 
(Petitioner's Ex. 4). 
36. The search also produced a box of.25 ammunition in the garage, with five 
shells missing. The.22 rifle normally kept in the guest house was in the garage on top 
of the freezer, and a spent .264 casing was located in the garage as well. (Id.). 
37. Based upon the evidence obtained by the Blaine County prosecutor, a 
grand jury convened and ultimately indicted Johnson for two counts of First Degree 
Murder. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, page 511:3 - 512::16; TT 1458:18-1460:7). 
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38. Johnson's trial was conducted between February 7 and March 16, 2005. 
(TT 1454:16-20, 6173:18-6175:22). 
39. The Honorable R. Barry Wood, District Judge, presided at the trial. 
40. Johnson was represented by two attorneys at trial: Bob Pangburn 
(Pangburn) and Mark Stephen Rader (Rader). 
41. At the conclusion of the trial Johnson was convicted of both counts of first 
degree murder, as well as an enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of the 
crime. (TT 6174-6175). 
42. The defense "team" 2 included Mr. Patrick Dunn (Dunn), a private 
investigator who assisted Pangburn and Rader prior to and during the trial. Dunn's 
wife was also a member of the team, along with various experts who would be available 
from time-to-time to consult with counsel, some of whom testified at the trial. See infra, 
Finding of Fact ~ 88. 
43. Pangburn practiced law for about twenty years before he surrendered his 
license to the Oregon State Bar on or about September 8,2004. The state of Idaho 
suspended Pangburn's license on January 17,2008 by Order of the Supreme Court. The 
Idaho suspension was a result of multiple violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct (see Petitioner's Exhibit 15), including violation of Rule 8.4( c) for /I conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id. 
2 Pangburn also felt that Rader's associate attorney, Anita Moore, was a member of the "team." 
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44. While the court gives the suspension weight in evaluating Pangburn's 
credibility, the fact that Pangburn is now suspended does not make his testimony 
entirely unworthy of belief. The findings of fact set forth by the court herein regarding 
Pangburn's testimony and his conduct are based on the entirety of the record, which 
includes his individual testimony. Where the court's findings are based upon 
Pangburn's testimony, the court has engaged in the appropriate weighing process and 
accepts his testimony as true, notwithstanding his ethical misconduct. 
45. During his lawyering career, Pangburn practiced primarily criminal 
defense, including representing hundreds of prisoners in the state of Oregon. 
46. Pangburn tried over 100 cases to jury in Idaho and Oregon. 
47. Pangburn devoted a large amount of time to Johnson's defense, spending 
"hundreds and hundreds" of hours on the case between 2003 and 2005. (PCHT 279:25-
280:20). 
48. Before assuming responsibility for the Johnson case, Pangburn 
represented a number of people with homicide-related charges. Pangburn also handled 
a number of post-conviction and habeas cases involving murder and aggravated 
murder in Oregon. 
49. Rader has been licensed to practice law in Oregon since 1973 and in Idaho 
since approximately 1990. Rader's practice is focused on aggravated murder and 
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capital murder cases in Oregon. He also does some post-conviction work in those kinds 
of cases. 
50. The court gives limited weight to Rader's testimony in this case because 
he was admittedly confused about several areas of his testimony and he had poor 
recollection of the details regarding his beliefs and opinions. (See, e.g., PCHT 188:5-
189:2). Rader further admitted his bias in that he would like to see Johnson have 
another trial. (Id.,195:9-12). This admission causes this court to give even less weight to 
Rader's testimony in this proceeding. 
51. Pangburn, on the other hand, testified that the defense team did a "real 
good job" of defending Johnson, "given what [they] had to work with." (PCHT 268:9-
11). While the court discounts this self-serving statement to some degree, the record 
ultimately sustains Pangburn's conclusion that both attorneys representing Johnson 
were qualified; both worked diligently on the case and both put forth significant effort 
in Johnson's behalf. 
52. Rader has experience with ballistics experts and multiple contacts with 
forensic experts due to the focus of his legal practice. Rader was thus familiar, based on 
his significant experience, with the evidentiary standards necessary to challenge or 
admit expert or forensic testimony in court. 
53. Rader was asked by Pangburn to assist with the Johnson defense 
primarily to handle the forensic/scientific evidence. Rader also had prior involvement 
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with Dunn, and suggested that the team hire Dunn when there was a falling-out 
between Pangburn and a prior investigator. 
54. Dunn has significant experience as an investigator and he is now working 
primarily as an investigator on post-conviction criminal cases. 
55. Dunn was hired generally to review and evaluate the police investigation, 
review the evidence and witness interviews and assist with trial preparation. 
56. In a general sense, when Dunn is hired as an investigator he initially 
receives and reviews material from the defense attorneys, which the attorneys receive 
via discovery from the prosecution. This pattern was followed by Dunn, Pangburn and 
Rader in this case. 
57. Once Dunn has a grasp of the evidence in the case, he then organizes the 
material for trial counseL Dunn organizes the material chronologically and he also 
creates an alphabetical witness listing. Dunn does not generally create written reports 
because such reports may have to be provided to the state, thus giving away defense 
strategy. Again, Dunn followed this pattern as a member of the Johnson defense team. 
58. Like Rader, Dunn expressed a bias favoring the success of Johnson's post-
conviction petition. (See Rader's Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief). This again causes the court to question Dunn's testimony at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing; however, the court accepts some of Dunn's testimony as accurate 
regarding selected details of the case, as is set forth below. 
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59. Dunn had done criminal investigation work for Rader prior to the Johnson 
case. Dunn understood that Rader and Pangburn decided to change investigators on 
the Johnson case in March 2004 and he was hired thereafter. 
60. Dunn met weekly with Rader, but not as often with Pangburn. Prior to 
trial the defense team met less than once per month with both lawyers and Dunn 
present. 
61. Pangburn felt that the meetings between the lawyers and Dunn were held 
often enough for case preparation. Dunn disagreed,3 but this court concludes that both 
counsel prepared adequately for the Johnson trial. 
62. The first thing Dunn received was the Grand Jury transcript. He then 
received police reports and witness statements from the police; later in the process he 
and Rader received and reviewed the forensic evidence. 
63. One of Dunn's stated concerns regarding Pangburn's preparation 
involved Pangburn'S obtaining discovery and carrying it around in his trunk, 
sometimes for weeks. (PCHT 42:17-19). Nevertheless, Dunn ultimately received all 
discovery in the case, albeit later than he might have liked. 
64. Dunn had access to all the discovery necessary to prepare the case and to 
prepare witness books for every witness in the case in advance of trial. 
3 Dunn swore-out an affidavit in support of lohnson's petition in which he testified that Pangburn was unprepared in 
the case. Dunn testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that he had never made such an allegation against 
an attorney before. 
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65. Pangburn indicated that associate attorney Moore organized the discovery 
and copied it for Rader and Dunn. Ultimately the parties received the discovery, 
although Pangburn did argue several motions to compel during his representation of 
Johnson, (TT 787; 837-39; 863-866), and some information was received late in the 
process. 
66. The witness books Dunn compiled consisted of an index in the front and a 
copy of every statement that related to an individual. The team had such books for all 
witnesses, and for most subject matters. There were three copies of each book: one for 
each attorney and a working set which was kept in a room right off the courtroom for 
use during the trial. When the team knew which witnesses were coming up, the books 
were available for counsel's review. 
67. The plan for trial was that Rader would handle the forensic experts and 
Pangburn would handle all the other witnesses. No exceptions had been discussed to 
this plan in advance of the trial. 
68. During trial the attorneys and Dunn would meet every day after trial, and 
in the morning, prior to trial, to go over the witness list to make sure everyone was 
prepared. 
69. Dunn testified that in the morning meetings, he and Rader would be the 
first ones at the courthouse, and they would bring out the books, go through the books 
and make any adjustments necessary. Pangburn was not always present for the pretrial 
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meetings each day, although Dunn cannot say what Pangburn was doing during these 
times. 
70. Pangburn admitted that he made several appearances on the Nancy Grace 
television show, (PCHT 273:12-14) and that he attempted to arrange an interview of 
Johnson on Nightline. (Id., lines 15-18). While this court has reservations about such 
conduct, there has been no showing that Pangburn's media contacts or appearances 
undermined trial strategy, affected the jury pool, or otherwise had any casual nexus 
with Pangburn's performance or the jury's verdict. 
71. During the early pre-trial phase, there really wasn't a working strategy for 
the defense team; the best Dunn could glean is that they wanted to go after Bruno 
Santos (Santos). 
72. Dunn did a "fairly in-depth" investigation of Santos, spanning from Utah 
to Hailey, Idaho to Montana. Dunn obtained police statements regarding Santos' 
alleged gang affiliations and Santos' known associates. Santos had a gang tattoo and 
the school was aware of his gang status. 
73. Dunn couldn't interview Santos extensively because Santos "lawyered-
up"; however, Dunn was able to interview Santos one time during the Johnson trial. 
74. Santos was Johnson's boyfriend at the time of the murders, and he was an 
initial suspect of both the police and the defense team. 
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75. The record thus establishes that the police did not focus on Johnson to the 
exclusion of all other suspects. (PCHT 405:12-13). To the extent that Johnson suggests 
that Santos was ruled out as a suspect on the day of the murders, any such claim is not 
supported by the evidence. 
76. Despite Dunn's in-depth investigation, he was not able to discover that 
Santos was convicted of any felony crimes. (See TT: 860:2-5). Dunn uncovered 
information that Santos had been involved in a possible rape of a girl out of Sun Valley, 
and he identified the girl and made contact with her father. While the father confirmed 
the information Dunn had discovered, the father did not want his daughter subpoenaed 
and he moved the daughter out of Idaho. 
77. Through the school, Dunn obtained a record of a number of fights when 
Santos was a juvenile. 
78. Through the course of Dunn's investigation, Santos denied any sexual 
contact with Johnson; however, the defense team had sheets from Johnson's bed tested, 
which showed DNA from Santos, which confirmed in Dunn's mind that Santos had 
sexual contact with Johnson. 
79. The court finds that Johnson and Santos were having a sexual relationship 
while Johnson was a minor. 
80. Dunn was unable to locate any evidence linking Santos to the commission 
of the Johnson murders. The police also had no evidence establishing such a link. 
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81. Pangburn testified that the information the defense team had on Santos 
was "not necessarily what they were looking for," which this court concludes means 
that there was no evidence indicating that Santos was personally culpable for the 
Johnson murders. (PCHT 259:16-17; 284:23-285:3). The court agrees with this 
conclusion. 
82. Moreover, the court further concludes that the evidence which the defense 
team did have on Santos was largely inadmissible, either due to Santos' assertion of his 
5th Amendment rights, or based on the nature of the evidence and evidentiary rulings 
made by Judge Wood during trial. 
83. Johnson references alleged statements by Santos about his car possibly 
having been in the area of the murders on the morning of September 3; however, there 
is no evidence that such statements were made as cited by Johnson. When interviewed 
by Detective Harkins, Harkins asked Santos: "What if I told you that someone said that 
they seen [sic] your vehicle in the area that morning?" (Petitioner's Exhibit 34, p. 13). 
Santos response to this question was: "I don't know, maybe someone, some guy get my 
car I don't know, I don't think so. I was asleep .. .. If (Id.) Thus, Santos' statement was 
clearly not an admission that his car was in the area of the murders on September 3. 
84. Harkins explained to this court that his question was not based on 
evidence the police had, but on an interview technique. (PCHT 409:15-22). 
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85. Thus, as a matter of trial strategy, the defense focus moved from Santos to 
a "no blood, no guilt" theme. (IT 4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; PCHT 264:8-13). 
86. Rader testified that their goal at trial was to show that if Johnson had 
pulled the trigger, she would have been covered with blood and other matter, and she 
couldn't have gotten out of the room without significant blood on her person. (PCHT 
157:2-14). 
87. The court concludes that the defense, both Pangburn and Rader pursued 
this "no blood, no guilt" strategy with witnesses and argued the same to the jury. (TT 
4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; PCHT 264:8-13; Supplemental Appeal Transcript 270:8-272:25). 
88. The defense also focused their efforts in trying to undermine the state's 
case with science, (TT 4604:25-4605:1) and the defense called several scientists to 
support their arguments. E.g., Dr. Craig Beaver, id., 6367-6407; Dr. Todd Grey, id., 
5350-5379; Michael Howard, id., 4685-4941; Keith Inman, id., 5240 - 5348; Robert 
Kerchusky, id., 5045-5130; Dr. Leslie Lundt, id., 5480-5522; Ron Martinez, id., 5179-5191; 
and Rocky Mink, id., 5618-5734). 
89. The defense also brought-out the deficiencies in the state's evidence 
collection practices, as noted during their opening statement. (TT 4603-4610). These 
deficiencies focused on the comforter covering Diane and other items that were not 
collected as evidence. 
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90. Dunn testified that he brought shortcomings of the police investigation to 
the attention of Rader and Pangburn, i.e., Exhibit 5, which showed a green carpet, 
covered with blood, and a towel bar, which items were not taken into evidence. Dunn 
also told the attorneys that fingerprints were not taken from the top of the garbage can, 
which would have, in his opinion, been a critical identifier as to who opened the can. 
See PCH Exhibit 6. 
91. The court finds that the lack of fingerprinting the garbage can was 
inconsequentiat given the myriad of individuals who had potential contact with the 
can. 
92. Finally, the defense relied upon unidentified, but matching fingerprints 
found on the scope, the rifle and a box of ammunition to point the finger of blame away 
from Johnson. 
a. The Comforter. 
93. The allegation regarding the error in failing to request a continuance is 
based on late-disclosed discovery regarding the comforter which had covered Diane's 
body. The state failed to collect the comforter as evidence during their search, causing a 
perceived need for the defense to have additional time to consider issues surrounding 
the missing comforter and "what happens to a head when it's shot at close range, those 
kinds of things." (PCHT 162:1-7). 
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94. There was little testimony before this court regarding the comforter which 
covered Diane Johnson's body when she was found. The court is without the benefit of 
any evidence which indicates what value the comforter might have had, in retrospect, 
from a forensic point of view. 
95. Rader testified that the defense was informed of the comforter not being 
collected as evidence at a time "close" to trial, but he could not recall how close. (TT 
158:24-159:10; 162:3-12). 
96. Rader testified that the defense should have asked for a continuance: " 
we should have backed up a little bit at that point, ... and asked for a continuance orr] 
whatever, however much time the court would do it, give us, to back up and re-
examine some of this material and try and find a better way of presenting it at trial. ... " 
(PCHT 121:20-25). 
97. Rader swore-out an affidavit in support of Johnson's case wherein he 
concluded that his conduct was ineffective in failing to move for a continuance of the 
trial. The court does not accept Rader's conclusions in this regard. 
98. The record shows that Rader was prepared; that both he and Pangburn 
conducted examinations and/or made strategic decisions based upon the nature of the 
case at the time. While, given the outcome, the court understands how Rader can 
second guess his own performance, and that of Pangburn, Rader's conclusions are not 
borne-out by the entire record before this court. 
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99. No other witness referenced the need for a continuance or what it would 
have done to benefit the defense team. 
b. I.S.P. Video/Audio. 
100. Dunn also reviewed a copy of an ISP video/audio which this court 
listened to during the evidentiary hearing. (PCH Exhibit 12). Dunn had the audio 
enhanced, but the enhanced version was not available for this court. 
101. The audio portion of the recording reveals a number of conversations, 
some of which are inaudible, among members of law enforcement. 
102. Johnson played the entirety of the recording at the evidentiary hearing 
and asked Sheriff Jerry (Walt) Femling about some of the voices he could identify on the 
recording (PCHT 335:17-336:12). 
103. The video starts with Trooper Kirtley's stop at roughly 6:10 a.m. on 
September 2, 2003, after which Kirtley proceeded to the crime scene. Kirtley was the 
first officer at the crime scene and he recorded4 conversations for about 2.5 hours. 
104. The enhanced audio includes the voice of Sheriff Femling, Trooper Kirtley 
and Bellevue Marshall Trumble. 
105. Dunn concluded that the recording held good information for the defense 
because it contained the initial impressions of law enforcement regarding the crime 
scene and the officers' initial suppositions about the case. 
4 The dashboard camera simply video-recorded a house across the street from the lohnsons' home while the officers 
were conducting their business inside the Johnson home. The audio recorded Kirtley and others' statements during 
the approximately 2.5 hour-period. 
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106. Dunn's synopsis was that the officers did not think it was possible for 
Johnson to have committed the crime because the blood spatter was everywhere and 
Johnson didn't have any blood on her. Dunn felt the defense should play the enhanced 
version of the whole tape; however, counsel disagreed and the recording was not 
introduced. 
107. Rader was generally aware of the law enforcement recording which was 
played during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Rader's knowledge came from 
Dunn; Rader never reviewed the recording himself. (PCHT 185:2-3). Rader further 
believed that Pangburn was aware of the recording and that he would seek to admit it 
during the cross-examination of Kirtley. (Id., lines 12-16). 
108. Pangburn testified that the recording would not have added much to the 
case, but that that tape may have helped and it was probably a mistake not to seek to 
admit it. (PCHT 269:5-12). However, Pangburn wouldn't go so far as to say he should 
have sought to admit the recording, but that, in hindsight, he "would think more about 
putting it in." (Id' l lines 13-16). 
109. Sheriff Femling (Femling) could be heard on the recording making a 
statement that he was concerned about the community or the valley being worried with 
a murderer running around and that Femling thought they should concentrate on the 
girl. The officers also discussed that Johnson was an unlikely suspect, due to her not 
being covered with blood. 
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110. Dunn acknowledged that strategic decisions during trial are within 
counsel's discretion and that the same would hold true as to what evidence was 
admitted and what cross-examination would be conducted of a particular witness. 
c. Division of Labor/Defense Team Interaction. 
111. Rader noted that he was primarily engaged to handle the scientific 
experts; however, he testified that he learned a few days before their fingerprint expert, 
Robert Kerchusky (Kerchusky) was called, that Pangburn would be handling 
Kerchusky's direct examination. 
112. Pangburn indicated that the decision for him to handle the fingerprint 
experts was to allow him to be more involved in that part of the case, and to take some 
of the load off Rader. 
113. Rader had concerns regarding how the defense team was interacting 
throughout their preparation and handling of the trial. He expected the case to be 
defended as a team, and to be able to share their opinions; however, Rader felt that 
Pangburn did not seem interested in doing that at all. Their conversations were so 
limited that they were not engaging as a team. 
114. Pangburn disagreed with this testimony and indicated that he and Rader 
worked "together" from the beginning of their association. Pangburn recognized that 
he was "lead" counsel; however, he and Rader worked well together throughout the 
case. Pangburn does not recall handing Rader a witness notebook at the last minute 
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and asking Rader to handle the witness' cross-examination. The court accepts 
Pangburn's memory and testimony in this regard, given Rader's credibility and 
memory issues previously noted herein. (See supra, ~ 50). 
115. Rader's examination of several lay witnesses was very limited, in that he 
asked no questions, or very few questions. However, very little in the record from the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing establishes what information would have been 
elicited from those witnesses had they been asked further questions during the murder 
trial. 
116. Moreover, this court concludes, based on the weekly and ultimately daily 
meetings, at least between Rader and Dunn, that Rader had an adequate grasp of the 
facts regarding such witnesses when he asked them limited or no questions. 
d. Rader's Knowledge of the Law and Scientific Principles. 
117. The trial record also establishes that Rader fought for the admission of the 
defense scientific tests and experiments which had been done seeking to replicate the 
blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane Johnson was shot in the head. The 
experiments used multiple media, i.e., coconuts, melons, pig's heads, Styrofoam heads, 
(TT 4506:17-19), containing multiple substances, i.e., plastic bags with sponges, 
pudding, half and half colored blue and red. (Id., lines 19-23). 
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118. Rader's efforts were made during an extensive hearing on the state's 
motion to exclude these experiments, primarily the experiment conducted using a 
coconut. (TT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503). 
119. Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic 
pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between 
the coconut used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508). 
120. Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-
replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment," he would "take another look at it." 
(TT 4509:17-22). 
121. At the hearing before this court, Rader testified that, in response to the 
court's ruling, he asked his experts "to go back and find, see if there's something else 
[they] could do," whether there was "some other object that [they] could shoot," but his 
experts "didn't come up with anything." (PCHT 166:13-167:2). 
122. In hindsight, Rader testified he could have II gone out to ... various 
defender agencies in various places around the country" to "see if [he] could find 
different experts or different information somehow." (Id., 169:9-24). 
123. Johnson presented no evidence at the hearing regarding what experts 
Rader would have located had he "reached out," nor did Johnson present any evidence 
regarding what other experiments or reconstruction options could have been presented 
to the trial court. 
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124. Thus, there is no evidence before this court which shows what any 
additional testing could have provided by way of a test which would have been 
admissible. Six years have now passed, and nothing has been presented to this court to 
show that any such evidence exists. 
125. While Rader felt that he should have reached out further, to other defense 
groups, in seeking to find different experts or different information regarding the blood 
spatter testimony, nothing has been provided to establish that such reaching-out would 
have accomplished anything more than the defense tried to accomplish at the time of 
trial. 
e. Facts Regarding Cross-examination. 
126. The defense also raised issues regarding cross-examination of several 
witnesses. Those matters are detailed individually as to those witnesses, below. 
A. Sheriff Walt Femling. 
127. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked Sheriff 
Femling (Femling) whether he recalled "making statements to the press very shortly 
after [the murderst assuring the public that there was no concern for their public 
safety." (Tr., p.328, Ls.4-7). Femling answered: 
Yes. I thought that was very important to let my community 
know that I did not believe that this was a random act of 
violence or we had some killers out there running, that were 
just randomly picking homes and, you know, shooting 
people. 
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So the crime scene definitely told me that probably was not 
the case. 
(PCHT 328:8-15). 
Femling further explained his initial impressions based upon the crime scene: 
I think what the crime scene was telling me pretty quick was 
that it was not committed from, by somebody from the 
outside as a random killer or killers that carne into the scene. 
It was somebody that was familiar with the house and the 
contents of the house and that the information that I was 
getting from investigators who had talked to Uohnson] was 
not adding up to what the crime scene was telling me. So at 
that time, it was, you know, something's not right here from 
potentially my only witness to these two homicides. 
(PCHT 326:12-23). 
128. Femling also testified before this court that he did not, at least initially, 
"form[] the theory" that Johnson murdered her parents "out of revenge." (PCHT 
338:11-25). 
129. Notably, it took weeks before Femling and his department ruled out 
Johnson's boyfriend, Bruno Santos, as a suspect. Femling did not want to believe 
Johnson committed the murders because Johnson went to school with Femling's son 
and it was hard to believe that she could have killed her parents. However, a crucial 
piece of evidence leading Femling to believe Johnson was involved "carne in six weeks 
after th[e] case started." (Id., 340:17-342:4; 350:20-351:25). 
130. That crucial piece of evidence was Johnson's DNA on "the gloves that 
were wrapped in the bathrobe found in the garbage can." (PCHT 341:10-14). 
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131. Femling further testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing about 
the scope of the investigation surrounding the murders: 
You know, I can't give you a time when I, you know, 
absolutely felt confident that it was - [Johnson] acted alone. 
I can tell you, once again, is that we worked really hard to 
make sure that we covered every basis that we could, and 
Bruno Santos was not involved. We believe very strongly 
that he was not involved. There is no evidence at all to put 
him at that scene of that crime .... 
(PCHT 349:5-13). 
132. In addition to investigating Santos, law enforcement also investigated: (1) 
Janet Sylten, the cleaning lady Johnson claimed to have heard at 2:00 in the morning 
outside her house the morning of the murders (PCHT 354:23-356:1, 358:20-22); (2) Mel 
Speegle, the owner of the murder weapon (id., 356:2-7, 361:3-362:1); (3) the possibility of 
a robbery, which there were no signs of at the residence (id., 356:8-24); and (4) whether 
someone escaped up the embankment behind the house based on Johnson's claim that 
the killer went out the back door (id., 356:25-357:19). 
133. Consistent with his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
Femling testified at trial that, on the day of the murders, he identified four persons of 
interest - Speegle, Santos, Johnson, and the cleaning lady. (TT 2417:10-2418:2). Also 
consistent with his post-conviction testimony, Femling testified at trial that he did not 
want to believe Johnson committed the murders and he continued to investigate other 
possibilities. (Id., 2424:1-7). 
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134. Femling also testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law enforcement 
interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, spent $517,000 
investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5 people to the 
case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative leads. (TT 
2458:4-2461:16). 
135. Rader cross-examined Femling at trial. (TT 2461-2496; 4057-4059). 
136. Johnson did not ask Rader any questions at the post-conviction 
evidentiary about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Femling. (See 
generally PCHT 138-195). 
B. Steve Harkins. 
137. At the Johnson trial, in response to a question on direct about how many 
"calls or interviews" were conducted with Santos, Detective Harkins (Harkins) testified: 
"I don't know if I can give you an exact number. I talked to him a number of times. 
Numerous interviews. Weekly contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We 
made contact over the phone, met in person. I didn't document every contact I had 
with him." (TT 2191:1-6). 
138. Harkins further testified he had spoken to Santos "over a hundred" times 
"[o]ver the last year and a half," "maybe a lot more." (Id. / 2114:20-23). 
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139. Johnson alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to "adequately cross-
examine" Harkins about this statement, claiming "police reports and supplements do 
not support this bald assertion." (Petition, p.l0, ~ 16.a.i.). 
140. Johnson further alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to adequately 
cross-examine Harkins "regarding the lack of depth to the search of Santos [sic] 
residence [or] outside dumpster," his "failure to acquire fingerprints from [Santos'] 
known associates," "the inconsistencies in statements made by Santos [sic] family 
members, including his mother and cousin," or about "the fact that .25 caliber 
ammunition was found in Bruno Santos [sic] residence and in the pink robe found in 
the trash can at the crime scene." (Petition, p.l0, ~ 16.a.i, p.12, ~ 16.a.vi.). 
141. Pangburn cross-examined Harkins at trial. (TT 2169-2222,2235-2244). 
142. Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about the number of times he 
indicated he had spoken with Santos, nor did Pangburn ask Harkins about any alleged 
inconsistencies in statements made by Santos or his family members or the ammunition 
found in Santos' residence or the Johnson's garbage can. (See generally id.). Although 
Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about his failure to "fingerprint[ ]" Santos' 
"known associates," Pangburn did ask Harkins about his investigation of Santos' 
/I associates."s 
5 Marshal Tremble was also asked about his investigation of Santos' "associates." (IT 1861 :16- J 863:24). 
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143. Pangburn's cross-examination did cover several areas, (See generally TT, 
pp. 2197-2202), including Santos' associates who were "law breakers," (TT 2199:1-9) and 
Santos' "drug dealer connection." (Id., 2197:2-12, 2200:16-22). Harkins was even asked: 
"did you look for someone who may, at the request of Bruno Santos, kill these people 7" 
(Id., 2200:5-7). 
144. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn 
any questions about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Harkins. (See 
generally PCHT 237-279). Johnson did call Harkins as a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing, but Johnson also failed to ask him any questions about his testimony regarding 
the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See generally id., 378-441). 
145. Johnson also did not introduce any "police reports" or "supplements" at 
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to rebut Harkins' trial testimony about the 
number of times he had contact with Santos. 
146. Johnson did ask Harkins about the extent of his search of Santos' 
residence. Harkins testified in that regard that he did not recall what his role in the 
search was, i.e., whether he "actually did the searching or instructed other officers to, to 
search the residence." (PCHT 406:20-24). Harkins acknowledged the "trash 
receptacles" at the apartment complex where Santos lived were not searched. (Id., 
407:17-22). Harkins explained the "trash receptacles" were not searched "because [he] 
and ten other detectives probably didn't think it was necessary." (Id., 410:1-3). 
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147. Johnson did not introduce any evidence regarding what a more extensive 
search of Santos' residence or a search of the "trash receptacles" would have uncovered. 
148. Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
whether any .25 automatic shells were found at Santos' residence and Harkins agreed 
that those were found. (PCHT 410:11-25). Harkins further testified that he was aware 
that .25 shells were found in the pocket of the robe discovered in the garbage can at the 
Johnson's house.6 (Id., 411:1-6). 
149. With respect to his involvement in the investigation of Consuelo Cedeno 
and Jane Lopez, Harkins testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not recall 
interviewing them, but he was sure he talked to them "at one point." (PCHT 411:10-14). 
150. Johnson did not ask Harkins about any inconsistencies in Cedeno's 
testimony but she did ask Harkins questions about Lopez's testimony. Specifically, 
Johnson asked: "[1]f I told you that those phone numbers [that were subpoenaed] 
verified that Jane Lopez did not in fact call Bruno nor the horne phone number when 
she originally told you and when she testified before the court, do you think I'd be 
mistaken about that?" (PCHT 413:7-12). 
151. Harkins responded that he had "an explanation of why they weren't 
recovered." (Id' l lines 13-14). That explanation was that if a call was made from "Qwest 
to Qwest numbers, local carriers, [they] would not be recorded," and that "in 2003 the 
6 Exhibit 20, admitted at trial, was a photograph of five rounds of .25 ammunition found in the pocket of Johnson's 
robe. (TT 1900: 19-1901: 13). Exhibit 103, also admitted attrial, was a photograph of a box of Remington .25 
automatic shells with five missing rounds. (Jd., 2048:1-16). 
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whole valley's local phone carrier was Qwest." (ld., 414:3-5, 15-17). So, if Jane Lopez 
had "called from the school to a horne number, it wouldn't be recorded." (Id., 416:3-4). 
152. Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
whether he "learned quickly" who Santos' "close associates were." (PCHT 422:16-18). 
Harkins answered: "I don't know which ones you're referring to. There was several 
interviewed that were friends of his." (Id., 422:19-21). Johnson specifically asked about 
If Ayala," and Harkins agreed he was interviewed. (Id., lines 22-24). Johnson then asked 
whether Harkins ever "took any DNA swab from Ayala." (Id.,422:25-423:1). Harkins 
testified that he could not recall. (Id., 423:3). 
153. Johnson did not ask Harkins about fingerprinting Ayala, nor did she ask 
him about any other of Santos' "associates." 
C. Bruno Santos. 
154. Johnson's Petition alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-
examine Bruno Santos about the "abundant information" that Santos "was dealing 
drugs/' "had gang connections," and had "committed the crime of statutory rape." 
(Petition, p.13, ~ 16.d). 
155. While both attorneys handled both lay and expert witnesses during the 
trial, Pangburn generally handled the lay witnesses. Nevertheless, Rader did conduct 
the cross-examination of several lay witnesses, including Santos. (PCHT: 172:19-173:2). 
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156. The court concludes that the claim regarding a last-minute hand-off of 
Santos' cross-examination to Rader is disproved by the record. 
157. The state brought a motion in limine under I.R.E. 609 and 404(b) regarding 
Santos' prior history. (See IT 2739:8-24). The state sought to preclude the defense from 
asking Santos about his arrest on October 30,2004, or about "statutory rape" or "having 
sexual relations with Sarah Johnson." (Id., 2739:8-2740:3). 
158. The prosecutor objected to any inquiry on the arrest as irrelevant and on 
the grounds that Santos would "be claiming the Fifth" on any "pending case" and 
would also "invoke his privilege not to incriminate himself" on his sexual relationship 
with Johnson. (TT 2739). The state also objected to any questions on a previous battery 
charge when Santos was a juvenile. (Id., 2740:24-2741:7). 
159. Counsel for Santos confirmed that he advised Santos to "invoke his 
privilege against self-incrimination with respect to any questions relating to drug 
activity" and any questioning regarding his sexual relationship with Johnson. (TT 
2743:12-15,2751:24-2752:18). 
160. Rader responded to the state's motion and ultimately agreed not to 
inquire of Santos regarding his October 30 arrest or the "juvenile information." (TT 
2745:4-17; see also p. 2748:1-2749:6 (Rader explaining in detail why Santos' gang 
involvement and "other bad acts" should be admitted); p.2750:4-2751:1 (Rader offering 
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further argument regarding why he believed certain evidence relating to Santos should 
be admitted). 
161. Rader thus argued in specific detail referencing Santos' history and prior 
acts, indicating the scope of the cross-examination that he wished to conduct. 
162. For example, Rader argued that he intended "to ask questions about 
[Santos'] gang involvement ... and the fact that [Santos] admitted having sexual 
relations with Sarah Johnson seven times, and she was a minor at the time and he was 
an adult. ... Then [he intended] to ask him about his gang connections and the story 
he told the police about his gang involvement." (IT 2747:2-11). 
163. Rader showed additional direct and significant knowledge of Santos' past 
as well as the defense purpose for their intended cross-examination. (IT 2748:1-2749:6). 
164. Judge Wood essentially granted the state's motion in limine; however, he 
offered the option of a stipulation regarding some of Santos' history. (IT 2754:16-
2755:19). 
165. Although the trial court limited the scope of Santos' cross-examination, 
much of the information that was subject to the state's motion in limine had already 
been elicited through cross-examination of other witnesses. For example, during cross-
examination of Femling, Rader elicited that Santos was a "look-out" for a fight, which 
resulted in a suspension. (TT 2474:8-2475:3). Rader also asked Femling about Santos' 
reported drug use, to which Femling responded: "I think we did show that he does 
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have involvement in drugs" and that he had "used illegal drugs," (id., 2475:21-2476:7), 
and examination of Detective Harkins revealed that Santos had a IIdrug dealer 
connection." (Id., 2197:2-12, 2200:16-22). 
166. On direct examination at trial, Santos testified: (1) he was dating Johnson 
when the murders occurred (TT 2761:15-19); (2) Alan Johnson came to his apartment the 
weekend before the murders and threatened that if he did not "leave his daughter 
alone, ... he was going to hit [him] and ... put [him] in jail" (id., 2762:5-18); (3) he saw 
Johnson the Monday before the murders and she was acting "weird" (id., 2763:9-2764:7); 
(4) he spent the night at home the night before the murders (id., 2764:16-20); (5) his 
cousin, Jane Lopez, called him about the murders the morning they occurred (id., 
2764:24-2765:5); (6) he was surprised about the murders and went to the Johnson's 
home to see what happened (id., 2765:6-2766:9); (7) he allowed law enforcement to 
search his car and apartment, he submitted to fingerprint and blood testing, and gave 
them his clothes (id., 2766:16-2767:3); (8) he saw Johnson at the hospital the day of the 
murders at which time she hugged him and told him she loved him and said she was 
sorry and "not to worry" (id., 2768:7-2768:5); (9) he was deported in September 2003 
and returned to the United States to testify (id., 2768:17-2769:4); (10) he was not at the 
Johnson's house the night before the murders and did not remember Johnson telling 
him there were guns in the guest house (id., 2769:5-10); and (11) there was a wedding at 
the Johnson's house the weekend before the murders that Johnson wanted him to 
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attend, but Alan would not let him, which upset Johnson (id., 2770:21-2770:6). Santos 
denied having anything to do with murdering Alan and Diane. (Id., 2769:11-13). 
167. After Santos testified to these facts, and based on Judge Wood's ruling, 
Rader indicated that the defense "decided not to enter into a stipulation and ... decided 
not to cross examine Mr. Santos ... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15). 
168. Thus, this court concludes that Rader was well-versed and well prepared 
to cross-examine Santos, but that given Judge Wood's ruling and Santos' intention to 
assert his 5th Amendment privilege, the defense, as a matter of strategy, chose not to ask 
any questions at all. 
169. This court recognizes that Johnson asked both Rader and Pangburn at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the decision not to cross-examine Santos. 
170. Despite Rader's vigorous response to the state's motion in limine 
regarding the scope of Santos' cross-examination, Rader claimed at the evidentiary 
hearing that Pangburn would, without any "warning," have Mr. Rader cross-examine 
witnesses he had not planned on cross-examining, including Santos. (PCHT 172:19-24). 
171. Rader could not recall how many witnesses he cross-examined, or even 
recall the witnesses he was responsible for, yet he claimed Pangburn gave him the 
responsibility of cross-examining Santos without any prior notice. (PCHT 172:13-173:2; 
188:5-189:2). 
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172. Pangburn denied Rader's assertions, testifying that the decision to have 
Rader cross-examine Santos and other witnesses was not made at the last minute, and 
that Rader did not object to cross-examining any particular witness. (PCHT 282:19-
283:19). 
173. The court again accepts Pangburn's testimony in this regard because it is 
more credible than Rader's, given Mr. Rader's involvement in arguing the motion in 
limine, during which he demonstrated extensive knowledge of the information 
available on which Santos could be cross-examined and the reasons why he believed 
such cross-examination should have been permitted. Pangburn's testimony is also 
more believable considering Rader's general inability to remember even who he cross-
examined. 
174. Most significantly, Rader still believed at the time of the post-conviction 
hearing that he handled the fingerprint evidence, even though the record clearly 
indicates Pangburn handled that evidence. 
175. Johnson also called Santos as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. This court concluded, as had Judge Wood, that Santos could invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during the evidentiary hearing. When 
asked about his "gang connections," Santos did just that, declining to answer any 
questions on that subject. (PCHT 482:10-14). 
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176. Given this court's ruling, and Santos' counsel's indication that he would 
continue to assert his privilege, Johnson did not ask Santos about the other topics she 
claimed in her Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into, i.e., 
"dealing drugs" and whether he had /I committed the crime of statutory rape."7 
(Petition, p.13, , 16.d; PCHT 472-490). 
D. Consuela Cedeno. 
177. With respect to Ms. Cedeno, Johnson alleges in her Petition: 
Mr. Pangburn had been provided information based on 
prior statements of Consuelo Cedeno wherein she insisted 
her son Bruno Santos had not driven the car the morning of 
the murders because there was dew on the windshield. 
Further, Ms. Cedeno asserted in pre-trial statements that she 
checked the mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno was lying 
about where he had been .... Ms. Cedeno testified at trial 
that she didn't pay attention to such things. Yet, Trial 
Counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno. 
(Petition, p.12, , 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted»). 
178. At trial, Ms. Cedeno testified (through an interpreter), in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Q: Okay, the morning Alan and Diane Johnson were killed, 
Tuesday morning, did you go to work that morning? 
A: Yes. 
7 Nor did Johnson ask either Mr. Rader or Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to enter into a stipulation regarding 
the sexual nature of lohnson's relationship with Santos. (See generally PCHT pp. 138-187, 196-198,237-279). 
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Q: Do you recall seeing Bruno in the house that morning when 
you went to work? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was he doing? 
A: He was sleeping. 
Q: All right, and about what time do you go to work? 
A: Well, exactly, I couldn't really tell you. I don't remember, 
but I think around 7:30, 8:00. I always leave around 7:30 or 8:00. 
Q: Okay, where was Bruno sleeping at that time? 
A: In a mattress in the living room. And then my bedroom is 
right next to it. 
Q: And when you left to work that morning, the morning Alan 
and Diane were killed, did you see Bruno's car in the parking lot? 
A: It's actually my car, and I always take it; and sometimes he 
does take it, too. But it's usually just me, because I am the one that 
has the key, so it was parked. 
Q: And could you tell whether or not it looked like the car had 
been driven that morning before you got into it? 
A: No. 
Q: And how could she tell? 
A: Because I have the key. I have the key. 
Q: Miss Cedeno, was there anything on the window, was there 
dew on the window? 
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A: Well, no, no. I don't pay attention to things like that. But 
no, I didn't look. 
Q: But it's her car and she had the keys to it? It's your car, and 
you had the keys to it, is that correct? 
A: Always. 
(TT 2774:19-2776:9). 
179. In response to this testimony, Rader indicated that the defense would not 
be cross-examining Ms. Cedeno. (TT 2776:12-13). 
180. Prior to this decision being made, the defense investigator Dunn had 
reviewed the statements of Cedeno and Jane Lopez (Lopez). (See PCH Exhibit 13, a 
transcript of the interview of Cedeno and Lopez, conducted by two law enforcement 
officers, with Lopez translating for Cedeno). Cedeno is Santos' mother; Lopez is 
Santos' cousin. 
181. Dunn found some things problematic with Lopez and Cedeno's 
statements. Cedeno gave statements to the police concerning the condition of Santos' 
(her) vehicle, i.e., that it had dew on the windshield and that she had checked the 
odometer to see whether Santos had been driving the night of the murders. 
182. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dunn testified that he made 
counsel aware of information that Ms. Cedeno" gave statements to the police 
concerning ... the condition of Bruno's vehicle, which was actually her vehicle," that 
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there was LI dew on the window, that she checked the odometer and various things like 
that./I (PCHT 62:18-23). 
183. Dunn checked with the weather service and found that there was no dew8 
that day, which made it a contradictory statement to him. Dunn made Pangburn aware 
of that information. (PCHT 63:3-7). 
184. While examining Rader at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
Johnson asked Rader about his decision not to cross-examine Cedeno. (PCHT 178:15-
21). Rader testified that he did not "remember doing that, but [he] wouldn't be 
surprised if [he] did./I (Id., 178:22-23). 
185. Rader further testified that, although he did not remember that Cedeno 
made certain statements to police about keeping track of the mileage on the car or that 
Santos "was always lying to her," he was not prepared to cross-examine her because 
Mr. P.angburn "handed off that witness." (Id., 179:13-180:5). 
186. Johnson called Ms. Cedeno as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. (PCHT pp. 457-468). Cedeno largely denied any recollection of the events 
surrounding the murders of Alan and Diane. (PCHT pp.460-468). 
187. With respect to the only claim in Johnson's Petition regarding the cross-
examination of Cedeno - that counsel failed to cross-examine her regarding her 
statements to law enforcement that she checked the mileage on the car and saw dew on 
8 The court notes that Officer Cornelas testified about footprints in the grass at the Johnson residence and the heavy 
dew that morning, which directly contradicts Dunn's testimony on this point. The court find's Officer Cornelas' 
testimony more credible on this point than that of Dunn. 
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the windshield the morning of the murders - Cedeno testified she did not remember 
making either statement to law enforcement. (PCHT 464:7-468:7). 
188. This court did not find any value from Cedeno's testimony at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing. She certainly appeared to be a hostile witness to all 
concerned, and the breadth of her loss of or lack of memory is astounding. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this record to conclude what Cedeno knows now, or 
what she knew in 2005 at the time of trial, to support any factual conclusion in that 
regard. 
189. This court cannot conclude, as a matter of fact that Pangburn just "passed 
off" the cross-examination to Rader, given the overall distrust this court has for Rader's 
testimony and his lack of memory regarding the facts. 
E. lane Lopez. 
190. As to Jane Lopez, Johnson's Petition alleges: 
[A] discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial 
testimony and proof to the contrary found in phone records, 
indicating Bruno Santos was not at his mother's house. Trial 
Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, yet, Trial 
Counsel failed to utilize the records on cross-examination. 
(Petition, p.12, ~ 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted». 
191. At trial, Ms. Lopez, who worked at the Blaine County High School at the 
time of the murders, testified that after she heard about the murders, she called Santos 
around 8:30 a.m. (TT 2789:14-2791:20). 
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192. Lopez testified that first she called Santos' house, "and he didn't answer," 
so she "called his cell phone, and he answered." (IT 2791:22-24). She asked Santos 
"where he was, and he said, 'at home.'" (Id., 2791:24-25). When Lopez asked why he 
did not answer the home phone, Santos stated he was sleeping and told Lopez that if 
she did not believe him, she should call him again at the home number. (Id., 2791:25-
2792:3). Lopez testified that she then did call Santos at home, "he answered the 
phone," and she told him about the murders. (Id., 2792:3-8). According to Lopez, 
Santos "seemed really surprised and really shocked." (Id., 2792:22-25). 
193. Dunn obtained information about these phone calls to the Cedeno 
residence which he felt directly conflicted with statements made by Lopez regarding 
her telephone calls with Santos the morning of the murders. 
194. Dunn contends that Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, when taken together, set 
forth that Lopez's statements were incorrect and the phone calls were not made as 
Lopez said. Dunn therefore concluded that Santos was not at home when Lopez said he 
was. Dunn made that information known to Pangburn because he thought it was 
critical. 
195. Dunn prepared a witness book for Lopez and one for Cedeno. Dunn 
included Exhibit 13 in the books he provided Pangburn. 
196. Rader cross-examined Lopez at trial, asking whether those were the "only 
phone calls" she made to Santos. (IT 2794:6-7). Lopez answered, "yeah." (TT 2794:15). 
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197. Ms. Lopez reiterated this version of events at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing. (PCHT 370:22-372:10,374:19-375:1). Lopez did not, however, 
remember the actual phone numbers she called. (Id., 375:1-25). 
198. Johnson did not attempt to impeach Ms. Lopez with any phone records 
during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (PCHT 368-376). 
199. Rader testified that he was simply handed the witness book for Cedeno, 
and that he was not prepared to conduct her cross-examination. In retrospect Rader 
indicated that the defense team was "incompetent" by his not requesting a brief recess 
or continuance to allow him to familiarize himself with the matters contained in Lopez's 
witness book. (PCHT 181:2-182:8). 
200. This court has reviewed Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 40, along with the testimony 
from the post-conviction evidentiary hearing in this regard. The court concludes that 
these exhibits do not establish the facts which Dunn asserts they do. Rather, the court 
concludes that the testimony given by Lopez was more probable, that she attempted to 
call Santos' cell phone, and thereafter that she called Santos at home on a land line from 
the school. This call was made via a Quest land line-to-land line call, which would not 
be traceable through any type of documentation. (PCHT 414:3-17). 
F. Raul Ornelas. 
201. Johnson's Petition alleges trial counsel" fail[ ed] to adequately cross-
examine Officer Raul Ornelas who testified regarding footprints allegedly observed in 
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wet grass in the back yard/' and I/[s]pecifically, ... failed to point out the [sic] Tim 
Richards, the neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked the very area of the 
back yard later observed by Ornelas," and counsel "further failed to highlight the fact 
that Ornelas concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, thereby 
pointing blame from [Johnson] alone and onto unidentified murders." (Petition, p.lO, , 
16.a.ii.). 
202. At trial, Tim Richards, (Richards) who was not called as a witness at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing, testified that after Johnson came to his home 
reporting that her parents had been shot, he walked down the "gravel road" by the 
Johnson residence and "peered into the backyard," then "went around the back side of 
the guest house" where "there's a little bit more gravel." (TT 1586:7-10, 1607:15-25). 
Richards further testified that there is a dirt hill behind the guest house and that he did 
not see any footprints going up the hill. (TT 1608:4-18). 
203. Thus, contrary to the assertions in Johnson's Petition, there is no evidence 
that Mr. Richards "walked the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas." 
Rather, Mr. Richards only testified that he walked down the gravel road, not that he 
walked in the grass, which is where Officer Ornelas observed the footprints. 
204. With respect to footprints, Officer Ornelas (Ornelas) testified on direct 
examination at trial that, after responding to the Johnson residence, he was "looking 
around" and "noticed that there were tracks in the lawn." (TT 1735:17-18). The prints 
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were "due north to the back of th[e] guesthouse" and "disappeared there by the stairs." 
(Id., 1736:10-12). 
205. In all, Ornelas saw "two or three sets of footprints" because the grass was 
dewy, including "footprints that led back to the garage." (IT 1736:20-1737:15). Ornelas 
could not, however, tell whether the prints belonged to more than one person. (Id., 
1737:20-22). Ornelas did not observe any footprints going up the embankment behind 
the house or from the "patio that leads off of the bedroom ... on the northeast side." 
(Id., 1738:14-25, 1739:11-19). 
206. Pangburn cross-examined Ornelas at trial. (TT 1759-1772). On cross-
examination, Pangburn specifically asked Ornelas about the footprints he observed in 
the yard and his failure to conduct an "extensive search" of the hillside for footprints. 
(Id., pp.1765-1771). 
207. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn 
about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas. (See generally PCHT 
pp.239-279). 
208. Johnson did, however, inquire of Ornelas regarding his recollection of the 
footprints he observed on the morning of the murder. (PCHT 205:15-18). Ornelas 
reiterated that he observed footprints in the backyard and again described those prints. 
(Id., pp.205-209). Ornelas further testified that he was not aware of "anybody else" who 
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had "been in the backyard looking for a possible perpetrator prior to [his] arrival." (Id., 
209:8-15). 
209. Also contrary to Johnson's assertion, Officer Ornelas did not "conclude[] 
the footprints were made by more than one person;" in fact, he specifically testified that 
he could not tell. The testimony that "there were two or three sets of footprints" is not 
equivalent to the footprints having been made by more than one person. 
G. Stuart Robinson. 
210. In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "should have been aware" 
that "Officer Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted that no latent prints were 
found at the crime scene" but "[ d]iscoverable documents[ ] made absolutely clear that 
this testimony was inaccurate and false testimony, in that the record reveals that thirty 
nine (39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (Petition, p.13, ~ 16.b.). 
211. Stuart Robinson testified to this court about his collection of evidence at 
the crime scene, and particularly about the testimony he gave before the grand jury, 
wherein he testified that the Idaho State Forensics lab "could not locate any prints that 
could be identified." (PCHT 231:11-17). Robinson's answer was in response to a 
question from the prosecutor, Mr. Thomas, asking "as part of your case review, as far as 
you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the scope, or the casings?" 
(Id., lines 11-15). 
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212. The court finds that Robinson's answer was correct to the question asked 
by the prosecutor. The fingerprints were not identified at that point in time. 
213. Rader cross-examined Robinson at trial and did not attempt to impeach 
him with his grand jury testimony. (TT pp. 2069-2082.). 
214. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson read the following 
excerpt from Robinson's grand jury testimony to him: 
Mr. Robinson, that [grand] juror asked: You say you found a .264 
casing in the garage and one in the chamber. I'm wondering if any 
prints were taken and found on those casings. 
[The prosecutor] interjected, as it's his right to do, and said: Good 
point. Let me ask you this, Detective Robinson. Did you collect the 
gun, the scope, the casings, and probably a whole host of other 
things to send for fingerprint analysis? 
And you said at that time -- this is back in October of 2003 -- yes, 
we did. 
Question [by the prosecutor]: Now, on the gun and the scope and 
the casing, did your Idaho State Police lab do that analysis or 
attempt to do that analysis? 
Mr. Robinson: Yes, that's correct. 
[The prosecutor J asked you the question: Now, based on your -- on 
your, I guess, investigation and as part of your case review, as far 
as you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the 
scope, or the casings? 
And you answered: They could not locate any prints that could be 
identified. 
(peHT 230:19-231:17). 
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215. Johnson then asked Robinson to agree that the testimony was inaccurate. 
(PCHT 232:15-17). Robinson did not agree and explained that contrary to Johnson's 
interpretation of the testimony, his testimony accurately stated that the prints could not, 
at that time, be identified. (Id., 232:18-234:2; see also id., 236:21-237:3). 
216. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Rader 
about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Robinson. (See generally PCHT, 
pp. 138-187, 196-199). 
f Facts Regarding Fingerprint Issues. 
217. Rader was also involved with pre-trial interviews with fingerprint expert 
Robert Kerchusky, (Kerchusky), but Rader testified that he became aware some time 
before trial that Pangburn was going to present Kerchusky as a witness. (PCHT 186:6-
18). 
218. Rader met with Kerchusky and Kerchusky had some concerns about the 
information given him by the state; however, Rader did not remember any discussion 
with Kerchusky before the trial about Kerchusky's opinion regarding the freshness of 
the fingerprints. (Id., 187:3-10}. 
219. At trial, Tina Walthall, (Walthall) a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho 
State Police, testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, 
Alan Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), Russell 
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Nuxoll (the cleaning lady's boyfriend), Matthew Johnson (Johnson's brother) and Robin 
LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer). (TT 3009:16-20). 
220. Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted from the 
crime scene. (TT 3018:2-5). After those comparisons, certain fingerprints taken from 
the crime scene remained unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock of the 
rifle (Id., 3027:20-3028:22), the scope from the rifle (Id., 3042:22-3044:2), and two boxes of 
.264 shells (Id., 3049:-3052:3). 
221. A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) prior 
to trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the 
unidentified fingerprints. (TT 3045:1-3046:10,3053:5-11,3066:1-13). 
222. Walthall repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to 
determine when it was left (TT 3028:13-17,3044:22-25,3052:22-25; 3058:19-3062:11, 
3073:5-15). Walthall specifically stated: (1) "many, many years can pass and you might 
still find usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (TT 3060:10-11); (2) she has 
discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later (id., 3061:4-5); (3) one 
would expect to find fingerprints more than a year old if nothing happened between 
"when they were deposited and when [they were] processed" (id., 3061:20-25); and (4) 
"it is probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a year, providing there 
has been nothing to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on a 
nonporous surface (id., 3062:3-6). 
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223. The defense called Kerchusky to testify at Johnson's trial, and again before 
this court. 
224. During the trial, Kerchusky was asked by Pangburn how long fingerprints 
can last. He replied that "we can't be sure how long they're going to last," but that 
"pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm 
concerned." (TT 5070:6-12; see also 5128:18-5129:16 (latent prints on a non-porous 
surface will not last more than one year)). 
225. Kerchusky further testified that fingerprints will dry up and evaporate 
over the course of one year. (TT 5074:7-9). Kerchusky also agreed, however, that it is 
fair to say that a fingerprint on a box could last for years and years and years. (Id., 
5075:9-14). 
226. Mr. Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on 
nonporous surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far 
as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things that come into it, there's 
no way in the world anybody could write any article on it." (TT 5107:3-6). 
227. Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can 
last for years and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent print that was over 
a year old could be found on a nonporous surface. (TT 5130:8-16). Kerchusky further 
testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he 1/ still would 
have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (IT 5108:1-6). 
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228. In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial, Walthall 
compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr. 
Christopher Kevin Hill (Hill). (PCHT 652:2-21). Walthall testified at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, Hill's matched 
those that were found on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and the rifle. (Id.,654:2-
22; see also p. 659:11-14). 
229. Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging" fingerprints and 
how long fingerprints can last. (See generally PCHT, pp.661-670). Walthall reiterated the 
opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last longer than a year. (Id., 
670:4-11). 
230. Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
(See generally PCHT pp. 538-638). Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was 
substantially similar to his trial testimony in that he testified that fingerprints left on 
nonporous surfaces "will be gone within a year." (Id., 553:15-554:10). 
231. Kerchusky also referred to the prints on the rifle, scope, and ammunition 
(Christopher Kevin Hill's prints) as "fresh" because, according to him, any prints left on 
the gun before Mr. Speegle put it in his closet would have been wiped off by the clothes 
hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched." (PCm 589:2-15; see also 
id., 609:22-610:17, 612:21-613:21). 
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232. With respect to the new information that some of the previously 
unidentified fingerprints had been matched to Mr. Hill, Kerchusky testified that, in his 
opinion, Hill was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Hill 
who removed the scope. (PCHT 615:23-616:19). However, Kerchusky admitted on 
cross-examination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints 
are placed on any given item. (Id.,627:15-17). 
233. At the evidentiary hearing before this court, Kerchusky found fault with 
Pangburn because Pangburn did not ask him specifically whether the unknown 
fingerprints were "fresh./I Kerchusky testified that several of the prints were fresh, and 
that he had spoken to Pangburn during the trial, requesting that Pangburn put him 
back on the stand to discuss the freshness of the prints, but that Pangburn declined to 
do so. 
234. It was implied, if not expressed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
that Pangburn's examination and presentation of Kerchusky's testimony was 
insufficient because Pangburn was inadequately prepared to present the expert, based 
upon the original plan for Pangburn to handle just the lay witnesses. 
235. The court does not accept this proposition for two reasons: first, the 
record of Pangburn's examination sets forth that he was prepared for the examination, 
and that he discussed various hypotheticals that brought the pertinent issue (aging of 
fingerprints) before the jury for Kerchusky to comment on. (E.g. TT:5071-5072); second, 
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the record also establishes that Pangburn conducted the cross-examination of the state's 
fingerprint expert, Ms. Walthall, on February 16, 2005, more than two weeks before 
Kerchusky's examination on March 3,2005. (Id., 5044:15). Clearly the decision for 
Pangburn to handle the fingerprint evidence was decided long before Kerchusky took 
the stand in March. 
236. At trial Pangburn began his cross-examination of Ms. Walthall with 
questions regarding "this idea about aging fingerprints," (IT 3058:11-12), and he 
inquired further regarding the defense theory that fingerprints would dissipate after 
approximately one year. (Id., 3060:7-3062:11). 
237. The court concludes from the nature and extent of Pangburn's cross-
examination that he was well-aware of the defense theory regarding aging/freshness of 
fingerprints by February 2005. Thus, Pangburn's examination of Kerchusky was not a 
last-minute, shoot-from-the-hip situation, but it was, in accord with Pangburn's 
testimony, to get him involved some in the scientific aspect of the case and to take some 
of the load off Rader. 
238. The court therefore concludes that the defense, through Pangburn, had a 
definite strategy regarding the fingerprints; that Pangburn was aware of this strategy 
well-ahead of his examination of Kerchusky and that he, as a matter of strategy, asked 
the questions he chose to ask of Kerchusky without asking about "freshness" per se. 
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239. Pangburn was prepared regarding the defense fingerprint theory, and he 
exercised his judgment and skill in presenting those issues to the jury. He also argued 
the freshness of the fingerprints to the jury in his closing. (See Supplemental Appeal 
Transcript, 270:11-272:25) ("You know, these things start getting a year old, and you're 
just not going to see it. ... Those fingerprints had not been there for very long."). 
240. Mel Speegle, (Speegle) was the tenant in the guesthouse at the time of the 
murders. He is also the owner of the .264 rifle used to murder the Johnsons. 
241. Speegle testified at trial that: (1) he kept the rifle in his closet along with 
three other guns (TT 2702:8-2703:2); (2) the guns were not locked (id" 2703:3-8); (3) he 
saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the scope was still on the 
.264 rifle (id., p.2704:6-2706:8); (4) he had only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior 
(id., 2706:17-21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (id., 2708:2-9); and (6) he has no idea how 
many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a friend helped him move into the 
guesthouse (id., 2707:11-22). 
242. Speegle also testified that Johnson had access to his apartment, that 
Johnson knew he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the .264 
rifle, as well as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when Johnson 
cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (TT 2693:17-20,2694:25-2696:6, 
2715:12-25). 
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243. Speegle and Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing before this court. Speegle testified that he moved into the guest house on the 
Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (PCHT 699:10-15). 
244. Hill helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the Johnson guest 
house. (Id., 700:18-20, 703:20-23). Hill was a "good friend" of Speegle's and had been a 
caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speelge's .264 rifle. (Id., 
p.704:1-4, 11-13, 724:10-20). To Speegle's knowledge, Hill did not have access to the 
Johnson guest house. (Id., 704:8-10). 
245. Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he 
helped Speegle move "a few things" into the Johnson guest house. (PCHT 726:14-17, 
727:5-12). Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the guest house. (Id., 
727:13-16). 
246. Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any involvement in the murders of 
Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders until about one week 
after they occurred because he had been camping. (Id., 728:5-20). 
247. In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than having 
possibly left them when he helped Speegle move, Hill testified that, during the 
springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch, he "took [the rifle] out, 
tried to sight it," and shot it 1/ six or seven times" using Speegle's ammunition. (PCHT 
728:21-729:7; see also 729:24-731:21). 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent that any Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of 
Law, they are incorporated into these Conclusions of Law. 
2. An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Kelly v. State, 
__ Idaho ---.-J 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). Like the plaintiff in any other civil 
proceeding, Johnson must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon 
which her request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; see also id. 
3. A preponderance of the evidence requires evidence establishing a fact as 
more probable than not. Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 622, 809 P.2d 472, 
483 (1991); Ebert v. Newton, 97 Idaho 418,546 P.2d 64 (1976); see also Big Butte Ranch Inc. 
v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6,9,415 P.2d 48,51 (1966) (,"Preponderance of evidence' means 
such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and 
from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein."). 
Id. 
4. As the Court in Big Butte Ranch noted further: 
In the event that the evidence is evenly balanced so that the 
court is unable to say that the evidence on either side of an 
issue ... has the greater convincing force, then the court's 
finding upon that issue must be against the party who had 
the burden of proving it. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 63 
5. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought 
under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,924-25,828 P.2d 
1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). 
6. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson must 
show that her attorney's performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064-65 (1984); 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995). 
7. To establish a deficiency, Johnson has the burden of showing that her 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
8. There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within 
the wide range of IIprofessional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 687-
88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(1988). 
9. "In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance," the Idaho 
Supreme Court has cautioned, "judicial scrutiny must be highly deferential and every 
effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time.' fI State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 127 P.3d 954, 
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961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999) and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668,689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984»). 
10. Moreover, Idaho's appellate courts have long adhered to the proposition 
that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal 
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 
4483675, 7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261, 
263 (Ct.App.1994)). 
11. In addition, Johnson must not only show incompetence, but must also 
show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the proceeding cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
12. Thus, Johnson's burden here is a "heavy" one. See Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). As was noted recently by the 
United States Supreme Court: 
Surmounting Strickland f s high bar is never an easy task. ... 
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to 
escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not 
presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be 
applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial 
inquiry" threaten the integrity of the very adversary process 
the right to counsel is meant to serve .... 
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Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. ----' ----' 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.s. ----' ----' 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)) (citations omitted). 
13. In the end, the "question is whether an attorney's representation 
amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing professional norms,'" not whether it 
deviated from best practices or most common custom. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 
14. Johnson maintains seven claims for relief. Each will be discussed in turn. 
I. Johnson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden To Establish Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel. 
A. Johnson was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel for her attorneys' 
failing to request a continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine the state's expert, after 
learning the comforter had not been collected as evidence. 
15. Johnson has presented limited post-hearing argument regarding this 
claim; however, there was some testimony during the evidentiary hearing regarding 
this issue, which therefore merits consideration by the court. 
16. The court concludes that there is very little evidence establishing: 1) the 
claim that a continuance should have been requested; 2) Judge Wood would have 
granted the request; 3) what should have been done with the extra time if the 
continuance would have been granted; and 4) what, if any, legal arguments or expert 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 66 
testimony could have been elicited to establish a defense or create a better presentation 
by the defense attorneys during the trial. 
17. In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Johnson is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
counsels' performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U .s. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of 
hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a 
strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.s. at 689-
90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
18. It was Johnson's burden to present evidence to this court sufficient to 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and 
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" in 
order to establish that counsels' performance was "outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th 
Cir.1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.s. at 690). 
19. Because "[s]trategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or 
serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel," it was also Johnson's burden to prove that counsels' decisions were the result 
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of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373. 941 P.2d 337, 344-
345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Gabourie v. State, 
125 Idaho 254,258,869 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
20. In order to prove prejudice, Johnson is required to show that counsels' 
deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for 
counsels' deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.s. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 
681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
21. Regarding the second element, Johnson had the burden of showing that 
her trial counsels' deficient conduct 1/ so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
Strickland, 466 U.s. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
22. When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's 
inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 
905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995). 
23. As with other decisions made by counsel, Johnson must overcome the 
presumption that the decision not to file a particular motion was strategic or tactical. 
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See State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice 
of witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to 
testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions). 
24. In the underlying trial, one of the defense strategies was to attack the 
state's improper handling of evidence and sloppy investigation. (See TT:4605:5-8 
("[We're] going to show you where the state, first of all, ... police agencies in this case 
did a very poor job of hanging onto the evidence; of even acquiring it, to begin with."». 
25. Thus, this court will not now second-guess that strategy and find that the 
defense should have had another strategy. 
26. Moreover, this court cannot conclude that a request for continuance on 
such vague grounds would have been granted by Judge Wood, much less that the 
continuance would have made a difference in the evidence presented or the approach 
taken at triaL 
27. It was objectively reasonable for counsel to do precisely what they did in 
this case - attack the state's failure to collect the comforter, along with other items of 
evidence the state failed to collect from the crime scene, rather than request a 
continuance on some vague, unsubstantiated basis. 
28. Therefore, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that 
her counsel were deficient in failing to request a continuance, and moreover, that she 
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suffered any prejudice as a result of the failure to request such a continuance. 
Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to relief on this claim and it is DENIED. 
B. Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the scientific 
basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on blood splatter opinion evidence. 
29. This allegation is factually disproved by the record in this case. As this 
court has found based on the facts presented, the defense attempted, although 
unsuccessfully, to create an experiment sufficiently similar to the explosion of a human 
head to be admissible at trial. No facts support the claim that counsel was unprepared 
or unschooled as to the legal standards applicable for the admission of this evidence. 
There was no proof at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, through expert 
testimony or otherwise, that there is some standard of law that Rader failed to recognize 
which otherwise would help to get an inadequate re-creation/experiment admitted. 
30. Moreover, nothing has been shown which establishes that an experiment 
better than the myriad of experiments tried by the defense even exists. In particular, 
this court has not been shown that an experiment has been conducted that: 1) would be 
admissible; and 2) Rader had access to, or should have known about during his 
preparation for and conduct of the forensic issues in the trial in 2004 and 2005. 
31. During the trial, before the defense case-in-chief, Judge Wood conducted 
an extensive hearing on the state's motion to exclude the experiment conducted by the 
defense seeking to replicate the blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane 
Johnson was shot in the head. (TT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503). 
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32. Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic 
pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between 
the media used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508). 
33. Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-
replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment/' he would "take another look at it." 
(IT 4509:17-22). 
34. Thus, the trial record belies Johnson's claims that her attorneys were 
"unable to consult with any experts." (Petition, p. 8, ~15.c.). Counsel had adequate time 
to consult with experts, and in fact did so, conducting a myriad of experiments with an 
array of media from Styrofoam filled with pudding to the coconut that was argued 
extensively before Judge Wood. 
35. Tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed 
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 
4483675, 7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261, 
263 (Ct.App.1994)). 
36. There has been no showing here that defense counsel's efforts regarding 
the experiments were anything but strategic, or that they were based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or any other shortcoming that can be 
objectively evaluated. 
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37. Rader's belief that he could have and should have reached out to other 
professional groups or attorneys for assistance is simply second guessing and is 
precisely the sort of hindsight that is insufficient for establishing a claim of deficient 
performance. 
38. Johnson also fails to establish any prejudice regarding this claim, in that 
the defense attorneys' theme throughout the case centered on the "no blood, no guilt" 
theory and counsel presented forensic evidence for the jury's consideration, albeit short 
of the coconut experiment, to establish their theory. 
39. Simply because the jury failed to accept the defense "no blood, no guilt" 
premise is insufficient to establish that the attorneys were at fault in any way regarding 
their efforts as to the science surrounding the blood spatter and their theory of the case. 
40. Therefore Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing defective 
performance or prejudice regarding this claim and it is DENIED. 
C. Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses. 
41. In claim 4(e), Johnson alleges that counsel were ineffective with respect to 
the cross-examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, KjeU Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve 
Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, 
Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, ~ 16.) 
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42. Of these fourteen witnesses, only seven were called as witnesses at the 
evidentiary hearing before this court: Walt Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, 
Consuelo Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (PCHT 2-3.) 
43. Johnson failed to call Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Glenda 
Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala and failed to present any evidence 
as to counsels' decisions regarding their examination of these witnesses, or any 
substantive evidence of how their testimony would have been different. Johnson, 
therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was ineffective in cross-
examining these witnesses. The court will discuss the remaining witnesses in turn. 
44. At the outset it is axiomatic that cross-examination of witnesses is 
generally a tactical decision. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,563, n.2, 199 P.3d 123, 138 n.2 
(2008). Judicial scrutiny of these issues "must be highly deferential and every effort 
must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time.' " State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338,345-46, 127 P.3d 954, 
961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 F.2d 323, 329 (1999) and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984». 
a. Sheriff Walt Femling. 
45. In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "failed to adequately cross-
examine the Blaine County Sheriff," Walt Femling who allegedly "made a statement 
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during the early stages of the investigation to the effect that it was vital that police find 
a suspect in order to prevent a negative perception of the Sun Valley area from 
outsiders who may have decided not to visit if the crime went unsolved." (Petition, 
pp.l0-11, ~ 16.a.iii.). 
46. The legal standard applicable to cross-examination provides that the 
scope of Rader's cross-examination is entitled to the presumption that it was sound trial 
strategy. 
47. Johnson has failed to rebut that presumption. Indeed, Johnson failed to 
even inquire of Rader regarding his strategic decisions regarding Femling's testimony, 
much less prove that the strategy was objectively unreasonable. 
48. The facts simply do not support Johnson's claim that law enforcement 
were so dead-set on convicting Johnson that they went after her to the exclusion of all 
others. 
49. As noted above, Femling testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law 
enforcement interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, 
spent $517,000 investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5 
people to the case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative 
leads. (TT 2458:4-2461:16). It also took an extended period of time, and the receipt of 
DNA evidence before the focus of the state's investigation narrowed to Sarah Johnson. 
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50. Given the similarities between Femling's trial testimony regarding the 
scope of the investigation into the Johnson murders and his testimony at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing, this court finds that such testimony is credible. 
51. Thus, Johnson has failed to prove that counsel was deficient in cross-
examining Femling regarding a theory that the facts simply do not support. Moreover, 
there is no showing that Johnson was prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate 
cross-examination. 
52. Accordingly, Johnson's claim as to the cross-examination of Femling is 
DENIED. 
b. Steve Harkins. 
53. The court concludes that Pangburn's cross-examination was, again, based 
upon tactical decision-making and is not subject to second-guessing by this court. 
54. Pangburn did cross-examine Harkins' extensively regarding his 
interviews in the case with Santos' known associates, and Pangburn succeeded in 
asking about unsavory characters and Santos' drug-dealing mindset--even going so far 
as to ask whether Santos' associates would kill for him. 
55. While not every question was asked of Harkins that Johnson would now, 
in hindsight, think should have been asked, Johnson has failed to overcome the heavy 
burden that such questions and the scope of such examination are matters of trial tactics 
which are presumed to be sound trial strategy. 
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56. Johnson has also, given the scope and extent of the questions that were 
asked, failed to establish the requisite prejudice here, that but for any errors by 
Pangburn in his cross-examination of Harkins, the result would have been different. 
57. As such, Johnson has failed to overcome this presumption as to the cross-
examination of Detective Harkins. This claim is DENIED. 
c. Bruno Santos. 
58. This court has reviewed the record of the underlying trial and made 
factual findings regarding the cross-examination of Santos by Rader. 
59. Those findings set forth that Rader was very knowledgeable of Santos' 
shortcomings, and had a plan regarding the scope of his inquiry. 
60. His inquiry was largely cut short based on Judge Wood's evidentiary 
ruling regarding the propriety of the defense's intended questions. Based thereon, 
Rader indicated at the conclusion of the state's direct examination that the defense 
"decided not to enter into a stipulation and ... decided not to cross examine Mr. Santos 
... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15). 
61. This was a penultimate strategic decision made with knowledge of Santos' 
past, with full knowledge of the lack of facts tying Santos to the Johnson murders, and 
with an understanding of the legal ruling made by Judge Wood. 
62. Thus, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of proving that Rader's 
decision not to cross-examine Santos was anything but strategic or that the decision was 
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objectively unreasonable in light of the testimony Santos offered on direct and the 
limitations Judge Wood placed on cross-examination. 
63. Johnson likewise has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the 
failure to cross-examine Santos. Santos provided no additional testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing that would have aided in Johnson's defense and there is no reason 
to conclude that cross-examination of Santos at trial would have resulted in a different 
outcome in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Johnson and the 
complete absence of any evidence implicating Santos in the murders. 
64. Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief 
on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Santos and this 
claim is DENIED. 
d. Consuela Cedeno. 
65. This court has indicated that Ms. Cedeno's testimony at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing was essentially valueless. 
66. The court has concluded as a finding of fact that it cannot conclude that 
Pangburn simply passed off the cross-examination of this witness to Rader at the last 
minute. 
67. The presumption therefore remains that the failure to cross-examine 
Cedeno was a strategic decision and Johnson has not overcome the presumption in that 
regard. 
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68. Moreover, even if the decision was inept and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, this court cannot find prejudice regarding the issues which 
Johnson now contends should have been asked on cross-examination. 
69. The court has concluded that Dunn's information regarding their being no 
dew on the morning of September 3 is an unsupported fact, based upon the testimony 
of Officer Cornelas. See supra, fn. 8. Moreover, the fact that Santos may have "run 
around," or that Cedeno may have told differing stories regarding the odometer on the 
family car is, in light of the entire record and the overwhelming evidence against 
Johnson, inconsequential. These facts simply would not have made a difference in this 
case, and there is no prejudice to Johnson based on counsel's failure to inquire about 
them. 
70. Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief 
on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Cedeno and this 
claim is DENIED. 
e. Jane Lopez. 
71. This court has reviewed the entirety of the record as it pertains to the 
issues raised as to the cross-examination of Jane Lopez. The court has further 
concluded that the phone records which purportedly create a discrepancy actually do 
not. 
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72. Therefore, the presumption that Rader's questioning, limited though it 
was, was simply strategic has not been overcome in this case. 
73. Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's decision 
regarding the cross-examination of Ms. Lopez was anything but strategic, much less 
that it was deficient, and she has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Rader's 
failure to try and impeach Ms. Lopez with the phone records. Indeed, Johnson did not 
even attempt to do so at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
74. Consequently, Johnson cannot demonstrate how any such impeachment 
would have made a difference in the outcome of this case, particularly where the court 
has made a factual determination that the records do not impeach Lopez. 
75. Because Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was 
ineffective in his cross-examination of Ms. Lopez, this claim is hereby DENIED. 
f. Raul Ornelas. 
76. The court has made factual findings that establish: 1) that Tim Richards 
never testified to having walked in the back yard at the Johnson home before officers 
arrived at the scene; and 2) Officer Raul Ornelas did not testify that the footprints were 
made by more than one person; rather, he specifically testified that he could not tell. 
77. Pangburn's cross-examination of Ornelas was thus based upon the record 
and the scope of Ornelas' direct testimony. Johnson has failed to prove Pangburn'S 
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efforts were either deficient or prejudicial for his failure to "point out" or "highlight" 
information that was not actually in evidence. 
78. Moreover, Johnson failed to offer any evidence, let alone prove that 
Pangburn's cross-examination of Officer Ornelas was anything but tactical. Johnson's 
claim regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas is therefore DENIED. 
G. Stuart Robinson. 
79. The court has made factual findings establishing that Stuart Robinson's 
testimony before the grand jury was not inaccurate at the time it was made; the 
fingerprints, though recovered at that time, were not identified. 
80. Thus, Rader's failure to impeach Robinson with that information is a non-
issue. There was no impeachment to be had regarding that statement. 
81. Even if there is some limited value from information Johnson elicited from 
Robinson at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, that value comes nowhere close to 
establishing Johnson's burden to show that "but for counsels' deficient performance, 
there [is] a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.s. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
82. Thus, this court concludes that Johnson has established neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice regarding the cross-examination of Stuart Robinson. This 
portion of Johnson's claim is therefore DENIED. 
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D. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to present evidence of an audio recording, 
recorded inadvertently by Trooper Ross Kirtley. 
83. In this claim Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present 
evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on 
Johnson "to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] 
was the easiest target." (Petition, p.13, ~ 16.c.). 
84. The recording to which Johnson refers was a recording from Trooper 
Kirtley's microphone and dashboard camera, which recorded from before he was 
dispatched to the crime scene to approximately two and one-half hours later, when he 
was still at the scene. (Exhibit 12). 
85. Given the entirety of the record herein, and the court's factual findings 
regarding the lack of a "focus" on Johnson to the exclusion of others, see Findings of 
Fact, ~~ 126-134, this court concludes that counsel were not ineffective for failing to 
admit the recording. 
86. The officers' initial thoughts, while of some interest9, do nothing to 
undermine the record of the police investigation, which shows that there were initially 
multiple suspects, and that, in the eyes of Sheriff Femling, Johnson's status as "prime 
suspect" did not materialize until the DNA results were returned showing Johnson's 
DNA in the glove hidden in her pink robe in the garbage can. 
9 One of the initial thoughts of the officers on the recording was that a murder-suicide had occurred, a theory which 
is unsupported by the evidence and which the defense did not pursue at trial. 
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87. Johnson failed to establish that the decision not to introduce such 
evidence was objectively unreasonable or that introduction of such evidence, assuming 
it could even be correctly characterized as Johnson has characterized it, would remotely 
undermine confidence in the outcome of her case. 
88. Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel was 
ineffective for failing to introduce the entirety of Trooper Kirtley's audio, the court 
DENIES Johnson relief on this claim. 
E. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to inquire whether certain 
previously unidentified fingerprints were 'fresh. /I 
89. As the court has concluded based on the record in this case, Pangburn was 
adequately prepared regarding the forensic/fingerprint testimony in the Johnson trial. 
He inquired of the state's expert regarding aging of fingerprints, and he inquired 
similarly of Mr. Kerchusky regarding the same issues. 
90. The information regarding the freshness of the prints was before the jury 
from both Pangburn's direct examination of Kerchusky, and from his cross-examination 
of Ms. Walthall. Moreover, Pangburn in fact argued that when the fingerprints /I start 
getting a year old ... you're just not going to see [them]." He also argued that the 
unknown fingerprints, which have now been identified as those of Christopher Hill 
"had not been there for very long./I (Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25). 
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91. Thus, Pangburn did not err in failing to specifically ask whether the prints 
were" fresh" or in failing to ask Kerchusky those questions which Kerchusky answered 
at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing regarding who, in his opinion, touched the 
scope last. 
92. The court therefore concludes that Pangburn's questions of Kerchusky at 
trial do not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court further 
concludes that Johnson has not overcome the "strong presumption that trial counsel's 
performance falls within the wide range of 'professional assistance.'" Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.s. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
93. This court further recognizes that its scrutiny must be "highly deferential 
and every effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 
127 P.3d 954, 961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323, 
329 (1999) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668,689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984». 
94. Viewing this issue from this deferential perspective, the court concludes 
that Johnson has failed to establish that Pangburn was ineffective or that she has 
suffered any prejudice from the claimed deficiency. This claim is accordingly DENIED. 
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F. Johnson did not receive a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict due to the 
cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of 
the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings. 
95. Johnson maintains that she is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon 
the cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the 
facts and law of the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings. 
96. As is set forth above, this court has concluded that none of these 
assertions, either individually or collectively, has been proven in this case. Nothing in 
the record establishes that the defense team, or any of them, was chronically late, 
unprepared or indolent. 
97. The facts have been established that Pangburn and Rader's conduct did 
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as to any of Johnson's claims. 
Consequently, she has failed to establish the cumulative error she alleges occurred in 
this case. 
98. Johnson has not cited any support in the record that the defense team was 
unaware of legal precedent or the law of the case. In fact, this court has found just the 
opposite is true, particularly as it pertains to the defense attempts to: 1) admit their 
blood spatter experiment; and 2) cross-examine Bruno Santos extensively regarding his 
history. 
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99. Therefore, the court DENIES Johnson any relief based upon the 
accumulation of alleged wrongful conduct by her attorneys. 
II. Johnson Is Not Entitled To A New Trial On The Basis Of Newly Discovered 
Evidence. 
100. Johnson seeks a new trial in this matter on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence relating to the recent identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of 
the previously unidentified latent prints. 
101. Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if Johnson 
demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to her at the time 
of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will 
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a 
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 
P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976». 
102. In announcing this four-part test in Drapeau, the Court cited Professor 
Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, 
1/ after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper 
reluctance to give him a second trial." 97 Idaho at 691,551 P.2d at 978 (citation 
omitted). 
103. A long line of Idaho cases have held, consistently with the Court's 
pronouncement in Drapeau, that evidence known to the defendant at the time of trial 
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cannot be considered newly discovered. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 
P.3d at 224 (in order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just 
importance or materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to 
trial); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404,410,273 P.2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which 
defendant was aware of prior to trial but chose not to present is not newly discovered); 
State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99,11 P.2d 619, 622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial 
is not newly discovered); State v. Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts 
unknown at time of trial could be considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 
45,88 P. 240,242 (1907) (concluding evidence that colts were not stolen but actually 
belonged to the rancher for which defendants worked was not newly discovered). 
104. In this case the only thing about the "newly discovered evidence" which is 
new is the identification to whom the fingerprints belong. Nevertheless, the court 
concludes that this identification meets the first prong of Drapeau because the evidence 
is newly discovered and was unknown to Johnson at the time of trial. 
105. The court also finds that the fourth Drapeau prong is met; the discovery of 
the identity of the unknown fingerprints had nothing to do with the defendant's 
conduct. 
106. However, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the 
discovery that Mr. Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and ammunition boxes is 
material or would likely produce an acquittal on a retrial. 
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107. At triat the evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the scope, the 
box and elsewhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (TT 2994:10-3077:25; 
5045:15-5132:15; 5808:1-5843:4; 5846:16-5858:17). 
108. The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were on the scope, gun, 
some of the shells, and the box containing the shells. (TT 3077:1-17). Thus, it was 
established at trial that Johnson had left no fingerprints on those items; if any of the 
prints on those items belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not Johnson and 
was some unidentified person. 
109. Pangburn utilized this fingerprint information and argued it to the jury, to 
no avail. (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25) (Pangburn'S closing 
argument that the fingerprints on the rifle and scope had not been there very long -
implying that the "real killer" was unidentified). 
110. The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they still convicted 
Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus, telling a new jury the name of the 
owner of those phantom prints will not likely produce an acquittal. 
111. Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and where Hill had 
touched the rifle. The fact that this information is now known makes the fingerprint 
testimony even less valuable than it was at the time of the trial, when the defense could 
argue that a nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the scope. 
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112. The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a contradictory 
manner to this conclusion; he is convinced of his theory of the case, as much as the 
state's expert, Ms. Walthall is convinced that you cannot age fingerprints. 
113. This court's task is to evaluate both witnesses' testimony in light of the 
entire record before the court. In doing so, the court chooses not to accept Kerchusky's 
hypothesis. 
114. This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the testimony of any 
expert witness. See Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 566, 130 P.3d 1097, 
1104 (2006) (the factfinder is free to determine the weight to be given to the testimony of 
an expert); In re Baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 460,902 P.2d 477, 485 (1995) (the weight to 
be given to expert testimony is for the trier of fact). 
115. The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill was the unknown 
killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he was camping on East Magic Road at the 
time of the murders. He had no access to the guest house or to the Johnson home; he 
has no knowledge of the inner workings of the Johnson home, i.e., where knives were 
hidden, where Sarah's robe was kept, or where the key to the gun safe was located (to 
retrieve the 9mm magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply does not support 
Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to touch the scope, the gun, or the 
ammunition and this court does not accept that theory. 
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116. The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson's fingerprints were 
not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the ammunition or packaging, given that a 
leather glove was found in her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was 
wrapped in Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove containing 
Johnson's DNA. 
117. Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the theory of aiding and 
abetting murder. Use of such instruction was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 
145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). 
118. While the state did not rely upon that "theory of liability" in proving its 
case, see 145 Idaho at 975, 188 P.3d at 917, the jury was free to consider that theory 
because "it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been the actual shooter." 
ld. at 977, 188 P.3d at 919. 
119. Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not the actual shooter, was not 
complicit as an aider and abettor. 
120. It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the murders. There 
was no forced entry in this case, either to the Johnson home or the guesthouse; 
Johnson's bedroom contained .264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-
handed leather glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson's robe in the garbage; 
both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the family vehicle; the knives found in 
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the guest bedroom and at the foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder 
or stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to the guesthouse; 
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her relationship with 
Santos; and Johnson gave numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was 
doing when her parents were shot. As Judge Barry Wood viewed this evidence: 
I think it's really interesting that the brother-in-law, the 
man who had gotten married there the week before, two 
weeks before, whatever it was, that spent he testified, four 
or five days in that very upstairs apartment in the guest 
house, and never knew the gun was there, never saw it. 
Used the closet and didn't even know the gun was there. 
Didn't know the bullets were there. 
[T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that 
somebody off of the street could corne and find that gun in 
the guest house, find those bullets in the guest house, know 
when the parents were going to be there; find the knives in 
the kitchen that are hidden, the one knife that's hidden 
behind the microwave or bread box, whatever it was, in the 
dark, no less; go out past the family dog that the evidence 
was would bark, and the dog didn't bark. Take the same 
route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the 
house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her 
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not 
awaken her or bother her. 
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the 
parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this 
in the dark and not disturb the parents just defies common 
sense. 
I think a reasonable jury could clearly find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here. 
(Supp. Appeal Transcript, 449:1-450:4). 
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121. This court agrees with this sentiment, to the extent that Johnson must 
show that the alleged "newly discovered evidence" would produce an acquittal in 
another trial, and this court simply cannot make that leap given the above-noted facts. 
122. This court's reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not to say that 
this court is unconvinced of Johnson's direct culpability for the murder of her parents, 
as argued by the state at trial. Add to the above-noted circumstances the DNA 
evidence, Johnson's motive for the crimes, her access and her opportunity, and this 
court concludes that telling a new jury that the fingerprint owner is now identified will 
do nothing to ameliorate the mountain of evidence which the jury saw and heard in this 
case against Ms. Johnson. 
123. To quote Judge Wood again: 
The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe. The 
jury doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly 
the way the defense theory is that it occurred. The argument 
of no blood, no guilt; well, the converse of that is if there's 
blood, there is guilt. And there's blood. There's blood all 
over the robe, blood on the socks. 
Your whole theory, it seems to me, the whole defense 
theory is an aiding and abetting theory, because the 
defendant's there and there's no evidence that excludes the 
defendant. There's not one piece of evidence that excludes 
the defendant from the commission of this crime that I 
heard. She's right there. And her defense -- I mean her 
defense people, Howard and Mink, testify -- and Inman, I 
believe, all three - at least two of them testified that the 
doors were open. The door to the parents' bedroom, which 
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is propped open by the pillows, and the door to Sarah 
Johnson's room is open. 
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was 
taken out of the Suburban, that's something else that this 
unnamed killer would have had to have known, is where the 
gloves were located, the mother's gloves in the Suburban. 
Located those in the dark, as well, and brought them into the 
house to help commit this crime. And leave one in Sarah 
Johnson's room with two cartridges for the .264; unspent, 
unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her 
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah 
Johnson's room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it 
just doesn't make sense to me. 
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of 
the leather gloves found in her room, the other one found 
out -- wrapped up in the trash can inside the pink robe. 
That's what I mean by the circumstantial evidence here, and 
she admits being there. 
The evidence here is overwhelming. 
(Id., 450:4-451:19). 
124. This court adopts Judge Wood's reasoning as its own. The court has spent 
significant hours reviewing the 1000's of pages of transcripts from trial; the court has 
listened to testimony during the post-conviction hearing; the court has reviewed the 
parties' post-hearing briefing; and the court has reviewed all of this evidence against 
the legal standards set forth herein. The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in 
this record is, indeed, "overwhelming." 
125. Thus, the court concludes that the evidence identifying Mr. Hill's 
fingerprints is insufficient to make such evidence material, or likely to produce an 
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acquittal. As such, Johnson's claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 
is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court 
hereby concludes that Johnson's Petition for Post-Conviction relief is, in all respects, 
DENIED. Counsel for the state is to prepare a judgment in conformity with this opinion 
within seven days. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
District Judge 
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7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
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ORDER FOR APPOlNTIv1ENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER-Pag~ 1 
MAY-03-2011 TUE 01:43 PM TF r~urL Services FAX NO 20A 736 4155 
' p, 03 
05/02/2011 11;11 2087885512 BLAINE COUHTV COURT #2550 P.OOS/OOS 
, 
I 
, '. 
. CERTIFICATE OF MAlLING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have thl,s _ 3 day of f'f\ ~ , 2011. caused a ttue 
and correct copy of the attsclted ~ APFEAL to be pla:ced in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Sarah Johnson 
c/o Pocatello Woments Correctional Center 
1451 Fore Road 
Po<:atello, Idaho &3205 
Blaine Caunty Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Ste. 100 
. Hailey, Idaho 83333 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise. ID 83703-691.03 
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
POBox 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Virginia Bailey 
Court Reporter 
P.O. 126 
Twin Falls •. ID 83303 
. M<C\ / 
Deputy Clerk .... 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STA TE APPELLATE PUBUC DEFENDER - Page 2 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law ISB #7473 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
PH 208 788 2800 
FAX 208 788 2300 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
FI LED ~ .. ~.' -/.';l{) 
MAY 0 4 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV -06-324 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY 
FOR CLERK'S RECORD 
AND TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
AT COUNTY COST 
!l 
I 
v~ 
__________ =R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t~. ____________ ) I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e) 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner-Appellant, SARAH M. JOHNSON, by and through her 
Attorney of Record, Christopher P. Simms, in the above-entitled matter and files this, her Motion 
for Blaine County to Pay for Clerk's Record and Transcript on Appeal and in support thereof 
states the following: 
1. The above-named Petitioner-Appellant filed her NOTICE OF APPEAL on April 29, 
2011, against the above-named Respondent from the Judgment entered in the above-entitled 
cause on the i h day of April, 2011, the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, presiding. 
2. A Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Supporting Affidavit, has been prepared and 
submitted to appellant for verification, and will be filed with this Court in due course. 
3. The Petitioner Petitioner-Appellant has requested, in her Notice of Appeal, the 
preparation of the entire reporter's transcript as defined in LA.R. 2S(c), without exclusions or 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRlPT ON APPEAL AT COUNTY 
COST - Page 1 
omissions, and including all argument at motion hearings, all pre-trial proceedings, and all trial 
proceedings. 
4. The Petitioner-Appellant has requested in her Notice of Appeal the preparation of the 
standard clerk's record pursuant to LA.R. 28(b)(2), without exclusion or omission, to include all 
pleadings papers and evidence filed and submitted in the District Court. 
5. The Petitioner-Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of 
the record because the appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of 
Corrections and is therefore indigent. (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, LA.R. 24(e). 
WHEREFORE appellant prays this Honorable Court enter an Order directing Blaine 
County, Idaho pay for all fees associated with producing the Clerk's Record and Transcript on 
Appeal in the above styled matter. 
istopher P. Simms 
Attorney for Petitioner - Appellant 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRlPT ON APPEAL AT COUNTY 
COST - Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT 
ON APPEAL AT COUNTY COSTS was served upon the parties below as follows: 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Ste. 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Fax: 208.788.5554 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703-69103 
Fax: 208.334.2985 
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Fax: 208. 854.8074 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL AT COUNTY 
COST - Page 3 
MAY-05-2011 THU 10:33 AM TF C- "rl Services FAX NO, 20A 736 4155 p, U4 
FILED~: :>v{ ~~ 
[ MAY n 5 2011 I ~ 
Jolynn Df8ge, Clerk District 
Court Blains Counly, Idaho 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON~ .) Case No: CV~06-324 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) ORDER FOR BLAINE 
) COUNTY TO PAY FOR 
vs. ) CLERK'S RECORD AND 
) TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Res:Qondent ) I.C. 19 ~ 4904 
The Court) having considered PETITlONERlS MOnON FOR ORDER TO PAY FOR 
CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCIPT ON APPEAL AT COUNTY COSTS filed herein by 
the Petitioner-Appellant, Sarah M Johnson, by and through her Attorney) Christopher P. Simms. 
and good cause appearing therefore, HEREBY ORDERS the clerks record be prepared aud the 
transcript of all hearings on the Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief in the above styled matter 
~ct:ibed at the cost of Blaine County, Idaho . 
. C~· 
DATED this () day of May, 2011. 
ORDER. FOR BLAlNE COUNIYTO PAY FOR CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
SOOO/sooo lei IVd ~9:Cl TIO~/~O/gO 
Sarah Johnson 
clo Pocatello Womens Correctional Center 
1451 Fore Road 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
Petitioner-Appellant 
F I LE D ~ .. ~ .. ~'f"'H­
MAY 2 6 2011 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Count , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________ ~R=e=sp=o=nd=e=n=t, ___________ ) 
Case No: CV -06-324 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT 
COMES NOW, the petitioner, SARAH M. JOHNSON, in the above-entitled matter and 
moves this Honorable Court for an order of the Court to proceed in forma pauperis on the 
grounds she is a prisoner and indigent pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3 220A. Said Motion is 
supported by the following Affidavit of Inability to Pay Court Fees. 
DATED this -.:L day of Uo L\ 
\ 
, 2011. 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 1 ['1l.{ ~ 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County 0[1)\ ai ne.. 
AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY 
) 
) ss 
) 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, declares under penalty of perjury, that I am the Petitioner-
Appellant in the above entitled proceeding; that, in support of my request to proceed without 
being required to prepay fees, cost or give security therefor, I state that because of my poverty, I 
am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or give security therefor; that I believe I am 
entitled to relief. 
The nature of my action is I have been incarcerated for many years, am indigent and 
unable to earn funds adequate to pay for these proceedings. 
In further support of this application, I answer the following questions: 
1. I am presently employed. )(Yes o No 
a. 
houb" If the answer is "Yes" my wages per moRY are: $ • 'bD 
b. If the answer is "No" list last date of employment and salary: 
$_--
2. I have received money from the following sources within the last 12 months: 
0 business, profession or other self employment $ 
0 rent payments, interest or dividends $ 
0 pensions, annuities or life insurance payments $ 
0 gifts or inheritances $ 
0 other sources $ 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 2 tql1~ 
3. The real and personal property I own is: None. 
4. I have a savings account: DYes ~o $ 
5. 1 have a checking account: DYes ~No $ 
6. Balance in inmate trust account $5~.12 
7. Spouse's income $ 
8. Affiant's dependents : 
9. Affiant's debts: 
---------------------------------------------
10. Affiant's monthly expenses: _________________________________ _ 
11. Attached is a copy of my inmate account reflecting the activity of my account 
over the period of my incarceration or for the past twelve (12) months, whichever is less. Said 
copy has been celiified by the custodian of said account. 
Further, your Affiant states that I am unable to pay the costs of pursuing this action. I 
verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct. 
DATED this~ day of \\A 0 U , ,20_ 
&wilim.&~ ffiant 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 3[q45 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this q~day of--..l-H4-hJ..-..q ___ ' 20~. 
\ 
111 ~~OA)~LbKJ 
Notiry Public for IdaJ1(;'" 
Commission Expires: Nru . It 1 2D\~ 
~ERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /(p day of mlft , 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT upon the parties below as follows: 
Sarah Johnson 
c/o Pocatello Womens Correctional Center 
1451 Fore Road 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Ste. 100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 N. Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703-69103 
The Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT - Page 4 [q414· 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/09/2011 = 
Doc No: 77613 Name: JOHNSON, SARAH MARIE 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
PWCC/UNIT5 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-4 
Transaction Dates: 05/01/2010-05/09/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.69 1195.65 1250.71 55.75 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
---------- ------------- ------------- -
----------
---------- -----------
05/04/2010 HQ0498033-014 011-RCPT MO/CC 175.00 175.69 
05/07/2010 PW0498944-017 072-METER MAIL 65279 0.88DB 174.81 
05/11/2010 PW0499409-139 099-COMM SPL 158.40DB 16.41 
05/11/2010 PW0499409-140 099-COMM SPL 3.95DB 12.46 
05/18/2010 PW0500195-130 099-COMM SPL 5.83DB 6.63 
05/18/2010 PW0500195-131 099-COMM SPL 2.48DB 4.15 
06/01/2010 PW0501526-113 099-COMM SPL 3.71DB 0.44 
06/07/2010 PW0502412-004 223-IMF PAYROL MAY PAY 2.20 2.64 
06/07/2010 HQ0502431-011 011-RCPT MO/CC 50.00 52.64 
06/08/2010 PW0502501-123 099-COMM SPL 42.51DB 10.13 
06/08/2010 PW0502501-124 099-COMM SPL 5.00DB 5.13 
06/14/2010 PW0503375-025 071-MED CO-PAY 349717 2.00DB 3.13 
06/29/2010 PW0504940-105 099-COMM SPL 2.49DB 0.64 
07/06/2010 HQ0505608-003 011-RCPT MO/CC RTCP MO 60.00 60.64 
07/06/2010 PW0505745-007 223-IMF PAYROL JUN U3JNTR 3.00 63.64 
07/13/2010 PW0506629-140 099-COMM SPL 39.78DB 23.86 
07/13/2010 PW0506629-141 099-COMM SPL 13.71DB 10.15 
07/20/2010 PW0507697 128 099-COMM SPL 7.83DB 2.32 
08/06/2010 PW0510077-014 223-IMF PAYROL JUL JANTR 2.60 4.92 
08/10/2010 PW0510299-138 099-COMM SPL 4.61DB 0.31 
08/13/2010 HQ0510747-016 011-RCPT MO/CC MAIL 60.00 60.31 
08/16/2010 PW0510960-124 099-COMM SPL 35.94DB 24.37 
08/17/2010 PW0511143-006 071-MED CO-PAY 394601 13.00DB 11.37 
08/31/2010 PW0512737-100 099-COMM SPL 8.66DB 2.71 
09/07/2010 PW0513802-016 223-IMF PAYROL AUG PAY 57.60 60.31 
09/08/2010 PW0513917-118 099-COMM SPL 41.23DB 19.08 
09/08/2010 PW0513917-119 099-COMM SPL 10.00DB 9.08 
09/14/2010 PW0514614-133 099 COMM SPL 8.49DB 0.59 
09/21/2010 HQ0515343-013 011 RCPT MO/CC MAIL 60.00 60.59 
09/21/2010 PW0515397-103 099-COMM SPL 38.74DB 21.85 
09/22/2010 PW0515660-004 071-MED CO-PAY 393775 8.00DB 13.85 
09/28/2010 PW0516157-109 099-COMM SPL 13.36DB 0.49 
10/06/2010 PW0517372-014 071-MED CO-PAY 394853 8.00DB 7.51DB 
10/07/2010 PW0517574-009 223-IMF PAY~.fPA:rE OF ~DOGTR 72.00 64.49 
10/12/2010 PW0518049-121 099- COMM S PIMaho Department of Correction 42 . 94 DB 21. 55 
10/12/2010 PW0518049-122 099 - COMM SPIy hereby certify that the foregoing is a fit'fl; t17e?~d 6.78 
1 0'/ 19 / 2 0 1 0 PW0518899-117 099 _ COMM S P10IT t'Cl copy of an instrument as the same tfuw 7r6RJfns 0.06 10/19/2010 HQ0519006-023 011 RCPT MO o<;;Yi Ie and of).tc~;a il!1@y office. 60 . 00 60.06 
11/01/2010 PW0520157-019 072 - METER ~HfNESS m? fi~3 ~ereto affixed this O. 9 5DB ~ 59.11 
day of \o4t~ A..D.,2oJ.i tqlt 
Bv Jtl.lS 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/09/2011 = 
Doc No: 77613 Name: JOHNSON, SARAH MARIE 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
PWCC/UNIT5 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-4 
Transaction Dates: 05/01/2010-05/09/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.69 1195.65 1250.71 55.75 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
11/02/2010 PW0520383-102 
11/03/2010 PW0520641-007 
11/08/2010 PW0521189-006 
11/09/2010 PW0521506-137 
11/09/2010 PW0521506-138 
11/16/2010 PW0522164-104 
11/19/2010 HQ0522754-009 
11/29/2010 PW0523405-006 
11/30/2010 PW0523675-004 
12/03/2010 PW0524193-010 
12/08/2010 HQ0525277-001 
12/29/2010 PW0527785-114 
12/29/2010 PW0527785-115 
12/30/2010 PW0527938-011 
01/05/2011 PW0528702-006 
01/06/2011 PW0528859-113 
01/06/2011 PW0528859-114 
01/10/2011 PW0529267-006 
01/11/2011 HQ0529382-002 
01/11/2011 PW0529432-019 
01/11/2011 PW0529443-006 
01/21/2011 HQ0530528-014 
01/25/2011 PW0530964-012 
01/27/2011 PW0531167-118 
02/07/2011 PW0532588-002 
02/08/2011 PW0532732-132 
02/15/2011 HQ0533369-020 
02/16/2011 PW0533597-117 
02/23/2011 PW0534319-110 
02/23/2011 PW0534319-111 
03/04/2011 PW0535468-003 
03/04/2011 PW0535483-042 
03/08/2011 PW0535903-004 
03/09/2011 PW0536063-121 
03/09/2011 PW0536063-122 
03/10/2011 HQ0536202-012 
03/16/2011 PW0536841-114 
03/16/2011 PW0536841-115 
03/29/2011 PW0538057-102 
099-COMM SPL 
223-IMF PAYROL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
072-METER MAIL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
223-IMF PAYROL 
061-CK INMATE 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
072-METER MAIL 
212-LAUNDRY 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
223-IMF PAYROL 
013-RCPT RDU 
071-MED CO-PAY 
323-FIX529267 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
071-MED CO-PAY 
OCT PAY 
405549 
MAIL 
71781 
404511 
NOV PAY 
71787 
71439 
DEC PAY 
DEC PAY 
RDU 
430359 
FIX529267 
MAIL 
428034 
46.19DB 
74.40 
8.00DB 
41.97DB 
10.00DB 
27.24DB 
60.00 
10.35DB 
8.00DB 
72.00 
30.00DB 
29.80DB 
33.82DB 
0.44DB 
1. 20 
17.33DB 
3.40DB 
1. 20 
0.88 
11.00DB 
1.20DB 
100.00 
8.00DB 
099-COMM SPL 22.59DB 
223-IMF PAYROL JAN PAY 17.60 
099-COMM SPL 10.11DB 
011-RCPT MO/CC RTCP MO 60.00 
099-COMM SPL 6.80DB 
099-COMM SPL 68.90DB 
099-COMM SPL 32.29DB 
223-IMF PAYROL FEB PAY 17.60 
223-IMF PAYROL FEB PAY 10.30 
071-MED CO-PAY 439714 8.00DB 
099 - COMM SPIsTATE OF IDAHO 16.4 9DB 
099-COMM SP~ ,10.00DB 
011-RCPT MO;;~o DepaT1iJil~t1fffCorrectlOn 60.00 
099 - COMM S PI! reby cert'tyffi,at the foregoing is a ~" ~!9ld 
099 - COMM S p~orrect .:opy of an ms~rument as the sam~l!9~9..~s 
099 - COMM S PT(:~ file and of record In my office, 15 . 78 DB 
,\VffNESS my hand hereto affixed this Qt-b 
day Of_",,!C7--:::O-'V\.II.-l..I.o!U4~q...1 --__ A.D., 20Ji 
Bv __ --LI .-=1A~ 
12.92 
87.32 
79.32 
37.35 
27.35 
0.11 
60.11 
49.76 
41. 76 
113.76 
83.76 
53.96 
20.14 
19.70 
20.90 
3.57 
0.17 
1. 37 
2.25 
8.75DB 
9.95DB 
90.05 
82.05 
59.46 
77.06 
66.95 
126.95 
120.15 
51. 25 
18.96 
36.56 
46.86 
38.86 
22.37 
12.37 
72.37 
43.25 
17.74 
1. 96 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/09/2011 = 
Doc No: 77613 Name: JOHNSON, SARAH MARIE 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
PWCC/UNIT5 PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-4 
Transaction Dates: 05/01/2010-05/09/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.69 1195.65 1250.71 55.75 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
Date Batch 
---------- -------------
04/06/2011 PW0539351-114 
04/07/2011 PW0539603-016 
04/07/2011 PW0539617-006 
04/08/2011 PW0539796-015 
04/12/2011 PW0540171-132 
04/12/2011 PW0540171-133 
04/20/2011 PW0541101-123 
04/21/2011 HQ0541185-016 
04/27/2011 PW0541673-115 
04/27/2011 PW0541741-002 
05/04/2011 PW0542588-100 
05/05/2011 PW0542842-013 
05/05/2011 PW0542858-005 
Description 
------------------
099-COMM SPL 
223-IMF PAYROL 
212-LAUNDRY 
071-MED CO-PAY 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
099-COMM SPL 
011-RCPT MO/CC 
099-COMM SPL 
071-MED CO-PAY 
099-COMM SPL 
223-IMF PAYROL 
223-IMF PAYROL 
Ref Doc 
MARCH PAY 
MARCH PAY 
436127 
MAIL 
436190 
APRIL PAY 
APRIL PAY 
STATE OF JDAHO 
Idaho Department of Correction 
Amount 
1.64DB 
13.18 
51.60 
3.00DB 
15.00DB 
31.59DB 
11.39DB 
60.00 
39.50DB 
3.00DB 
14.22DB 
11. 60 
36.75 
I hereby certify th.at the foregoing is a full, true, and 
correct copy of an Instrument as the same now remains 
on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand hereto affixed this a=t:>. 
day of 1<5 ,\',lOM ~~~~.I.4.Jif--__ A.D .. 20-4-
By ! ./v1)! 
c; J";;;' 
Balance 
0.32 
13.50 
65.10 
62.10 
47.10 
15.51 
4.12 
64.12 
24.62 
21.62 
7.40 
19.00 
55.75 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
P. O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0101 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
DOCKET NO. 38769-2011 
NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
JUN 0 6 2011 
Jo!ynn DfBg6, Cieri, District 
Court Bj8int~ County; Id.e!'!~ 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on this date I lodged a 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL of 1109 pages in the 
above-entitled appeal, with the Clerk of the District Court, 
County of BLAINE, in the Fifth Judicial District. 
E-Mail Deliveryto:sctfilings@idcourts.net. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 2011. 
. .. _I Digitally signed by Virginia Bailey 
VI rg I n la Bal ey ON:cn:::::VirginiaBalley,Q,ou, email..lJinnybailey@hotmail.com. c=us 
__________ 0".:2011.06.0216:27:46-06'00' 
Virginia M. Bailey, RPR, CSR No. 262 
Official Court Reporter 
Fifth Judicial District 
State of Idaho 
NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
I N D E X 
DATE OF HEARING 
October 1, 2009 - Status Conference 
April 30, 2010 - Motion for Summary Dismissal 
July 19, 2010 - Status Conference . 
November 8 , 2010 - Pretrial Conference 
December 7 , 2010 - Court Trial, Day 1 
December 8, 2010 - Court Trial, Day 2 
December 9, 2010 - Court Trial, Day 3 
December 10, 2010 - Court Trial, Day 4 
2 
PAGE 
7 
17 
96 
112 
142 
427 
663 
934 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Petitioner's Exhibits: 
1. Reporter's Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings lodged December 4, 
2003 
2. Transcript of Trial Proceedings on CD 
3. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn in Support of Post-Conviction Relief-NOT 
ADMITTED 
4. Photograph of Glen Aspen Drive diagram 
5. Photograph of murder weapon at scene 
6. Photograph of trash can at Johnson residence 
7. Photograph of removed rifle scope on guest bed at Johnson residence 
8. Photograph of cartridges from Winchester Super X Rifle 
9. Consuela Cedeno's phone records 
10. Jane Lopez's phone records 
11. Bruno Santos' application for travel document 
13. Transcript of police interview of Consuela Cedeno and Jane Lopez 
14. Affidavit of Mark Rader, Co-Counsel for Bob Pangburn-NOT 
ADMITTED 
15. Bobby E. Pangburn's Disciplinary Order from Idaho Supreme Court 
] 6. Attorney Roster Search, Bobby Eugene Pangburn-NOT ADMITTETJ 
EXHIBIT LIST, 
17. June 5,2009 Deposition of Bob Pangburn-NOT ADMITTED 
18. Orchid Cellmark Laboratory Report, Bates Nos. 10017-10021 
19. Blaine County Sheriff s Report 2/272009 identification of 
fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill, Bates Nos. 003PC thru 
0020PC 
20. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 0021-PC thru 0028-PC 
21. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 0029-PC thru 0092-PC 
22. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of 
Fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill with lab report, Bates Nos. 
00094PC thru 00106PC 
23. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 00108-PC thru 00123-PC 
24. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of 
Fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill, Bates Nos. 000124PC thru 
00125PC 
25. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 00126-PC thru 00132-PC 
26. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. 00133-PC thru 00139-PC 
27. Blaine County Sheriffs Office Case Supplemental Report 11/022009 
identification of fingerprints of Christopher Kevin Hill, with suspect 
written alibi statement, Bates Nos. 000 140PC thru 00141 C- NOT 
ADMITTED 
28. ISP Forensic Services Report, Bates Nos. unknown dates 1.27.09-
2.11.09-NOT ADMITTED 
31. Written statement of Julia Dupuis, Bates Nos. 000201-NOT 
ADMITTED 
EXHIBIT LIST 'a 
32. ISP Chain of Custody for last date 11125/03, Bates Nos. 005988 
33. ISP Forensic Services Latent Section case notes 11/25/03, Bates No. 
004550-NOT ADMITTED 
34. Transcript of interview with Bruno Santos held on September 3, 
2003, Bates Nos. 002861-002922 
35. Blaine County Sheriffs Department Report of Interview with Bruno 
Santos on September 2,2003. 
36. Transcript of taped telephone call Nikki Settle & Bruno Santos 
37. Police report of Carlos Ayala interview Bates Nos. 003087 
38. Resume of Robery J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert 
39. Latent Fingerprint Cards (without Bates stamps) 
40. Qwest telephone records 
Respondent's (State's) Exhibits: 
1002. AFIS printout dated 11129/2010 
EXHIBIT LIST :3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
Supreme Court No. 38769-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or 
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 
31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereun 0 set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this l day of ~ , 2011. 
JOL YNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
By ~ 
Andrea Logan, De uty Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
{ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SARAH M. JOHNSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------) 
Supreme Court No. 38769-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any 
Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Attorney General's Office 
Criminal Appeals 
Boise, Idaho 83703 P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant Attorney for Respondent 
IN WITNE%S WHEREOF, I hjt hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this day of ~ , 2011. 
JOL YNN DRAGE, Clerk of the District Court 
By ~ 
Andrea Logan, eputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-1 
